













Università degli Studi di Padova 
 
 Dipartimento di Studi Linguistici e Letterari  
Corso di Laurea Magistrale in  
Lingue e Letterature Europee e Americane 
Classe LM-37 
   Tesi di Laurea 
Relatore 




n° matr.1177963 / LMLLA 
 
The Body; or, A Contemporary Prometheus:  
a Posthumanist Reading of Mary Shelley's  
and Hanif Kureishi's Works 




CHAPTER 1 – THE POSTHUMAN BODY
1.1 - Bodies and Technology: From Impairment Correction to Body
Enhancement
11
1.2 - Redefining Identity in a Technology-Imbued Culture 23
CHAPTER 2 - A POSTHUMANIST READING OF FRANKENSTEIN; OR,
THE MODERN PROMETHEUS BY MARY SHELLEY
2.1 - Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley: the Motherhood Issues of a Rebellious
Woman
31
2.2 - «Man, how ignorant art thou in thy pride of wisdom!»; an introduction to
Frankenstein
37
2.3 - The Construction of the Monstrous Body in Frankenstein 47
CHAPTER 3 – A POSTHUMANIST READING OF THE BODY BY HANIF
KUREISHI
3.1 - Hanif Kureishi: the Colonial Legacies of a Western Man 61
3.2 - «All I want is to be rid of this, to get out of this meat»; an introduction to
The Body
68
3.3 - Ageing Issues and the Youth Myth: the Commodification of the Body 78
CHAPTER 4 – METAMORPHIC BODIES AND UNCANNY SELVES
4.1 - Venturing into Science Fiction: Hanif Kureishi's Homage to Mary Shelley 93








Even though the title of my thesis already gives away the main topics and themes that I 
have decided to connect and analyse in this work, I understand that it may appear intricate 
and possibly obscure for those who are not familiar with the texts that I have taken into 
consideration, or the approach I have adopted. For this reason, in the next few pages I am 
going to elucidate the ambiguous term “posthumanist” and the reasons why I believe this 
concept can be appropriate to provide a reading of the two texts whose titles have been 
dismembered, altered and re-assembled – all terms that seem particularly fitting to 
describe the works I have considered – to create the main title of my thesis; these texts, 
both of which I am particularly fond of, are Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel Frankenstein; or, 
the Modern Prometheus and Hanif Kureishi’s 2002 novella The Body. 
 The idea of developing my thesis around these two texts stemmed primarily from 
my interest for Hanif Kureishi’s literary production. It can be argued that most people are 
not familiar with this author's name, because even though his first novel The Buddha of 
Suburbia, published in 1990, made him gain reasonable popularity, the rest of his works 
have received moderate attention, and have been for the most part investigated within the 
field of post-colonial studies. Personally, I have been following Kureishi for the last few 
years and I have come to appreciate the honest, sometimes brutal approach he takes 
towards the account of everyday life’s tales. In particular, I find that the irony and sense 
of humour that are tightly intertwined in his stories work particularly well as to break the 
tension and drama that characterizes the lives of his (usually male) protagonists. Since 
his debut on the British literary scene, Kureishi has been exploring the lives of ordinary 
men who are faced with the insecurities, anxieties and struggles that their often-banal and 
pretty much always unsatisfactory lives force them to go through. However, even though 
the protagonist of The Body aptly fits this description, the text that I have decided to take 
into account for the development of my thesis stands out as an odd element in the list of 
novels, short-stories, play scripts and screenplays Kureishi has produced so far because 
of its peculiar nature: when I first approached The Body, I was immediately surprised to 
be faced with a novella that employs science fiction as the literary premise that propels 
the action. In fact, Kureishi has accustomed his readers with a realistic style, and even 
though experiments with the genres of the grotesque and magic-realism can be identified 
within his previous production, the fact of introducing an avant-garde biotechnological 
experiment at the core of his story can be considered a unique example among his works. 
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However, even though this novella can hardly be taken as a representative of his wide 
production, the style that characterizes Kureishi’s writing is clearly recognizable within 
this text as well: not only does the author make extensive use of the aforementioned irony 
and sense of humour as to break the tension of some pivotal scenes, but the fact that he 
interposes the action with a wide range of foul language and lewd remarks that 
characterize his works – and that, in my view, have the purpose of both shocking and 
amusing his readers, as well as adding some colour to the characters’ speech – undeniably 
marks this peculiar novella as a Kureishian text; and even though this was his first 
experiment with science fiction, I personally consider it a very well accomplished first 
attempt in a genre that until then had been alien to him – but that, to the present day, has 
not been followed by any other try. 
 As I have anticipated, what I want to propose in the next chapters is the 
comparison of Kureishi’s novella with one of the most famous texts in the British (but I 
would move so far as to say, in the world-wide) literary canon; a novel that, since it was 
published in 1818, has opened the way to a profusion of adaptations, re-writings and re-
readings of its text under a number of different perspectives, proving to be able to endure 
the passing of time without losing any of its attractiveness and relevance. The text I am 
referring to is Mary Shelley’s first and most famous novel, Frankenstein; or, the Modern 
Prometheus. I am aware that the idea of comparing two texts written almost two centuries 
apart from one another may seem quite odd, but what I would like to propose is that the 
two works (that are, in fact, quite different in terms of narrative style and, of course, 
characters’ lifestyles) can be argued to share a consistent number of literary features, as 
well as themes; and, as I am going to show later on, it can be argued that the social reasons 
that moved both authors to write their texts are quite similar. For these reasons, what I 
want to propose in my thesis is that in 2002 Hanif Kureishi offered his readers a 21st 
century re-writing of Mary Shelley’s most famous novel, with the purpose of making use 
of literature as to address the fields of science and technology and advance both a warning 
for his readers and a critique to those scientific experiments that thoughtlessly seem to be 
going too far; in fact, this was exactly what Mary Shelley aimed to do at the beginning of 
the 19th century when she published her Frankenstein. 
 In addition to this, the theoretical framework that I have decided to adopt when 
analysing and comparing the two texts is the one that has been developed around the 
discourse on the “posthuman”. Indeed, it is not a case that the science fiction genre is 
generally taken into consideration when a posthumanist approach is adopted to explore 
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literary texts: science fiction works have the power to create fictional settings that provide 
readers with alternative realities to the one they live in and make them reflect upon them. 
Of course, it may be argued that the fantasy genre uses this same premise too; however, 
fantasy stories generally deal with supernatural and magical elements to carry out the plot, 
and these features give fantasy authors the utmost freedom when imagining fictional 
scenarios for their characters, without putting their imagination under any kind of restraint. 
On the other hand, the genre of science fiction deals instead with scenarios and 
technologies that are either already existing, or that readers can perceive could actually 
be developed in a more-or-less near future, because the stories they tell are always based 
on technological premises that stem from scientific advancement. And even though it is 
true that some science fiction premises might still seem quite implausible in the current 
era (and, among these, it is possible to place Kureishi’s full-body transplant too), all the 
technologies they employ are still located within the realm of scientific theory and 
necessarily force the readers to meditate on the consequences of the technological change 
that the current age is characterized by. In this respect, science fiction can be considered 
a supplement to science, because the literary genre embraces scientific development, but 
it also reminds its readers that science has consequences that need to be dealt with and, 
envisioning abstract scenarios and concepts, it forces its readers to consider the legal, 
ethical and socio-economic implications of scientific endeavours that are often not 
explored by science. It can be argued that one of the reasons why the genre has gained 
increasing popularity in the last few decades is because science and technology are 
something that people who live in first-world countries in the twenty-first century are 
becoming increasingly familiar with and accepting towards, and this is exactly one of the 
aspects that the “posthuman” discourse aims to analyse: in recognizing that people’s lives 
are increasingly characterized by the presence of technological items, posthumanist 
thinkers have been asking themselves – among other things – in what ways machines, 
science and technologies are affecting contemporary lives, and they question whether 
scientific and technological advancements should be allowed to move forward in a steady 
impetus of continual advancement towards knowledge, or whether limits should be 
imposed to this trend. In an age when free information circulates on the web and virtually 
everybody can access it thanks to increasingly advanced and inexpensive portable devices, 
when social networks have developed new means of interaction between individuals and 
are changing the ways in which people conceive relation, and when progresses in the field 
of medicine make it possible for human bodies to be controlled, fixed and modified in 
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case of necessity (or even at will), posthumanism examines how the increasingly intricate 
relationships between biological bodies and technoscience are bringing about the 
necessity for a radical revaluation of human subjectivity, exploring the many ways in 
which technological innovations have changed (and keep doing so) the understanding of 
concepts like “normal”, “natural” and even what it means to be human in the modern era. 
In fact, nowadays most people who live in developed countries cannot imagine their lives 
as stripped of the aid provided by technological items, but they often overlook the fact 
that these are constantly changing the way they interact with the environment they live 
in, with the people they share that environment with and, no less importantly, the way 
they perceive themselves. This is exactly the point of departure of the posthumanist 
thinking, that proposes theoretical and analytical tools in order to understand and explain 
the impact of technology and science on the human subject. 
 At this point, it might be argued that using an approach that has been developed 
in the last few decades and that focuses on the changes occurring in the contemporary era 
might not seem appropriate to analyse a literary text like Frankenstein, that was written 
at the beginning of the 19th century. However, as I will argue in the second and, more in 
detail, in the fourth chapter of this thesis, Mary Shelley’s first and most famous novel is 
still relevant in contemporary discussions about science and technology as it was the first 
literary text written in an age when huge advances and innovations in the fields of science 
and technology were raising conflicting feelings towards these issues. In those 
circumstances, Shelley wrote her fictional narrative with the specific purpose of 
addressing these questions and advocating for a rational and sensible use of the new 
opportunities offered by those emerging fields of knowledge: stemming from the realm 
of science-fiction (and being, in fact, the first literary text ever written that can be 
legitimately labelled as such), her novel had the power of making readers reflect upon the 
dramatic changes that were occurring in real life because of science-fact. Indeed, it can 
be argued that one of the many reasons why Mary Shelley's text has well survived to the 
present day is because the kind of issues that one can clearly read in her novel are still at 
stake in the second decade of the 21st century. Nowadays, with the advancements of 
reproductive technologies, cloning, artificial intelligence, robotics and other scientific 
advancements that are often accused to be threatening the natural state of things, the name 
of Frankenstein (that, as a matter of fact, is most often erroneously attributed to the 
“monster” rather than to his creator) still often resonates as a threatening reminder – or 
anticipation – of what can happen when science oversteps its bounds, and two centuries 
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after its publication the novel can still give contemporary readers pause for thought. With 
the purpose of connecting the themes I have mentioned so far, I have decided to organise 
the development of my thesis in the following way: 
 In the first chapter, I have proposed a broad introduction to the cultural and 
philosophical discourses that have been developed in the last few decades and that have 
been collected under the umbrella term of “posthuman”. However, I think it is necessary 
to point out that what I have proposed cannot be taken as a thorough and complete 
investigation on the matter for at least two reasons: firstly, since this is a fairly recent 
discourse that started being developed in the late 20th century and that to the present day 
has not been examined in its entirety, I have tried to highlight the major issues and 
concerns that have been discussed so far in the field, but I have done so while being fully 
aware that it would take a much more elaborate work to provide an extensive and detailed 
account of the state-of-the-art on the matter. Secondly, on the same grounds it can be 
argued that, at the moment, there are a number of scholars working in different fields who 
are trying to provide their own, personal contribution towards the definition and analysis 
of what constitutes the posthuman state, tackling the issue from different points of view 
and with different approaches. As a consequence of this, a number of various (sometimes 
competing, or at least not perfectly-overlapping) models of posthumanism are currently 
in existence and, apparently, it is not even possible to identify a single, unambiguous 
definition for the term “posthuman” yet, as to embrace all the multiple facets of the issue. 
For these reasons, it is necessary for me to state that, even though different possible 
definitions of what “posthuman” and “posthumanism” (as a philosophical approach) 
represent today, the ones I refer to in this thesis are based primarily on the concepts 
developed by Donna Haraway and Katherine Hayles. In particular, the works published 
by Haraway in the 1980s and '90s aimed to dismantle the dualistic and anthropocentric 
vision that for many centuries the Western tradition had considered valid in order to 
analyse, categorize and interpret the world. Haraway proposed a rejection and 
reconfiguration of the values traditionally connected with the humanist subject, because 
she wanted to demonstrate how static or fixed theories of what it means to be human have 
harmed historically precarious subjects (women, non-white, queer and disabled people 
among others) by framing them as less-than-human. On her part, Hayles focused on the 
necessity to bring the question of embodiment back into the discourse of posthumanism: 
according to her, this was something that had been overlooked in early discussions on the 
posthuman, that focused more on the possibility of disentangling human consciousness 
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from the burden of the physical body and the possibility of transferring the former into a 
machine. Instead, Hayles strongly supported the view that the body one inhabits is a 
crucial element in the shaping of one's identity and thoughts and, as a consequence of this, 
since the publication of her works embodiment has been posited as a central tenet in 
contemporary posthumanism, which endorses the idea that human consciousness is tied 
to the human body and cannot exist apart from it. In their works, both Haraway and 
Hayles emphasise the disintegration of the liberal humanist subject as the core 
characteristic of posthumanism: for a long time, not only had that been assumed to be a 
rational, autonomous and unified being, but it tended to be identified as a European, white, 
able-bodied, and heterosexual male subject. Of course, it can be argued that this was quite 
a limited vision of humanity, but for a long time that was accepted as a standard of 
reference, contributing to the devaluation of all those subjects who did not fall within that 
frame. Nowadays, this limited vision can no longer be supported and, as the “post” prefix 
indicates, it seems appropriate to move beyond the static and fixed representation of 
humanity that had been provided by humanism. However, even though this is a central 
tenet in all the theories developed around the “posthuman”, I am aware of the fact that 
taking the works of Haraway and Hayles as the main reference for the development of 
my thesis implies that the interpretation of the two literary texts that I have proposed 
cannot necessarily be the only valid one, and alternative interpretations based on the 
works of other posthumanist thinkers would be plausible as well. 
 However, what I argue in my reading is that in both texts the creation of a post-
human character is carried out as a reaction to feelings of fear and anxiety connected with 
human corporeality: ageing, physical decay and death are features congenital to all human 
beings, but both Victor Frankenstein and Adam (the protagonist of Kureishi's novella) are 
unwilling to accept this fact, and they both resort to the means offered by science and 
technology to try and dominate natural life processes. As a consequence of this, both 
stories seem to be particularly suitable to be interpreted in a posthumanist light, because 
they both put at the centre of their narratives two subjects whose “birth” defies the natural 
process of sexual reproduction and whose bodies, created from the assemblage of 
different pieces, host two subjects who cannot be either defined as completely human or 
not human at all, and necessarily need to be labelled as posthuman. And if at first the two 
human protagonists apparently succeed in their objectives, cheating nature and gaining 
control over death and ageing, they are soon bound to learn that meddling with nature 
without considering in advance the possible negative outcomes of one’s actions is a high 
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risk and this does not, ultimately, provide them with the originally desired result. In 
addition, it can be argued that both texts help carry out the discourse on the posthuman in 
its two main aspects: on the one hand, developing fantasies of post-human embodiment 
that fit the “transhumanist” ambition of a future in which technoscience will allow human 
bodies to be augmented and enhanced, creating a better version of humanity in which 
issues such as physical fatigue, illness and even biological death will no longer be a 
problem; on the other hand, they both help investigating posthumanism as a philosophical 
discourse that aims to move away from traditional notions of identity and embodiment. 
These are the main reasons why I have considered it appropriate to employ these two 
science fiction texts as a way to explore the posthuman discourse in literature. 
 The second chapter of my thesis is devoted to the analysis of Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. In particular, in my reading of this literature classic I have decided to 
highlight and debunk a series of common, wrong assumptions regarding this novel and 
its author. In fact, not only did the fame of her first work overshadow any other text 
written by Shelley (so much so that today she is commonly considered a single-book 
author), but over the course of the last two centuries both the plot and the characters of 
her most famous novel have been deeply reworked and rehashed multiple times, as to 
adapt them to the increasing influence of different entertainment industries; in particular, 
it can be argued that theatre first and, in later years, even more so the film industry have 
appropriated Shelley's work and, in order to make it more appealing for their audiences, 
have deeply altered and distorted her original idea, creating a parallel version of the story 
that hardly matches the novel but that has gained extraordinary fame and widespread 
acceptance in popular culture, with the result that, even though most people have never 
actually read the novel, they erroneously believe they know the story and the characters 
of Frankenstein, because they have become acquainted with them by way of the novel's 
numerous cinematic adaptations. In spite of this, in its two centuries of life, Mary 
Shelley's novel has attracted the attention of a wide number of literary scholars, who have 
advanced numerous readings of the novel under the light of different cultural movements. 
Especially in the late decades of the twentieth century, with the rise of feminism, post-
colonial, queer, and disability studies, the novel has been analysed and reappraised with 
the purpose of recovering and empowering the figure of the “monster”, that for way too 
long a time was considered to have been abused and mistreated. In fact, even though 
popular narrations connected with the story tend to depict the evil monster as the cause 
of his innocent creator's problems, Shelley's novel tells a whole different story. For this 
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reason, the fictional figure of Frankenstein's creature (this, a much more neutral term, 
which also carries in its etymology the idea of creation, and therefore that of a newborn 
who needs to be looked after during the first stages of its life) was taken as an example 
of the outcast social minorities whose voices had been constantly silenced throughout 
history, leaving them out from public engagement, and whose lives had been therefore 
valued as less worthy to be lived. In fact, this imposed social silence, along with the 
continual rejection that the creature is subjected to throughout the novel, is what ignites 
the creature's frustration and anger and what sparks his conversion into a murderous 
monster; Mary Shelley's ethical message was that once the unfamiliar is forcibly 
described as monstrous and denied a voice, bringing about and perpetrating injustice, 
racism, sexism, and prejudice, one literally creates the evil. 
 In the third chapter of my thesis I have developed my reading of Hanif Kureishi's 
The Body. It can be argued that the feelings of being rejected by society and being cast in 
a state of otherness – that, as I have just highlighted, characterize the creature's story in 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein – are something that Hanif Kureishi himself experienced 
early on in his life: being the son a Pakistani immigrant who married an English woman, 
Kureishi grew up in the still-predominantly-white society of the 1950s and '60s Britain. 
Back then, the country was undergoing a massive social revolution, that would later on 
bring about a whole redefinition of the values that constitute “Britishness” and, 
consequently, of those who can legitimately call themselves British. However, at the time 
not everyone was willing to accept this dramatic social change, and young Hanif 
experienced on his skin the racial discrimination that would later become one of the major 
themes of his first works. In fact, unlike Frankenstein's creature, Kureishi actually 
managed to find a way out of his imposed social silence: determined to find his legitimate 
place in the world, he used art as his means of expression, and the power of his words 
allowed him to finally make his voice heard, and liberated him from the burden of 
otherness. As I have anticipated, in 2002 the writer proposed for the first time a science-
fiction story in which the protagonist, a British writer in his mid-sixties, undergoes a full-
body transplant and has his brain transferred in the corpse of a handsome young man in 
his mid-twenties. In particular, the themes I have focused upon in my reading of The Body 
are the social reasons that propel the protagonist to willingly accept such a drastic turn in 
the events of his life. The novella is set in a society dominated by a youth-centred vision 
which is strongly supported by the consumeristic urges of the mass media industry, and 
that is easy to identify as a typical Western society of the beginning of the 21st century, in 
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which the increasing trend of depicting youth (which, as a social category, is the main 
target of advertising campaigns) as the ideal stage of life, and the only one worth to be 
lived, has deep effects on the psyche of those who receive that message, and brings to the 
internalization of negative attitudes about ageing and old age, undermining the confidence 
of older adults in their dealings with the physical and social world, and leading them to 
entertain lower expectations of themselves as agents. In fact, this is the reason why Adam, 
the protagonist of Kureishi’s novella, seems at first to be blessed by the rejuvenating 
process offered by the cutting-edge procedure, but both the fact that his new life 
necessarily requires inhabiting the body of a dead “donor”, and the fact that he is prone 
to discard his own body expecting that there will be no consequences, make him a 
negative character who is bound to get punished: the experiment he willingly accepts to 
take part in brings about the idea of a future society in which bodies will be considered 
as mere vehicles that can be discarded and replaced when no longer useful, and this also 
implies that new bodies will need to be made constantly available, eliminating the subject 
who inhabits that body to make room for a new one. Kureishi advances a dystopic vision 
of a future in which the wealthy and powerful will be able to keep on living to the 
detriment of the ‘dregs of society’, who will be exploited in new, inhumane ways. 
Moreover, the writer describes how Adam and the other body-buyers assume that their 
brain is the only repository of their identity, while their decaying physical bodies are not 
involved in the definition of personal identity. Instead, as the protagonist eventually 
comes to understand, the body’s role is not simply that of a brain’s receptacle, but it is a 
person’s interface with the outer world, which necessarily shapes that person’s view on 
the world surrounding him/her and, at the same time, determines how the world sees and 
evaluates that subject. In fact, this is the central proposition that I have taken into 
consideration in the analysis of both novels: the two creatures’ life experiences are 
fundamentally determined by the peculiar bodies they 'wear' and that (both in Kureishi's 
contemporary 21st century society, as well as in the 19th century one in which Shelley’s 
creature lives) are the first thing that people who meet them use to interpret how they are 
in terms of personality. On the one hand, Adam manages to escape from the apathetic life 
that he feels his old body had condemned him to, and after the surgery his new body 
becomes the enabling tool that rekindles the zest for life he had long set aside (before he 
realizes that he has willingly condemned himself to live in a foreign body and witness his 
old life as an external spectator). On the other hand, Frankenstein's creature's life is 
doomed to be spent in a state of imposed loneliness that cannot give him any hope for the 
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future: no matter how much he tries to prove his humanity through kind and benevolent 
deeds, it is only the “blind” readers who perceive that he is a good-natured and 
sympathetic being. All those who judge him using their eyes cannot overcome the 
terrifying and repulsive feelings that his monstrous body generates in them and assume 
that his outer aspect mirrors his personality. However, as distinct from Adam, the creature 
never asked to be brought to life, he never had the chance to choose his body, and he is 
repeatedly denied the only things he ever asked for: love and affection, especially on the 
part of the man who gave him life before remorselessly abandoning him. 
 Finally, in the fourth chapter of my thesis I have compared the two texts, 
highlighting a number of literary features that helped me to support my hypothesis that, 
when venturing into the genre of science fiction for the first time, Hanif Kureishi drew 
inspiration from the novel which is commonly assumed to be science fiction's 
foundational text, with the purpose of paying homage to Mary Shelley and providing a 
21st century version of her Frankenstein: in both text, the science fiction premise is the 
pretext that helps sparking the visionary gaze of the writers, who use literary fiction in 
order to speculate on the possible social consequences of what they see is happening 
around them, especially in terms of the scientific and technological innovations that are 
being developed around the time they write their works. Putting at the centre of their 
narrations two non-human characters that are also the narrators of their own stories, both 
authors question the stability of the concept of “human”, pushing their readers to consider 
whether the technologically-mediated lives of their not-fully-human characters should be 
granted the same kind of dignity and respect as any other human subject. This is the same 
kind of philosophical question that lies at the heart of posthumanism, that tries to de-
privilege the traditional hierarchical status of the humanist subject: indeed, even though 
posthumanism does not mean to reject the Western humanist traditions of the past, it 
proposes a re-conceptualization of identity and social relations that seems to be more 
appropriate to describe the lives and modes of relations of the (post-)humans who live in 
the 21st century. With this in mind, what both Shelley’s prescient novel and Kureishi’s 
(not too) futuristic novella seem to demand is an ethical development of science and 
technology that will not create further hierarchies and new subaltern classes among 
individuals but, in a hopeful and positive view of the future, will work towards the 




CHAPTER 1 – THE POSTHUMAN BODY 
 
1.1 - BODIES AND TECHNOLOGY: FROM IMPAIRMENT CORRECTION TO 
BODY ENHANCEMENT 
I am always looking for provocative titles that can help carry the theme of an 
exhibition beyond the insider art world and into the wider culture. During one 
of my morning runs, I came up with “Post Human”. It has been very 
interesting to see the term enter into language. 
Jeffrey Deitch1 
 
The relationship between bodies and technology is a much-debated and contested issue, 
a contemporary and on-going discourse that has served to “draw attention both to the 
limits of human body boundaries, and to the extension of the human body”. 2  The 
scientific and technological discoveries of the last few decades have been altering the 
traditional concept of how physical boundaries are perceived, since genetics, cybernetics 
and surgery are constantly manipulating the body, altering its perception and calling into 
question its traditional biological principles. 
This period of redefining the human condition as distinct from other entities 
is not limited to any specific technology. It encompasses biotechnologies, but 
also includes such innovations as artificial intelligence, life extension and 
genetic or nanotechological engineering. Yet, the symbiosis of the organic and 
machinic takes place in its most extreme form through the merging of humans 
with medical technology, allowing the transplantation of limbs, and the 
reconstructing of life, which utilises technology and biology.3 
In the same way, technologies have been affecting the way people relate with the 
environment they live in, as well as how they conceive relationships with other fellow 
humans. In the light of these evolutions, artists and scholars working in different fields 
have then started questioning traditional concepts, like the relationship between 
embodiment and identity and, to a greater extent, they have begun to work towards a 
redefinition of what it means to be “human” in the contemporary age. The quote at the 
beginning of this chapter was drawn from an interview with Jeffrey Deitch, the curator of 
the renowned 1992 exhibition “Post Human” in which, for the first time, artists working 
                                               
1 “Exhibition Histories: Jeffrey Deitch on 'Post Human' in 1992/93”. Available from:   
      https://www.spikeartmagazine.com/en/articles/exhibition-histories-0 [Last accessed on March 1, 2020] 
2 M. Fraser, M. Greco (2005), “Introduction”. In M. Fraser, M. Greco (eds.), The Body: A Reader, London: 
Routledge, pp. 1-42, p. 5. 
3 A. Miah (2008), “A Critical History of Posthumanism”. In B. Gordijn, R. Chadwick (eds.), Medical 
Enhancement and Posthumanity, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 71-94, p. 88. 
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in different fields tried to express through their works the cultural mutations that they 
perceived were occurring in the changing society that surrounded them: contemporary 
artists were the first to give thought to the radical alterations humans are undergoing, 
claiming an increasing blurring of the boundaries traditionally separating the “natural” 
and the “artificial” and envisioning a future in which clear-cut distinctions between them 
would not be easy to identify. The reason why I have decided to use Deitch's words to 
tackle this question at the beginning of my thesis – instead of starting by quoting the many 
researchers who, in different fields, have been addressing the relationship between 
humans, science and machines – is because I think that an artist's point of view can be 
more relatable and easier to access in order to get a broad overview on the questions that 
I am going to deal with in the next few chapters. Deitch's arguments are then meant to be 
considered as an introduction to the many theories developed around the “posthuman”: 
When I presented “Post Human”, almost 25 years ago, I began the catalog 
essay by asking if we might be the last generation of real humans. Would the 
inevitable fusion of bioengineering, high-tech bodybuilding, plastic surgery, 
and artificial intelligence create the next stage of evolution while we 
watched?4 
Of course, in tracing the history of human evolution, it is impossible to ignore the 
relationship between human bodies and the use of more-or-less technological instruments: 
since the beginning of their existence, men (and Katherine Hayles noticed that the gender 
encoding implicit in “man” - rather than “human” - is reflected in the emphasis on tool 
usage as a traditional defining characteristic of male humans, rather than altruism or 
nurturing, that commonly encode the female5) started making use of whatever they could 
find in nature, be that simple wood branches, rocks or leaves, turning these into objects 
that could ease their everyday life and help them cope with the threats of the wild world 
surrounding them. Obviously, “the claim that man's unique nature was solely defined by 
tool use could not be sustained, because other animals were shown to use them too”.6 At 
this stage of human evolution, the idea of technology is far from how it is intended today; 
however, even though the first rough, mechanical tools were simply objects that could be 
picked up in case of necessity and put down at will, something foreign to the body and 
apart from it, they were starting to change the way humans perceived and experienced the 
                                               
4 “Exhibition Histories: Jeffrey Deitch on 'Post Human' in 1992/93”, cit.. 
5  N. K. Hayles (1999), How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and 
Informatics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 298. 
6 Idem, p. 34. 
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world around them. Anthropologists claim that, little by little, humans started using these 
rudimentary tools as “detachable extensions of the forelimbs”,7 gradually turning those 
foreign objects into something that may be defined as “prostheses” of their own biological 
bodies. Hayles also claims that the speed of this transition seems to have improved 
dramatically when humans switched from the position of “tool-users” to that of “tool-
makers”, actively shaping and crafting their tools and making them essential parts of their 
lives.8 
 Nowadays, scholars of the posthuman are said to be engaged in a broad project 
that aims “to continue the Enlightenment ideal of aspiring to bring about progress through 
the employment of technology (as knowledge)”. 9  In fact, according to them, 
posthumanism (and even more so its branch of transhumanism, that will be further 
analysed in the next few pages) has its roots in the Enlightenment, an age that put 
“emphasis on notions such as rationality, progress and optimism”:10 in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, belief in human progress through the development of human knowledge, and 
especially the sciences, started to spread throughout Europe; the application of science 
and technology to the human body was strongly supported by the Enlightenment thought, 
in which reason and scientific knowledge were promoted and that viewed the 
development of science and medicine as a way to correct (but also improve) the natural 
bodily functions: the idea that “humans themselves [could] be developed through the 
application of science”11 started to gain a foothold in that period and, especially with the 
purpose of “extending human life span by means of medical science”,12 this interference 
with the natural life cycle through medical intervention was not only accepted, but also 
encouraged, because the deeply-rooted faith in the use of science aimed “to achieve 
mastery over nature in order to improve the living condition of human beings”.13 
 In the 19th century, along with the scientific innovations that characterized the 
Industrial Revolution, that gave rise to an increased faith in technologies and marked an 
                                               
7 K. P. Oakley (1949), Man the Tool-Maker, London: Trustees of the British Museum, p. 1. Quoted in N. K. 
Hayles (1999), How We Became Posthuman, cit., p. 34. 
8 N. K. Hayles (1999), How We Became Posthuman, cit., p. 34. 
9 A. Miah (2008), “A Critical History of Posthumanism”, cit., p. 95. 
10  F. Ferrando (2013), “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New 
Materialisms: Differences and Relations”. Existenz, An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, 
Politics and the Arts, Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall 2013, pp. 26-32, p. 27. 
11 N. Bostrom (2011), “A History of Transhumanist Thought”. In M. Rectenwald, L. Carl (eds.), Academic 
Writing Across the Disciplines, New York: Pearson Longman, pp. 1-30, p. 3. 
12 Ibidem. 
13 Idem, p. 2. 
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improvement in life conditions (and a subsequent improvement in humans' life 
expectancy), the English naturalist Charles Darwin started developing his theories 
concerning the evolution of life. In his 1859 book On the Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection, or, The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life and in 
The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, published in 1871, he explored the 
concept of human development, giving a great contribution towards the understanding of 
human life and its evolutions. After the publication of Darwin’s theories, “it became 
increasingly plausible to view the current version of humanity not as the endpoint of 
evolution but rather as an early phase”.14 Darwin’s theory of natural selection was based 
on the criterion of a species’ adaptation to a given environment: according to him, through 
natural selection it would be possible to reach more fertile and healthier offspring, since 
those who could not adapt would become extinct. In the light of posthumanist thinking, 
it has been observed that, since the posthuman’s (and specifically the transhuman’s) main 
goal is to “overcome species-based limitations”, it can be claimed that this concept is 
“deeply rooted in the Darwinian understanding of evolutionary biology”,15 although it 
recognizes the necessity of scientific (and specifically biological and medical) means in 
order to reach a longer human life expectancy and the chance to have healthier and more 
fertile new generations: “although Darwin believed that it is speciation and selection that 
produce species, transhumanists seem to believe that through individual adaptation we 
may also arrive at the creation of a new species”,16 with the difference that, in this case, 
humans would have the chance to lead their own biological evolution. Moreover, one of 
the most radical aspects of Darwin’s work was the rejection of the anthropocentric view 
that characterized his age: “the insistence on a radical division between man and animals 
received a series of challenges in the 19th and 20th centuries, arising principally from the 
Darwinian revolution in the biological sciences” 17  and, “because of Darwin’s […] 
theories, we are [now] aware that humans were not created to be masters of all creatures 
but are themselves animals”.18 As I am going to argue more in detail the next few pages, 
                                               
14 Idem, p. 3. 
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in recent decades posthumanist thinkers have put this anti-anthropocentric stance at the 
base of the theories that they have developed around the definition of what constitutes the 
“posthuman subject”. 
 In fact, the first academic publications that systematically engaged with the idea 
of the “posthuman subject” and “posthumanism” as a cultural discourse appeared in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, even though it is recognized that the term was first used by 
the Arab American literary theorist Ihab Habib Hassan's in his 1977 essay Prometheus as 
Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?. Hassan expressed the notion as follows: 
At present, posthumanism may appear variously as a dubious neologism, the 
latest slogan, or simply another image of man’s recurrent self-hate. Yet 
posthumanism may also hint at a potential in our culture, hint at a tendency 
struggling to become more than a trend. [...] We need to understand that five 
hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end, as humanism 
transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call posthumanism.19 
This implies that the “posthuman” is a contemporary and on-going debate, a topic which 
is being developed right now and that is not easy to summarise in a single definition, 
because the many scholars engaged in this discourse (among them Rosi Braidotti, Elaine 
L. Graham, Katherine Hayles, Cary Wolfe and others) have different approaches to the 
matter and these result in a series of distinct schools of thought that are generally 
encompassed under the umbrella term of “Posthuman”.20 In general, it is possible to say 
that they all share the view that the old notion of human does not reflect anymore who we 
are in the 21st century, because technological improvements and their application in 
people's lives (and bodies) have reached a level that allows to go beyond what was 
historically portrayed as human. the idea of expanding the human life span, improving 
the biological structure of the human body, surpassing its limits and even the idea of 
reaching eternal life have always been major concerns of science and humanities, but 
recent discoveries in the fields of genetics, cybernetics and informatics among others, are 
now turning these science-fiction scenarios into reality. And even though for most people 
these topics still seem to belong to the realms of fiction and speculation, it is undoubtable 
that nowadays technology has leaked into practically every aspect of everyday life, 
considerably changing people's habits and means of relations. This is exactly what Deitch 
                                               
19 I. Hassan (1977), “Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?”. The Georgia Review, 
31.4, p. 843. Quoted in B. Clarke, M. Rossini (2017), The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the 
Posthuman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xi. 
20  F. Ferrando (2013), “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New 
Materialisms: Differences and Relations”, cit., p. 26. 
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was envisioning when he put together his exhibition at the beginning of the 1990s, 
gathering artists who worked in different fields that were joined by a common vision: that 
of an anthropological change about to occur in a close future, when everybody would be 
able to use technology not only to make their lives easier, but also to actively re-shape 
their bodies and, as a consequence, their own perception of self. 
 At this point, I would like to draw from R. L. Rutsky's observation that modern 
technologies seem to have always been judged according to their utility for human beings, 
generally attributing them a twofold judgement in terms of “goodness”: on the one hand, 
when they were “viewed as tools, instruments, or prostheses for human use, and thus 
under human control, they have largely been seen in positive, utopian terms”;21 on the 
other hand, when technologies have been viewed as not serving human ends, they have 
generally been interpreted as dystopian, monstrous forces, ready to prevail over humans 
and creating a vision of a future in which machines would cast them away, enslaving 
human beings or making them dispensable. Deitch also observed: 
I have been thinking about what will happen when self-driving cars eliminate 
the need for taxi and truck drivers. Interactive online lectures by entertaining 
star professors may wipe out the jobs of thousands of teachers. Computer 
scans connected to big data may provide better medical diagnoses than 
experienced doctors. Robotic factories might underprice skilled labor, 
throwing millions of people out of work, even in developing countries. Will 
governments be able to stop people from cloning their favorite sports and 
movie stars with stolen DNA? Even the genetically modified and 
electronically enhanced posthumans may have trouble finding jobs.22 
Of course, fears of technological change are nothing new: “traditional hand-knitters 
protested against the mechanical stocking frame as far back as the mid-eighteenth century, 
and the twentieth century saw automobile workers losing jobs to the machines on the 
assembly lines”.23 With reference to the issue of “good” and “bad” technologies that I 
have just brought up, I would like now to address the issue mentioned in the title of this 
chapter and the different ways in which science and technological advancements can be 
analysed in reference to their application to the human body. An analysis of the concepts 
of “impairment” and “enhancement”, in reference to the body, requires first and foremost 
the definition of their traditionally opposed categories: that of the “natural” and “normal”. 
                                               
21 R. L. Rutsky (2018), “Technological and Posthuman Zones”. Available from: 
http://criticalposthumanism.net/technological-and-posthuman-zones/ [Last accessed on March 1, 2020] 
22“ Exhibition Histories: Jeffrey Deitch on 'Post Human" in 1992/93', cit.. 
23 A. Tarr, D. R. White (2018) “Introduction”, cit., p. xi. 
 17 
These terms could be considered as the starting point from which the concepts of 
impairment and enhancement are constructed, departing from them in two completely 
opposed directions. 
 The concept of “normal” has a double function, both descriptive and evaluative, 
and these are already evident in the etymological roots of the world: in Latin, norma 
means a T-square, so that “normal” means that which is perpendicular, at right angles. 
From an extension of this definition, the “normal” comes to be socially defined as what 
is right and good.24 In the same way, the Greek-derived orthogonal is synonymous with 
the Latin normalis, and it provides the origin for the adjective “orthodox”: “[just] like the 
normal, the orthodox conforms to a set of sanctioned, valued standard”, and becomes in 
turn “the reference for objects or facts which have yet to be in a position to be called 
such”.25 This leads us to consider as devalued anything that falls outside or differs from 
the norm, “designating them as modes of being in need of correction”.26 The idea of 
normality is then connected with the concept of “normalisation”, meaning the correction 
of anything that falls outside the norm. 
 With concern to bodies, “the development of anatomo-clinical medicine and of 
physiology – the science of normal vital functions – were particularly important in 
inaugurating a secular rationality based on the normal/abnormal [...] distinction”.27 and 
this led to the fact that from the nineteenth century onward, the term “normal” was used 
to designate the state of organic health. Moreover, this normal/abnormal distinction 
gradually started replacing the one based on the notions of good and evil, and especially 
in reference to the good human nature we now say that “it is 'natural' for something to 
occur when we mean it is 'normal' - that is, regular, typical, and not deviant or 
pathological”.28 Once again, as a consequence of this, anything that falls outside the norm 
and cannot reach the standard functions of which are connected to “normality” is 
automatically labelled as bad and, as I have mentioned earlier, in need of correction. For 
this reason, both in the medical and in the social discourse, impairment and disability 
have been defined as deviations and lack of normalcy, and therefore have been relegated 
to a state of inferiority. Disability is therefore a “socially created” status, one that imposes 
on the condition of disability “not only the status of a body in need of medical treatment 
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but the social stigma inflicted on this condition, which is reflected both in the individual's 
experience and in the social perception of disability”.29 As Peter Freund explains in his 
Bodies, Disability and Spaces,30 this is immediately apparent in the norms regulating the 
built environment, which “reflect an assumption of able-bodiness as the norm of reference 
and, in so doing, simultaneously reinforce it as a superior social value”.31 Freund claims 
that the only possible way to relieve disabled people from the social stigma connected 
with their condition is to change the way the built environment is thought and planned, 
and this will lead even “normal” people to change the way they appraise it: an example 
of this is the fact that the more “architectural features catering for wheelchair users 
become ubiquitous, the more wheelchair users themselves are able to function ‘normally’, 
and indeed cease to be perceived and defined as individuals with ‘abnormal’ bodies”.32 
Therefore, since “characteristics of 'normalcy' give rise to the phenomenon of disability 
as devalued existence”,33 the main goal of technology in the medical field has been that 
of tackling the disabled and impaired body as to correct the malfunctioning of the organic 
body and take it back to a state of normal functioning. 
 Starting from this point, a further analysis has been conducted on the way in which 
these body-normalizing technologies affect the way the corrected body is perceived as a 
whole, and to what extent those “foreign objects” have gradually become an integral part 
of the organic body and, consequently, of the perceived self; for a long time, the question 
of body boundaries was considered to be a very matter-of fact and visual question: 
boundaries were assumed to be defined by the epidermal surface of the organic body, and 
any application of foreign objects onto (or into) the organic body was seen as a mere 
juxtaposition, since the merging of the two in a single unity was perceived as “unnatural”. 
In fact, this was one of the questions that Katherine Hayles wanted to tackle and reverse 
in her 1999 book How We Became Posthuman. In order to do this, Hayles reports an 
example provided by the English anthropologist and social scientist Gregory Bateson, 
who wanted to challenge the assumption that the human body's limits coincided with the 
skin. According to Hayles, Bateson asked his students a simple question: he wanted to 
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know whether an object like a blind man's cane could be considered part of the man:34 
“The question aimed to spark a mind-shift. Most of his students thought that human 
boundaries are naturally defined by epidermal surfaces”.35 Bateson's viewpoint was that 
cane and man joined “in a single system, for the cane funnels to the man essential 
information about his environment”.36 This conjecture was taken as a starting point by 
Katherine Hayles too, who provided further examples of everyday situations in which 
technologies are used to correct biological impairment and fully make experience of one's 
environment: in order to support her thesis she claims that “the same is true of a hearing 
aid for a deaf person or a voice synthesizer for someone with impaired speech”. However, 
she definitely moves a step further when she includes in this list “a helmet with a voice-
activated firing control for a fighter pilot”. 37  Her list, then, is meant to be utterly 
provocative, because she quickly moves from “modifications intended to compensate for 
deficiencies”, to “interventions designed to enhance normal functioning”, claiming that 
“once this splice is passed, establishing conceptual limits to the process becomes 
difficult”.38  Therefore, both Bateson and Hayles consider technological tools just as 
means to communicate with and acquire information from the environment surrounding 
the person using them, as bodily extensions whose function does not permit to mark a 
boundary line dividing user and tool, that become merged in a single operating unit. 
 In my view, Hayles' seamless joining together such different interventions of 
technologies on the human body can be purposefully used to move to the second issue I 
have determined to analyse in this chapter; namely, the use of technologies not to “fix” 
the impaired human body and bring it to a stage of normalcy, but to upgrade its functions 
in the perspective of departing from that normalcy, in order to reach a next stage of human 
evolution. This is exactly the question at the core of the Transhumanist thinking that, 
according to Ferrando “problematizes the current understanding of the human [...] 
through the possibilities inscribed within its possible biological and technological 
evolutions”.39 The word “transhumanism” appears to have been first used by Aldous 
Huxley’s brother, Julian Huxley, a distinguished biologist. In Religion Without Revelation 
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(1927), he wrote: 
The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just sporadically, an 
individual here in one way, an individual there in another way – but in its 
entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps 
transhumanism will serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself, by 
realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.40 
In essence, Transhumanism is born from the intention of transforming current human 
beings into an improved, better version of the species, enhancing the normal (which in 
this case is not meant as “better”, as in the case of impairments) physical and intellectual 
capacities of humans through technological and scientific applications. In 1998, an 
international group of authors crafted the Transhumanist Declaration,41 whose first two 
of the eight preambles state that: 
(1) Humanity stands to be profoundly affected by science and technology in 
the future. We envision the possibility of broadening human potential by 
overcoming aging, cognitive shortcomings, involuntary suffering, and our 
confinement to planet Earth. 
(2) We believe that humanity's potential is still mostly unrealized. There are 
possible scenarios that lead to wonderful and exceedingly worthwhile 
enhanced human conditions. 
Human enhancement is therefore the main focus and goal of the Transhumanist reflection, 
and it is something that is envisioned to be reached thanks to science and technology. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that Transhumanism considers science and 
technology in all of their possible variables: “not only those already existing, but also 
their emerging and speculative frames (from regenerative medicine to nanotechnology, 
radical life extension, mind uploading and cryonics, among other fields)”,42 anything that 
could allow humans to achieve a “more developed” state, transgressing their physical and 
intellectual limits. In fact, from the point of view of Transhumanism, the current era is 
still a middle passage in the history of human evolution, in that people cannot claim to be 
fully posthuman yet, but they are working towards this goal. 
 This idea that the current version of human evolution is not the final one, but rather 
an intermediate phase, allows me to go back to Darwin's concept of evolution, in which, 
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as I have stated before, the Transhumanist thinking is rooted. I would like to point out 
that discussions about the posthuman condition are not necessarily about human 
enhancement, because, as it was stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is not a 
single form of posthuman that can be identified as to portray an integral and unified 
history of the term, even though all the thinking on the concept revolves around the idea 
that the posthuman state defines an entity that surpasses the physical and intellectual 
capacities traditionally belonging to humans. In general, it is possible to say that 
posthumanist theories deal with the same relationship between species and their 
environment that Darwin used when he formulated his theories, in which “the 
classification of species and the survival of the fittest hypothesis reduced the complexity 
of life to neat and tidy relationships”.43 
Recently, [...] a new philosophical approach, posthumanism, [began] asserting 
that being human is not a fixed state but one always dynamic and evolving. 
Restrictive boundaries are no longer in play, and we do not define who we are 
by delineating what we are not (animal, machine, monster). [...] Instead, 
posthumanism looks at the ways our bodies, intelligence, and behavior 
connect and interact with the environment, technology, and other species.44 
In fact, a central proposition in the posthuman discourse is the acknowledgement of an 
anti-anthropocentric stance that aims to dismantle the idea that human beings are superior 
to all the other species they shares the environment with. As Ferrando expressed: 
In the West, the human has been historically posed in a hierarchical scale to 
the non-human realm. Such a symbolic structure, based on a human 
exceptionalism well depicted in the Great Chain of Being, has not only 
sustained the primacy of humans over non-human animals, but it has also 
(in)formed the human realm itself, with sexist, racist, classist, homophobic, 
and ethnocentric presumptions. In other words, not every human being has 
been considered as such: women, African-American descendants, gays and 
lesbians, differently-abled people, among others, have represented the margins 
to what would be considered human.45 
By the end of the 1990s, critical and cultural posthumanism developed into a more 
philosophically focused enquiry (now referred to as philosophical posthumanism), in a 
“comprehensive attempt to re-access each field of philosophical investigation through a 
newly gained awareness of the limits of previous anthropocentric and humanistic 
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assumptions”:46 in addition to the idea of bringing about a new, broader discourse to 
reconceptualize the “human”, the posthuman came to represent a new attitude against the 
systematic classification of the species that inhabit and cohabit on Earth, dethroning 
human beings from the high-standing position they have been located since the onset of 
the humanist thought. For this reason, posthumanism seems appropriate to investigate the 
geological time of the anthropocene, because 
as the anthropocene marks the extent of the impact of human activities on a 
planetary level, the posthuman focuses on de-centering the human from the 
primary focus of the discourse [and] stresses the urgency for humans to 
become aware of pertaining to an ecosystem which, when damaged, 
negatively affects the human condition as well . In such a framework, the 
human is not approached as an autonomous agent, but is located within an 
extensive system of relations.47 
This idea of de-centralising human beings in this system of relations goes beyond looking 
only at organic beings, and includes technological items too, like tools, prosthetics and 
other technological applications and bodily modifications that cooperate to dismantle the 
concept of human as a purely biological being: within the posthuman discourse, there is 
not an actual difference between human beings and the other biological species they share 
the planet with, but also between humans and inanimate items, tools and technologies in 
terms of their hierarchical position in the world, because they all influence and are 
influenced by one another in a system of mutual interaction. To conclude this first part, I 
would like to highlight that since anti-speciesism has become an integral aspect of the 
posthuman critical approach, the aforementioned “fear of technology” appears to be 
inconsistent, because the overcoming of humans' primacy does not imply that they will 
be replaced with other types of primacies, such as the one of the machines. In conclusion, 
by rejecting the traditional Western humanist ideals, posthumanism suggests a new 
understanding of the concept of “being human”, attributing major importance to the 
relationship between all the living and non-living entities that co-exist in nature: 
posthumanist scholars deny the traditional humanist definition of human as “boundaried, 
exclusive, unique, exceptional, or naturally dominant”.48 Instead, they claim that “Homo 
sapiens evolved because of interrelationships with other entities, organic and inorganic”49 
and, as I am going to analyse in the next few pages, this de-centralisation of humans 
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within the posthuman discourse has propelled a re-evaluation of human bodies, 
intelligence and behaviour – which are all considered to be interconnected with other 
species and the environment – in order to bring about a broader conception of how people 
conceive themselves and others. 
 
1.2 REDEFINING IDENTITY IN A TECHNOLOGY-IMBUED CULTURE 
The posthuman does not necessitate the obsolescence of the human [...] Rather 
it participates in re-distributions of difference and identity.50 
The rapidity of technological advancements that first-world countries have witnessed in 
recent years naturally leads to the idea that continued technological innovations will have 
even deeper effects on humanity in the next few decades because, as they permeate into 
people's lives to make them easier, the also seep into their bodies to fix them, or even 
make them more performative. As I have stated in the previous pages, humans have 
always used tools to survive and the development of technology in the medical field has 
simply accelerated and improved the integration of prosthetics onto (and into) biological 
human bodies: from the ordinary cane to lean on, to the evolution of glasses to improve 
vision and hearing aid to correct impaired hearing or loss of it, from the hook to replace 
a missing hand to the development of high-functionality prosthetic limbs. However, the 
rise of more-or-less technological machines to a state of necessary companions of people's 
lives has often raised concerns about the idea one can develop of themselves in relation 
to their bodies, in terms of body-boundaries, and in defining to what extent technology 
can influence and affect the definition of one's self. 
 The increasing “intrusion” of technology into many areas of everyday life since 
the 1990s, and even more so in the new millennium, has also led to an increased scholarly 
interest in posthumanism in the same period. Of course, being “human” has never been a 
fixed state: the concept has always been dynamic, and it is not surprising that it is still 
evolving. In fact, for more than six centuries the Western world has shared a set of values 
and beliefs that posited the liberal humanist subject – traditionally assumed to be a 
rational, autonomous, unified (but implicitly also white, male, able-bodied and 
heterosexual51) being – at the centre of our system of thinking the human. However, in 
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the contemporary age it seems necessary to recognize that this concept of “human” is no 
longer effective to describe and comprise all the multiple “manifestations of humanity”52 
that can be observed; and since these cannot be easily classified using the traditional 
categories that have been employed so far, theorists have started to lean on the label of 
“posthuman” (in which “post-” stands for “after” or “beyond”) as a more inclusive 
designation of the current – or soon-to-be – state of most subjects. The philosophers who 
have been analysing this new state propose that everyone has “multiple subjectivities that 
are in a constant state of construction”.53 As Victoria Flanagan summarizes: 
The key issues raised by posthumanism include: the relationship between 
embodiment and cognition; the independent and unified humanist subject 
versus the fragmented, destabilised and collective posthuman subject; and the 
significance of the cyborg, a figure that plays a pivotal role in posthuman 
ideology because of the way in which it subverts binary distinctions between 
human/machine and real/artificial.54 
In fact, the emblematic figure that has surged as a representative of the posthuman 
condition is the cyborg: in her 1985 Cyborg Manifesto (later revised and republished in 
1991), feminist scholar Donna Haraway introduced the “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” that is 
“simultaneously animal and machine” and “[populates] worlds ambiguously natural and 
crafted”.55 Haraway’s observations stemmed from her own experience of a woman living 
in the West; according to her, the Western culture has always been characterized by a 
series of binary oppositions like the “self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, 
civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, 
active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man”.56 Haraway claims that 
this need to label everything that surrounds us, from items to people, is based on the fact 
that those dualisms are never equally balanced, and they always signal the dominance of 
one element above the other. According to her, this is because once dualistic categories 
are created they are always functional to an organization of the opposed elements in a 
scale on the base of their value, and the passive acknowledgement of these dualisms 
signals an implicit acceptance of devaluation on one of the parts. In fact, Haraway 
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maintains that throughout history those dualisms have all been “systemic to the logics and 
practices of domination of women, people of colour, nature, workers, animals - in short, 
domination of all constituted as others, whose task is to mirror the self”.57 
 Haraway took the figure of the cyborg, that was born in the Science Fiction world, 
to represent the contemporary human condition: to her, not only does the cyborg break 
down clear-cut distinctions between organism and machine, but since it is also a race-less 
and sex-less “creature in a post-gender world”,58 it legitimises the fusion of parts that are 
not “naturally” meant to be together. In fact, the cyborg transgresses all the boundaries 
that are traditionally employed to interpret and categorize the world, because “[the] 
relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical 
domination, are at issue in the cyborg world”.59 
 According to Haraway, the idea that humans are the legitimate representatives of 
the ‘natural world’ is a cultural construction, in that “[modern] medicine is […] full of 
cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine, each conceived as coded devices, 
in an intimacy and with a power that was not generated in the history of sexuality”.60 The 
fact that nowadays technologies like the bypass, contact lenses and pacemakers are 
accepted as part of one's body, to the extent that some of them are vitally essential to some 
people's surviving, implies that “[by] the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, 
we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, 
we are cyborgs”. 61  And if one can easily accept to have their body moulded and 
supervised by these technologies, making them something that is not exclusively 
biological anymore, it is no longer possible to support the idea that the human body is the 
site of the ‘natural’ opposed to the ‘artificial’. Once this opposition is made void, it is 
possible to follow on by invalidating all the other dualisms that made up the Western 
culture, because Haraway's ‘cyborg myth’ is about “potent fusions, and dangerous 
possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political 
work”.62 Haraway concludes that: 
Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we 
have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is a dream not of a 
common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia. It is an imagination 
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of a feminist speaking in tongues to strike fear into the circuits of the 
supersavers of the new right. It means both building and destroying machines, 
identities, categories, relationships, space stories.63 
One of the goals associated with posthumanism is precisely “the philosophical 
exploration of the relationships between human beings and technology in the modern 
era”,64 and Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto was one of the texts that critical feminist 
Katherine Hayles, one of the most celebrated cultural posthumanists, took as a reference 
when she wrote her How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics, the text that brought posthumanism to broad international 
attention. Hayles draws from Haraway’s thinking when she asserts that: 
The flip side of the cyborg's violation of boundaries is what Haraway calls its 
"pleasurably tight coupling" between parts that are not supposed to touch. 
Mingling erotically charged violations with potent new fusions, the cyborg 
becomes the stage on which are performed contestations about the body 
boundaries that have often marked class, ethnic, and cultural differences. 
Especially when it operates in the realm of the Imaginary rather than through 
actual physical operations […], cybernetics intimates that body boundaries are 
up for grabs.65 
Hayles claims that cyborgs cannot be simply considered a “product of discourse” or a 
“technological practice”, because “manifesting itself as both technological object and 
discursive formation, it partakes of the power of the imagination as well as of the actuality 
of technology. Cyborgs actually exist”.66 In her view “About 10 percent of the current 
U.S. population are estimated to be cyborgs in the technical sense, including people with 
electronic pacemakers, artificial joints, drug-implant systems, implanted corneal lenses, 
and artificial skin”67 and since her book was published in 1999, it is reasonable to assume 
that today that percentage has increased dramatically. Moreover, “much higher percentage 
participates in occupations that make them into metaphoric cyborgs, including the 
computer keyboarder joined in a cybernetic circuit with the screen, the neurosurgeon 
guided by fiber-optic microscopy during an operation, and the adolescent game player in 
the local video-game arcade”.68 
 Since the publication of Hayles’ work, another issue has been brought to the centre 
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of discussion in critical posthumanism: that of embodiment. Since Cartesian cogito ergo 
sum had separated the mind from the body and had exalted the former over the latter, 
early cyberneticists had assumed that the two could be separated. Their assumption 
stemmed from the fact that, 
Identified with the rational mind, the liberal subject possessed a body but was 
not usually represented as being a body. Only because the body is not 
identified with the self is it possible to claim for the liberal subject its notorious 
universality, a claim that depends on erasing markers of bodily difference, 
including sex, race, and ethnicity.69 
Hayles took cybernetics to contest “[its] belief that such a separation is possible and that 
someday we will be able to upload a human consciousness into a machine or free it from 
physicality completely”.70 In fact, Hayles strongly rejects these assumptions, claiming 
that knowledge and information, in all their forms, are bound to some kind of physical 
form and, therefore, cannot exist without it. As a consequence of this, Hayles contends 
that human consciousness must be necessarily bound to the physical body that ‘contains’ 
it and, in the same way, “that physical self is embedded in a natural environment, not 
separate from that environment but part of it”.71 This is why Hayles cannot accept the 
idea of considering physical bodies just as natural protheses people are provided with at 
the moment of their birth, and that can therefore be replaced at one’s need (or will) without 
affecting who that subject is or how he/she perceives the world. 
 An analysis on this topic was carried out also by the French phenomenological 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who exploited the concepts of experience and 
perception in order to illustrate that “knowledge of one's own body and knowledge of the 
world can be accessed only through the body”.72 What he meant to propose was that there 
is a mutual influence in the way one experiences their own body and the way that body 
helps to shape the experience of the world. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty strongly contested the assumption that the body could be considered as a mere 
object, first and foremost because “I cannot get an outside perspective on my body, for it 
is the vehicle through which my perspective comes into being”.73 This means that our 
relationships with external objects, and with our own bodies too, are always partial: it can 
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be argued that the body is an omnipresent object that it is never possible to fully appraise, 
and that just like one's own body is always presented to that person from the same angle, 
“external objects too never turn one of their sides to me without hiding the rest”,74 but at 
least I can decide from which side to observe them. In other words, “I observe external 
objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, walk round them, but my body itself 
is a thing, which I do not observe: in order to do so, I should need the use of a second 
body which itself would not be observable”.75 Therefore, one's body cannot simply be 
considered a object like any other, because it is rather “the condition through which it is 
possible to have relations with objects, with, that is, the world”.76 And as a consequence 
of this, an individual's body cannot be considered an entity which is separate from the rest 
of the world, but it is rather the medium through which one experiences the world, and 
that world, in turn, contributes in the perception of one's own body: 
If objects may never show me more that one of their facets, this is because I 
am myself in a certain place from which I seem them and others, which I 
cannot see. If nevertheless I believe in the existence of their hidden sides and 
equally in a world which embraces them all and co-exist with them, I do so 
insofar my body, always present for me, and yet involved with them in so 
many objective relationships, sustains their co-existence with it and 
communicates to them all the pulse of its duration. Thus the permanence of 
one's own body, if only classical psychology has analysed it, might have led it 
to the body no longer conceived as an object of the world, but as our means of 
communication with it, to the world no longer conceived as a collection of 
determinate objects, but as the horizon latent in all our experience and itself 
ever-present and anterior to every determinate thought.77 
Katherine Hayles took into account Merleau-Ponty's considerations on embodiment when 
she claimed that posthumanism offers a new way to refigure the body: “As I have 
repeatedly argued, human being is first of all embodied being, and the complexities of 
this embodiment mean that human awareness unfolds in ways very different from those 
of intelligence embodied in cybernetic machines”. 78  Even though embodiment is 
something shared by all human beings, each one experiences it in a different way, because 
it is a phenomenon strictly connected to each person's specific body and, consequently, 
to the experiences that that body takes him/her through. Hayles writes that “[e]mbodiment 
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is akin to articulation in that it is inherently performative, subject to individual enactments, 
and therefore always to some extent improvisational”79 as well as “enmeshed within the 
specifics of place, time, physiology, and culture”. 80  The fact that embodiment is 
contextual and necessarily connected with one’s experiences within their own body, leads 
her to conclude that it is not possible to considered people as mere walking machines: she 
strongly contests and, in a way, shatters the dream of the cyberneticists who worked 
towards the idea of seamlessly transferring human consciousness into a machine; Hayles 
claims that there is a part of our selves, that she defines as  “incorporated knowledge” that 
is embodied and that, even though one cannot be aware of it, “has the power to define the 
boundaries within which conscious thought takes place”.81 In short, Hayles final goal is 
to “put back into the picture the flesh that continues to be erased in contemporary 
discussions about cybernetic subjects”82 and her posthuman view is that: 
Humans may enter into symbiotic relationships with intelligent machines 
(already the case, for example, in computer-assisted surgery); they may be 
displaced by intelligent machines (already in effect, for example, at Japanese 
and American assembly plants that use robotic arms for labor); but there is a 
limit to how seamlessly humans can be articulated with intelligent machines, 
which remain distinctively different from humans in their embodiments.83 
For her, the posthuman does not mean the end of humanity, instead it offers resources for 
rethinking the articulation of humans with other life-forms, both biological and artificial, 
with whom people share the planet. As a consequence of this, 
While it seems inevitable that technoscience will change what it means to be 
human in the near future, this is not necessarily a cause for despair. It is 
imperative that we develop an ethically responsible model of embodied 
posthuman subjectivity which enlarges rather than decreases the range of 
bodies that matter.84 
Although I am aware that in this introduction to the thinking on the “posthuman” I might 
have oversimplified the concepts introduced and developed by many scholars in the last 
few decades, the purpose of this first part has been to provide a broad overview of the 
many and complex interconnections that organic bodies and technologies have been going 
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through in recent times, and that have been analysed in different ways by many branches 
of the posthumn, that often overlap and interact in multiple ways. After all, “posthumanist 
theory [...] is networked and communal, fluid and changeable, always becoming—a 
mirror image of the posthumanist self”.85 
 To conclude this first part, I would like to quote once again two personalities that 
have helped me to develop this introduction to the posthuman: the first one is Jeffrey 
Deitch, who, in his dystopic view of a post-human world where machines might threaten 
the stability and survival of humans, making them obsolete, states that “artists’ might end 
up as one of the only secure professions left”.86 In a different way, Katherine Hayles also 
uses the figure of the artist in her thinking of the posthuman. However, instead of seeing 
their profession as an ultimate means of salvation for the humans' usefulness, she 
acknowledges that “literary texts are not […] merely passive conduits. They actively 
shape what the technologies mean and what the scientific theories signify in cultural 
contexts”.87 Hayles sees art, and literature in particular, as a way to absorb technological 
innovations (and speculations) within our everyday lives, normalising them and helping 
us meditate on them. In turn, literature might be able to influence scientific theories too, 
creating mutual exchanges between such different fields. This is the kind of influence I 
am going to explore through the literary texts that will be analysed in the next few 
chapters: although they were written in different periods and in the light of scientific and 
technologic discoveries that cannot be compared, they both describe an attempt at 
surpassing the limits of humanity, and the distorted bodies created as a result of those 
experiments mark the lives of two posthuman subjects who find themselves in the middle 
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CHAPTER 2 – A POSTHUMANIST READING OF FRANKENSTEIN; 
OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS BY MARY SHELLEY 
 
2.1 - MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY: THE MOTHERHOOD ISSUES OF A 
REBELLIOUS WOMAN 
 
It is not singular that, as the daughter of two persons of distinguished literary celebrity, 
I should very early in life have thought of writing.88 
 
Since her birth on August 30, 1797, Mary Shelley's life and career would always be 
shaped and influenced by the social and political ideals of her parents, two personalities 
of “controversial writings and reputations”.89 Mary's parents were intellectual rebels who 
strongly believed in their “duty of engagement in public debate on all pertinent moral, 
social, and political issues as a means of contributing to the general welfare”:90 her father 
was the radical philosopher William Godwin, whose major work An Enquiry Concerning 
Political Justice (1793) raised criticism of all forms of political authority, earning him 
“the enmity of the Prime Minister and the praise of Samuel Taylor Coleridge”;91 her 
mother was Mary Wollstonecraft, a proto-feminist who analysed the question of gender 
roles and discrimination, defending women's rights in her work A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (1792). In 1783 Wollstonecraft had established a school at Newington 
Green with “the evident aim of using its income to create a self-sustaining community of 
women”.92 She wanted to challenge the traditional view that women were 'naturally' weak; 
instead, she claimed that “society systematically educated and conditioned them to be 
so”.93 Utterly unconventional for the time, Mary Wollstonecraft was already four months 
pregnant when she and Godwin married. The two were against the institution of marriage, 
but agreed to do so in order to give their child social respectability. Unfortunately, their 
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marriage lasted less than a year, because Wollstonecraft died in September 1797 from 
complications following the birth of her daughter. The story of her life was disclosed to 
the public when in 1789 Godwin published Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman. In writing this tribute, not only did Godwin “[politicize] 
Wollstonecraft’s arguments in favour of women’s rights to equality and self-
determination, but also conceptualized her as an agent of revolutionary social change”.94 
As Piré noticed, “[it] is not surprising, then, that Mary Shelley's life was very much an 
embodiment of the self-sufficiency and resourcefulness her mother urged upon 
women”.95 
 Having become his daughter's only caretaker, Godwin also committed to raise 
little Fanny Imlay, Wollstonecraft's illegitimate daughter, to whom he later gave the name 
Godwin. He also attempted to adopt many innovative child-care practices: since he 
strongly believed that education was the key to social change, he “sought to put his 
enlightened pedagogical theories into practice in raising his children”. 96  Mary was 
educated at home and, although she never received a formal education, she made great 
use of her father's extensive library. Godwin himself never worried about the effects of 
books on his intelligent daughter, who, “challenging the traditional roles of women in the 
nineteenth century, [...] enjoyed both reading and writing stories from an early age”.97 
Godwin’s library included his own books and Wollstonecraft's, along with “a wealth of 
literature, history, science, and philosophy in both French and English Enlightenment 
traditions”.98 At the same time, young Mary had access to the political, philosophical, 
scientific and literary conversations that Godwin conducted with his visitors: the Godwin 
household was visited by some of the most interesting and famous men and women of 
the day, and this “provided Mary Shelley with an unusually wide-ranging education, in 
which different forms of knowledge, scientific as well as literary, were equally available 
as intellectual and literary resources”.99 
 In 1814 Mary became acquainted with Percy Bysshe Shelley, who was a devoted 
student of her father, and the two began a relationship. He was still married to his first 
wife when he and sixteen-year-old Mary fled England together that same year. They 
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eloped to France accompanied by Jane Clairmont, the daughter of Godwin's second wife, 
Mary Jane Clairmont. Mary's travel book History of a Six Weeks’ Tour, published in 1817, 
recounts the continental tour she took with Shelley in 1814, along with the account of 
their 1816 summer spent near Geneva. 
 Mary's elopement with Percy Shelley alienated her from her father, who refused 
to speak to her for a few years. While traveling around Europe, the couple struggled 
financially; moreover, in 1815 they faced the loss of their first child, when Mary delivered 
a baby girl who only lived for a few days. Unfortunately, of the three other children Mary 
gave birth to in the following years, only one survived to adulthood. In 1822 Mary 
miscarried during her fifth pregnancy and nearly lost her life, and with the suicides of 
both Fanny Godwin and Percy's first wife, Harriet Shelley, death became a steady 
presence in Mary's life. After Harriet's death in 1816, Mary and Percy Shelley could 
finally get married and on the day of the wedding Mary and her father met for the first 
time since she had run away. 
 The couple spent six weeks of the summer of 1816 on Lake Geneva, where they 
made friends with Lord Byron and his physician, Dr. John Willam Polidori. Mary Shelley 
herself, in her Author's Introduction to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, recalled the 
events that led to the writing of her “hideous progeny”100 and explained how “[she], then 
a young girl, came to think of and to dilate upon so very hideous an idea”:101 since the 
cold and rainy weather “often confined [them] for days to the house”,102 the four guests 
of Villa Diodati used to spend their time reading German ghost stories. One evening they 
agreed to Byron's proposal that each should write a tale of the supernatural. In those days, 
Mary had been listening to “many and long […] conversations between Byron and 
Shelley”,103 who was fascinated by the most up-to-date scientific theories concerning 
“the nature of the principle of life”.104 Mary goes further in her account: 
I busied myself to think of a story – a story to rival those which had excited 
us to this task. One which would speak of the mysterious fears of our nature, 
and awaken thrilling horror – one to make the reader dread to look around, to 
curdle the blood, and quicken the beatings of the heart [...] I thought and 
pondered – vainly [...] “Have you thought of a story?” I was asked each 
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morning, and each morning I was forced to reply with a mortifying negative.105 
Finally, a reverie of waking dream in which she saw a “horrid thing [...] with yellow, 
watery, but speculative eyes”106 gave her the beginning of her story. Mary was excited 
about it, because she knew that “[w]hat terrified me will terrify others; and I need only 
describe the spectre which had haunted my midnight pillow”.107 The next day she could 
finally announce that she had thought of a story, which she began that very day with the 
words “It was on a dreary night of November”,108 which would later become the very 
famous incipit of chapter 5 of the first volume of Frankenstein, in which Victor succeeds 
in bringing his creation to life. 
 In the following months, Mary turned her ghost story into the novel she is best 
remembered for: in 1818, Frankenstein, or; the Modern Prometheus debuted as a new 
novel from an anonymous author. However, Mary Shelley dedicated the first edition “To 
William Godwin, Author of Political Justice, Caleb Williams, &c.”. According to Clermit, 
the absence of the author's name puzzled the first reviewers of Shelley's work, but this 
did not prevent the novel from receiving praise by personalities of the calibre of Sir Walter 
Scott, who, soon after the novel was published, 
declared that Frankenstein was a novel on the same plan as Godwin’s St. Leon: 
A Tale of the Sixteenth Century (1799), in which 'the author’s principal object 
[…] is less to produce an effect by means of the marvels of the narrations, than 
to open new trains and channels of thought.' He surmised that the author was 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, Godwin’s son-in-law.109 
In fact, since Percy wrote the introduction to the 1818 edition of the novel, many assumed 
that he had written the book, which immediately proved to be a huge success, gaining 
instant reputation. 
 In 1818, Mary and Percy Shelley decided to leave England forever and moved to 
Italy, successively taking up residence in different cities until they finally settled in Pisa, 
which became their more or less permanent home until 1822. In 1819 Mary finished her 
second novel, Mathilda; this book was never published during Mary Shelley's lifetime, 
because her father held back the publication “thinking its mixture of fact and fiction to be 
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mischievous”.110 During this period Mary was struggling with depression from the loss 
of her children: her little daughter Clara had died in Venice, then her son William died in 
Rome. However, there was soon a new birth in November 1819, that of Percy Florence 
Shelley, the only child who survived his mother. Shelley began writing her next novel, 
Valperga (originally The Life and Adventures of Castruccio, Prince of Lucca), in April 
1820, while in Florence, and was still working on it in Pisa that autumn. This novel shows 
Mary Shelley moving forward to embrace a larger conception of her role as novelist and 
thinker: “[in] reaching out to assimilate history and political analysis to the acute 
psychological portraiture of her first novel, she greatly enlarges the arena in which she is 
willing to engage a public”.111 In this novel, Mary Shelley subscribes herself on the title 
page as “the Author of Frankenstein”. According to Curran, Mary “[refuses] to accept the 
implicit gender limits that barred women from focusing upon public issues in their 
writing”, making herself “an embodiment of a feminist aspiration to equality that boldly 
reclaims Mary Wollstonecraft’s legacy for a new generation”.112 
 On 8 July 1822, death once again visited Mary, when Percy Shelley went offshore 
on a small boat and was drowned when a sudden storm broke. His body was recovered 
and “his friends burned it on the beach at Viareggio, in a characteristically romantic 
fashion”.113 Percy's sudden death left Mary in a psychological turmoil, but she soon 
committed herself to the immortalisation of her husband, devoting herself to writing his 
biography and publishing a definitive collection of his poems: in 1839, Mary finally 
supervised the publication of Shelley Poetical Works, with extensive biographical and 
critical annotations. 
 Made a widow at age 24, Mary Shelley worked hard to support herself and her 
son. She wrote several more articles, tales and novels: in 1826 Mary published The Last 
Man, which is considered to be her other remarkable novel; it describes “the 
extermination of the human race by plague in the twenty-first century and explores the 
ultimate desolation of the last man left on Earth”.114 This has often been interpreted as a 
reflection of Mary's own feeling of loneliness after Shelley's death. She also published 
The Fortunes of Perkin Warbeck: A Romance (1830), Lodore (1835) and Falkner (1837). 
                                               
110 L. Piré, op. cit., p. 6. 
111 S. Curran (2003), “Valperga”. In E. Schor (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mary Shelley, cit., pp. 
103-115, p. 114. 
112 Ibidem. 
113 L. Piré, op. cit., p. 7. 
114 Ibidem. 
 36 
Lynch claims that, after 1820, Mary “[forsook] the imaginary horrors of Frankenstein in 
favour of historical materials […] so as to ease her re-entry into the respectable sector of 
the literary field, from which the extravagance of her debut work […] had exiled her”.115 
Moreover, in 1831 the revised edition of Frankenstein was published. 
 In 1844 her son Percy Florence unexpectedly inherited his grandfather's fortune 
and title. Rich at last, Mary Shelley was able to live a life of some comfort and she stopped 
writing. She travelled widely through Europe in later years, but in 1848 she began to 
suffer the first symptoms of the brain tumour that eventually killed her. Mary Shelley died 
in London on February 1, 1851. After her death, her son Percy and daughter-in-law Jane 
had Mary Shelley’s parents exhumed from St. Pancras Cemetery in London, which had 
fallen into neglect over time, and had them reinterred beside Mary at the family’s tomb 
in St. Peter’s in Bournemouth. A memorial sculpture to Mary and Percy Shelley was 
commissioned by Percy Florence and installed at nearby Christchurch Priory. 
 It was roughly a century after her passing that one of her novels, Mathilda, was 
finally published in the 1950s. From the 1970s onwards, thanks to the rise of feminist 
movements that considered literature as “a manifestation of the dominant cultural 
ideologies operating invisibly in the society”,116 started a series of re-readings of the texts 
that constituted the literary canon of the Western countries. Among others, the figures of 
Mary Shelley and her Frankenstein were reappraised and given new interpretations; in 
particular, Hoeveler observes that feminist scholars who have adapted Foucault’s theories, 
have studied literary genres as species of “discourse systems” that control and 
dominate how women function in a society that prescribes how they appear 
and behave. Therefore, feminists and critics working in cultural studies have 
been interested in Frankenstein as a particularly potent discourse system, a 
manifestation of conflicted ideologies, working sometimes in league with its 
society’s repressive attitudes towards women and sometimes arguing against 
society’s negative stereotypes about the proper roles of mothers, daughters, 
servants, and friends.117 
The decade of the 1990s saw feminist readings expand to include the insights of post-
colonial theory, queer theory, cultural studies, and disability studies. The text of Mary 
Shelley's first and most famous novel has proved to be so open to new interpretations in 
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different cultural fields (Fred Botting noted that “Frankenstein is a product of criticism, 
not a work of literature”118) that, after two centuries from its publication, she is still 
celebrated as “a figure who survived all manner of upheaval, personal, political, and 
professional, to produce an oeuvre of bracing intelligence and wide cultural sweep”.119 
 
2.2 - «MAN, HOW IGNORANT ART THOU IN THY PRIDE OF WISDOM!»: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO FRANKENSTEIN 
 
Considered one of the world's most famous horror stories, as well as the very first science 
fiction novel ever written, Frankenstein was first published anonymously in three 
volumes in 1818, introduced by a preface written by Percy Shelly, without whose 
incitement, as Mary Shelley later recognised, the novel “would never have taken the form 
in which it was presented to the world”.120 The cultural impact that Frankenstein has had 
since its publication has been so relevant that, in popular imagination, Mary Shelley's first 
novel has overshadowed by far all her other publications; so much so that most people 
erroneously believe “that she is a one-book author”.121 The name of Frankenstein – that 
by those who have not read the book is often mistakenly associated not to the maker of 
the creature but to his “monster” – has proved to be so popular that several of its variations 
are now commonly used in everyday language, especially when people want to cast irony 
on man-made assembly of miscellaneous parts or criticize scientific endeavours that they 
consider “against-nature”; for instance, “[the] condemners of genetically modified meats 
and vegetables now refer to them as Frankenfoods” and “the debates concerning the 
morality of cloning or stem cell engineering constantly invoke the cautionary example of 
Frankenstein’s monster”.122 
 However, the majority of people have never actually read Mary Shelley's novel, 
and their knowledge of this story rests on the popularity of the so-called “Frankenstein 
myth”: if they were asked to briefly summarise the plot, they would probably describe it 
as the story of “a mad scientist [who] creates a living being out of dead human parts; it 
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then becomes incontrollable and wreaks havoc on the community”.123 Grave-robbing, 
murders and stitches covering the body of a greenish, zombie-like monster who walks 
with jerky movements and stretched-out arms are the typical mental pictures that come to 
the average person's mind when they think of Frankenstein. And if asked to describe any 
crucial scene in the plot, they would probably recall an over-excited Victor Frankenstein, 
standing next to the operating table along with some spectators, witnessing the first 
motions of the creature and shouting “It’s alive!”, an exclamation caught between horror 
and exultation. However, little do they know that the overdramatic atmosphere often 
connected with the story is, in fact, the result of the many theatrical and cinematic 
adaptations that followed the instant success of Mary Shelley's novel: its first stage 
version, Presumption, or the Fate of Frankenstein, dates back to 1823, and it was so 
successful that in the same year William Godwin rearranged the second edition of his 
daughter's novel in two volumes. 
 Even those who have actually read the novel usually approach it by way of its 
cinematic versions or their influence on popular culture, and are generally surprised by 
the quietness and subdued atmosphere that surrounds the novel in general, and the scene 
of the creature’s animation in particular: “[there] are no lightning bolts, no thunder, no 
celebratory ejaculation; it occurs silently, to the accompaniment of a sputtering candle 
and pattering rain”,124 witnessed only by Victor Frankenstein: “It was already one in the 
morning; the rain pattered dismally against the panes, and my candle was nearly burnt 
out, when, by the glimmer of the half-extinguished light, I saw the dull yellow eye of the 
creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs” (p. 55).125
 However, this scene, which is probably the best-known in the whole novel, is not 
the beginning of the story. In fact, another of its features which is unknown to those who 
have not read it, since it would be hard to render it on stage or screen, is the structure of 
the novel: using original technical skills, Mary Shelley adopted a multiple narrative mode, 
and her story is told from three different points of view, organised in “a series of 
concentric screens”:126 the first consists of a series of letters written from Russia by the 
British explorer Robert Walton to his sister Margaret Walton Saville (whose initials 
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M.W.S. are those Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin “coveted and gained when she married 
the widowed Percy Shelley on December 30, 1816”127), who lives in England. In his 
letters, captain Walton describes his dangerous expedition to discover the passage “to 
those countries, to reach which at present so many months are requisite” (p. 12) and his 
meeting with Victor Frankenstein. Robert Walton’s story of a failed journey of discovery 
mirrors Frankenstein’s narrative of overreaching ambition: the two men both dream of 
“the inestimable benefit which I shall confer on mankind to the last generation” (p. 12) 
and Shelley suggests the reader to take Frankenstein's story as a cautionary tale when he 
invites the explorer to “[l]earn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, 
how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge and how much happier that man who 
believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his 
nature will allow” (p. 51). The second point of view within the novel is Frankenstein's 
account of how he created a “monster” and then abandoned it on the very night when he 
brought it to life, and how his creation turned to murder and revenge, killing 
Frankenstein's little brother (and indirectly also Justine Moritz, who is accused of little 
William's murder and sentenced to death), his friend Clerval and his newly-wed wife 
Elizabeth. Finally, the central narrative is the story of the creature itself, who recounts his 
own adventures: “how he learned to talk, how he educated himself by studying the literary 
classics and how his attempts to enter human society by means of kind deeds were always 
repulsed by people horrified at his ugly appearance”.128 Mary Shelley presents several 
versions of the same tale, but the stories are told from different perspectives; one 
important effect of this structure is to slow down the narrative, allowing time for 
“extended meditations by both the creature and Frankenstein on the nature of morality, 
the responsibilities of God and parents, and the very principle of life itself”.129 Shelley 
explores in minute detail the “outsized, inhuman Romantic ambitions”130  shared by 
Frankenstein and Walton, and analyses their effects on the creature, who is given the 
chance to narrate his version; in fact, Mary Shelley’s most powerful critique occurs when 
she allows the creature to tell his own story: in contrast to Frankenstein’s “melodramatic 
outbursts, the creature’s measured eloquence reflects a Rousseauvian sensibility, 
tempered by Godwinian logic”.131 What strikes a first-time reader of the novel is that the 
                                               
127 Idem, p.12. 
128 L. Pirè, op. cit., p. 9. 
129 A. K. Mellor, op cit., p. 14. 
130 Ibidem. 
131 P. Clemit (2003), op. cit., p. 33. 
 40 
usual cinematographic representations of Shelley’s creature as an abnormal and 
degenerate monster generally deny him the possibility of expressing his own point of 
view. In fact, according to Schor, “[p]erhaps the most extraordinary undocumented theft 
of the twentieth century is cinema’s theft of the creature’s eloquent language, forcing him 
to speak through his body and through his actions”.132 On screen, the creature is generally 
represented as dumb, inarticulate and stammering, something which does not correspond 
at all with Shelley's original description: in the novel, the creature strongly desires to 
create a bond with the humans that he meets and he understands that even though his 
appearance is actually scary, he might be able to convince them of his good nature 
persuading them with his words and action. Indeed, he commits to studying the life habits 
and the language of the De Lacey's family and proves to be a good student when he 
realizes that his learning improves much faster than that of Safie's. He understands that 
the language they share works as a tool that identifies them as members of the same a 
community, and that they use it to communicate “their experience and feelings to one 
another by articulate sounds” (p. 112). In an effort to be accepted within that same 
community, he teaches himself to produce linguistic sounds: “My organs were indeed 
harsh, but supple; and although my voice was very unlike the soft music of their tones, 
yet I pronounced such words as I understood with tolerable ease” (p. 115). Of course, this 
self-education creates a paradox, “which is both logical (because there is no such a thing 
as a private language) and anthropological (because there is no human being outside of a 
human community)”133 but the creature, still unaware of his own origin and identity, 
hopes that this will be enough to assimilate with the kind humans he has met. Moreover, 
when he accidentally finds some books, he cherishes them and works hard towards their 
understanding. He retrieves a copy of Volney’s The Ruins; or, A Survey of the Revolutions 
of Empires, “a powerful Enlightenment critique of ancient and modern governments as 
tyrannical and supported by religious fraud [which] gives him insight into the mixed 
nature of humankind and into systematized social inequality”:134 “Was man, indeed, at 
once so powerful, so virtuous, and magnificent, yet so vicious and base? He appeared at 
one time a mere scion of the evil principle, and at others as all that can be conceived of 
noble and godlike [...] I heard of the division of property, of immense wealth and squalid 
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poverty; of rank, descent, and noble blood” (pp. 119-120). Moreover, the books that he 
finds by chance – Parallel Lives by Plutarch, Paradise Lost by John Milton, and The 
Sorrows of Young Werther by Goethe – “complement Volney’s historical overview by 
focusing on issues of individual morality at different stages of Western civilization”.135 
In particular, the creature’s reading of Paradise Lost as “a true history [...] of an 
omnipotent God warring with his creatures” (p. 129) leads him to read his own's life as a 
curse that his creator has cast on him, understanding Frankenstein as a tyrannical God 
who denied him full humanity: “I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. 
Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous” (p. 99). Throughout the book the creature 
often quotes Paradise Lost, because he identifies himself with Adam and his wretched 
destiny, and this finally propels him to confront his creator to demand him the creation of 
his female counterpart: 
I swear to you, by the earth which I inhabit, and by you who made me, that 
with the companion you bestow I will quit the neighbourhood of man, and 
dwell, as it may chance, in the most savage of places. My evil passions will 
have fled, for I shall meet with sympathy! my life will flow quietly away, and 
in my dying moments I shall not curse my maker. (p. 147) 
In fact, it is Frankenstein's refusal to create a second creature that eventually condemns 
him to his promethean fate: although the novel is commonly known with the sole name 
of the creator, Shelley originally published it with the subtitle The Modern Prometheus. 
The mythological figure of Prometheus does not appear within the novel, but Shelley 
makes reference to the legends which are traditionally associated with this character; 
namely, that he made man from clay and, in order to give life to his creation, he stole fire 
from the Gods and donated it to man, infusing him with knowledge. It goes without saying 
that Prometheus' actions triggered rage on the part of the Gods, that punished him for his 
transgression having him chained to a rock and sending an eagle (the symbol of Zeus) to 
eat his liver day after day, for eternity. In Mary Shelley's novel, Victor Frankenstein is 
cast as a Promethean figure because, in striving against human limitations, he commits 
himself to science with the ultimate goal of bringing benefit to mankind, and he eventually 
manages to do so when he succeeds in fulfilling “the romantic dream of creating life from 
inert matter”.136 Equally, captain Walton’s desire to conquer nature, to arrive where no 
other man has gone before and to open a passage through the polar ice, “is cognate with 
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Frankenstein’s Promethean attempt to steal the principle of life from nature”. 137 
Unfortunately, just like Prometheus, Frankenstein also will be punished for his 
transgression of the natural course of the events, and even though no eagles are involved 
in Shelley's narration, her Prometheus will be bound to suffering and solitude for the rest 
of his life too. 
 Through the work of Victor Frankenstein, a young student of natural philosophy 
– which, at the time the novel was written, used to be a general designation for the 
sciences – Mary Shelley mounts “a powerful critique of the early modern scientific 
revolution”,138 questioning the moral implications of a science taken beyond “normal” 
limits and exploring them with acute awareness of the dangers involved: according to 
Mellor, in Frankenstein Mary Shelley “turns a skeptical eye on the Enlightenment 
celebration of science and technology and, no less critically, on her husband, the 
Romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, and their friend, Lord Byron”. 139  Indeed, she 
narrates how it was after hearing Byron and her husband discussing experiments 
concerning “the principle of life” that she fell into the waking dream that gave her the 
idea for her horror story. In fact, the very novel that is assumed to have initiated the genre 
of Science Fiction, is developed around Victor Frankenstein's peculiar experiment, that 
scholars claim is based directly on the work of three men of science of the 18th century: 
Humphry Davy, the first President of the Royal Society of Science; Erasmus Darwin, 
author of The Botanic Garden, or, Loves of the Plants (1789, 1791); and Luigi Galvani, 
“the Italian scientist who attempted to prove that electricity was the life force by 
reanimating dead frogs with electrical charges”.140  From Erasmus Darwin, who first 
theorized the process of botanical and biological evolution through sexual selection, Mary 
Shelley “derived her belief that a good scientist attempts, not to alter the workings of 
nature, but rather to observe her processes closely in order to understand her”.141 In fact, 
this is exactly the opposite of what Victor Frankenstein does when he tries to create a 
“new species” rather than allowing one to evolve randomly through sexual selection, and 
Mary Shelley strongly criticized his attempt to mingle with nature, later punishing the 
scientist for his carelessness regarding the moral consequences of his actions. There is no 
doubt that, in writing her novel, Shelley was influenced by the scientific advancements 
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that were occurring at the beginning of the 19th century and that she must have known of: 
historical records of the time report that in December 1802, in London, Luigi Galvani’s 
nephew Giovanni Aldini attempted to restore to life a recently hanged criminal named 
Thomas Forster. Aldini’s experiment, widely reported in the British press, is most likely 
to be “the scientific prototype for Frankenstein’s attempt to reanimate a human corpse”142 
using the “spark of being” (p. 55) for “bestowing animation upon lifeless matter” (p. 50). 
In fact, even though Mary Shelley does not give any direct clue about her inspiration for 
the novel, in her Author’s Introduction she claims that “[p]erhaps a corpse would be 
reanimated – galvanism had given token of such things – perhaps the component parts of 
a creature might be manufactured, brought together and endued with vital warmth”.143 
The powerful concept of electrical current was a particularly potent motivator in 
Romantic awareness, and the exciting possibility of bringing back to life parts of a dead 
body by means of electricity was definitely a dream that the scientific spirit of the age 
must have embraced with enthusiasm. Anne K. Mellor’s critical biography, Mary Shelley: 
Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters, argues that Shelley criticizes the scientific 
discoveries and increasing technological advancements that were taking place in her own 
day, “advocating instead a more humane, sympathetic and nurturing use of science to 
improve human life”:144 through her novels, Shelley “charts how Nature, a specifically 
feminine power, avenges herself on Victor’s benighted – rational, objective, 
Enlightenment – masculinity”.145 The idea of a nature that fights back, in an attempt to 
reclaim its legitimate role of life-giver and nurturer, is particularly strong throughout the 
novel. 
 In this respect, Mary Shelley's personal experience is deeply rooted in 
Frankenstein, and many critics agree that the strongest themes in the novel are those 
connected to the experiences of birth and motherhood: only eighteen months before she 
started writing her horror story, Mary Shelley had given birth for the first time to a baby 
girl, whose premature death had produced a recurring dream that she recorded in her 
journal: “Dream that my little baby came to life again – that it had only been cold & that 
we rubbed it by the fire & it lived – I awake & find no baby”.146 A year later, Mary had 
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given birth to her second child, William. The fact that Mary gives this same name to 
Victor Frankenstein's younger brother, who is the creature's first innocent victim, may be 
related to her fear for the survival of her own son, who did, in fact, die when he was just 
a child. The same year, Mary also conceived her third child, Clara, and she would die in 
the following years too. It is undoubtable that, in those years, Mary Shelley shared many 
feelings typical of pregnant women and new mothers, like the fear for the survival of her 
own children, concern for her role as a parent as well as a strong hope for a healthy and 
happy life for her progeny. And it is from these concerns that the central theme of 
Frankenstein is traditionally considered to have been born: Victor Frankenstein is an 
example of a father whose total failure in taking responsibility for his parental role leads 
to dramatic consequences in the life of his child, as well as his own. From the very 
moment he gives life to his creature, “Frankenstein rejects him in disgust, fleeing from 
his smiling embrace, and completely abandoning him”.147 This is why the novel is said to 
show deep anxieties about Mary's own role as a mother. 
 Ellen Moers was one of the first critics to recognize that Frankenstein evolved out 
of Shelley’s own tragic experience “as a young, unwed mother of a baby who would live 
only a few weeks”.148  For Moers, Frankenstein is a “birth myth” that reveals the 
“revulsion against newborn life, and the drama of guilt, dread, and flight surrounding 
birth and its consequences”149 in which Mary Shelley expressed her own guilt not only 
for having failed to give a healthy son to her husband – in contrast with Percy Shelley's 
legal wife Harriet, who had given birth just a few months earlier – but also for having 
caused her own mother’s death. The novel’s focus on inadequate parenting is therefore a 
way in which Mary Shelley investigates and expresses her own anxieties, creating Victor 
Frankenstein as a fictional stand-in for her fears and expectations towards the parenting 
role she is afraid of, and burdening him with the role of the thoughtless creator and 
careless parent. In fact, young Frankenstein, over-excited by the scientific breakthrough 
he is going to accomplish, never bothers to ask himself whether the creature he is about 
to give life to would wish to be created or what his life will be like once it is born, and 
even after he manages to carry out his experiment he never once gives thought to what 
his own responsibilities toward his “child” might be. Instead, Frankenstein tries to justify 
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his negligence and selfishness by repeatedly depicting the creature as an innately 
malignant “devil,” “monster,” and “fiend”, just like a parent who wants to discharge the 
responsibility for their child's behaviour: he never tries to acknowledge the creature’s 
independent will and needs, and never tries to show him the sympathy the creature begs 
for, finally casting him as “the loneliest character in the English novel”.150 Only later on 
Frankenstein partially takes responsibility for his careless behaviour, when he depicts the 
creature as a projection of his own worst qualities: “I considered the being whom I had 
cast among mankind and endowed with the will and power to effect purposes of horror, 
such as the deed which he had now done, nearly in the light of my own vampire, my own 
spirit let loose from the grave, and forced to destroy all that was dear to me” (p. 75), and 
during his hallucinatory fever he eventually acknowledges his responsibility for the 
deaths of his dear ones. 
 The themes of parenthood and childbirth are so crucial in the development of 
Frankenstein, that the novel “has figured more importantly in the development of feminist 
literary theory than perhaps any other”:151 feminist scholars have analysed the text in 
terms of “natural as opposed to unnatural modes of production and reproduction”,152 
claiming that Frankenstein essentially shows what happens when a man tries to procreate 
without a woman, subverting the laws of biological reproduction: Victor Frankenstein’s 
purpose is precisely “to usurp from nature the female power of biological reproduction, 
to become a male womb”.153 
 Frankenstein's aversion towards natural reproduction is evident not only when he 
gives life to his creature without resorting to traditional biological means, but also when 
he brutally destroys the female creature, the “mate” that Victor had promised the creature 
in return for their exile from humanity. This is another key scene in the text for feminist 
critics, who claim that the fact that Victor first accepts to construct the body and only on 
a second thought – when contemplating the realities of sexuality, desire, and reproduction 
– he decides to rip that body apart, suggests that “the female body is for Victor infinitely 
more threatening and 'monstrous' than the creature’s male body”: 154  not only does 
Frankenstein fear that she might become a potential sexual partner for the creature, giving 
rise to a new species of monsters capable to overthrow and destroy humanity, but he is 
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especially afraid that she might develop a will of her own, just like the male creature did: 
she might become ten thousand times more malignant than her mate, and 
delight, for its own sake, in murder and wretchedness. He had sworn to quit 
the neighbourhood of man, and hide himself in deserts; but she had not; and 
she, who in all probability was to become a thinking and reasoning animal, 
might refuse to comply with a compact made before her creation. They might 
even hate each other; the creature who already lived loathed his own deformity, 
and might he not conceive a greater abhorrence for it when it came before his 
eyes in the female form? She also might turn with disgust from him to the 
superior beauty of man. (p. 165) 
In fact, the sexism that feminist readings of the novel highlight is also undeniable when 
the creature states that, due to the fact that they will be the only two specimen of this new 
breed, the female creature will have no other choice but to love him: since he is “alone, 
and miserable; man will not associate with me; but one as deformed and horrible as myself 
would not deny herself to me. My companion must be of the same species and have the 
same defects” (p. 144). This shows that the same unconcern for the creature's feeling that 
Victor Frankenstein had shown when he first attempted his scientific endeavour, is 
perpetrated by the creature himself when he claims a female as if it was his own right; the 
same pattern of selfishness and carelessness is carried on without any concern for the 
female creature's own willingness and right to self-determination. 
 If in popular culture the figure of Victor Frankenstein persists as the model of the 
“mad scientist” who explores forbidden matters in his search for knowledge, 
Frankenstein – the novel – is our culture’s “most penetrating literary analysis of the 
psychology of modern “scientific” man, of the dangers inherent in scientific research, and 
of the horrifying but predictable consequences of an uncontrolled technological 
exploitation of nature and the female”. 155  But Mary Shelley’s literary purposes are 
primarily ethical: she wants her readers to understand that their ways of seeing and 
interpreting the world, imposing meanings on that which we cannot fully understand, 
necessarily have moral consequences, and she urges the reader to acknowledge that 
Frankenstein's creation is not evil in itself, but has been made that way by circumstances. 
In the next few pages I am going to analyse the process that turns the love-seeking creature 
to violence and revenge – leading him to kill not only Victor’s brother William but also 
his bride Elizabeth and his best friend Clerval – and, through a series of monstrous action, 
actually turns him into a monster. 
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2.3 - THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MONSTROUS BODY IN FRANKENSTEIN 
Monsters have always defined the limits of community in Western 
imaginations. The Centaurs and Amazons of ancient Greece established the 
limits of the centred polls of the Greek male human by their disruption of 
marriage and boundary pollutions of the warrior with animality and woman. 
Unseparated twins and hermaphrodites were the confused human material in 
early modern France who grounded discourse on the natural and supernatural, 
medical and legal, portents and diseases -- all crucial to establishing modern 
identity.156 
So far, I have tried to avoid using the term “monster” to address Victor Frankenstein's 
creation, using it only when the context necessarily urged me to do so – for instance, in 
reference to the murders he commits throughout the novel. In fact, as I have claimed in 
the previous pages, even though the popular narrations connected with the creature are 
those of an uncontrollable murderer that massacres humans following an alleged instinct 
intrinsic in his evil nature, first-time readers of Mary Shelley's novel are immediately 
struck by the fact that the author recounts an utterly different story in her original text, 
and they are soon drawn to abandon the label of “monster” when describing the creature 
– this, a much more neutral term, which also carries in its etymology the idea of creation, 
and therefore that of a newborn who needs to be looked after during the first stages of its 
life (something that, in fact, does not occur in the novel, and that undeniably marks the 
creature's existence). 
 The title of this subchapter can be interpreted in a double way, and I have decided 
to purposefully exploit its ambiguousness in that it will allow me to analyse the fact that, 
throughout Mary Shelley's novel, the figure of the “monster” is constructed twice: once 
in the physical sense, through the scientific experiment carried out by Victor Frankenstein 
and, even more so, later on in the social sense too, when both his creator and the other 
human beings he meets during the first stages of his life reject him, confining him to a 
state of solitary monstrosity. 
 Victor Frankenstein's original purpose is quite ambiguous from the beginning, in 
that he both declares that he “began the creation of a human being” (p. 51), as well as 
stating that he wants to give life to “an animal as complete and wonderful as man” (p. 51). 
Apparently, he is not sure of the final result he is going to achieve in terms of the nature 
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of his creation, but with the purpose of “bestowing animation upon lifeless matter” (p. 50) 
he aims towards the perfection that, according to him, identifies human beings. In order 
to achieve that, Frankenstein collects limbs and organs of humans and animals alike to 
put together his creature, venturing into “vaults and charnel-houses” (p. 50) where he 
selects parts of dead bodies that he considers “beautiful”, eventually giving his creature 
long black hair, pearly white teeth and proportionate dimensions. This last feature, 
however, does not seem to grant the creature entrance in the human realm, because the 
creator, in order to facilitate his job, decides to create a being that is much bigger than the 
average human being. Once sewn together, the parts of dead bodies indeed give life to a 
living being but, surprised by the success of his own experiment, Frankenstein soon 
realizes that the creature's appearance does not correspond with the society's traditional 
view of a “normal” human body, and that all the features that he had selected as “perfect” 
and “beautiful” suddenly appear to him deformed: “now that I had finished, the beauty of 
the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart” (p. 55). The 
monster’s “unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too horrible for human eyes” (p. 98), 
and this is the main reason why the newborn creature is denied a chance of human 
subjectivity by his own father: his physical appearance clashes with the traditional vision 
of what a human being should look like, and from the very beginning of his life the 
creature is cast in a non-human state by the person who should have nurtured and taken 
care of him. In fact, even though he claimed that he “began the creation of a human being” 
(p. 51) Victor Frankenstein did not expect that “being” to have a mind of its own or 
develop a personality, and this is what allows him to abandon his creature without 
showing any kind of remorse. 
 As I have stated in the previous pages, while describing Victor Frankenstein's 
endeavours Mary Shelley does not want to criticize scientific advancement per se, but the 
reckless use of science and technology as a way to overthrow the natural course of things, 
and especially the scientist's carelessness towards the consequences of his actions: Victor 
is depicted as so dangerously self-absorbed and entitled that he behaves like a god-like 
figure when he states that “[l]ife and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should 
first break through and pour a torrent of light into our dark world. A new species would 
bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their 
being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should 
deserve theirs” (p. 52). Through his scientific experiments and researches, Frankenstein 
wants to bend nature to his own will, and he moves so far as to create life out of dead 
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matter, bringing into the world a new creature employing unnatural reproductive means. 
 The fact that Victor wants to employ his scientific and technological knowledge 
in order to “banish disease from the human frame and render man invulnerable to any but 
a violent death” (p. 38), makes it possible to consider Frankenstein as one of the first 
examples of novels that can be read in a posthumanist light. Of course, the idea of 
posthumanism was developed almost two centuries after Mary Shelley wrote her novel 
and the creature cannot be considered a technological product in the modern sense of the 
term, but the fact that he is a being created artificially by means of science, and that the 
ultimate technological advancements of his time are used by Victor Frankenstein in order 
to move beyond the natural boundaries of life, permits the development of a posthumanist 
reading of Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus. 
 However, before moving on to analyse further elements of the novel that make it 
possible to label it as a posthumanist work, I would like to tackle the second issue that I 
have mentioned at the beginning of this subchapter; namely, the social construction of the 
monstrous body. As I have stated in the previous pages, the survival of Frankenstein’s 
creature in film, myth, and literary criticism has opened the way for a profusion of new, 
constructive readings of Mary Shelley’s “monstrous” character. And whether these new 
readings have concerned post-colonial theory, queer theory, cultural studies or disability 
studies, they have all had the same goal: that of analysing the creature in terms of an 
outcast character, one that struggles in order to assert his own right to life, sympathy and 
affection but that is constructed as – and forced into the role of – a monster by the society 
that surrounds him. 
 With concern to post-colonial theory, Edward Said’s seminal study, Orientalism, 
aimed to analyse the ways in which Western racial stereotypes depicted and 
(mis)conceived the “Orient”, creating a vision of its inhabitants that was functional to 
their discrimination and marginalization. This text was a criticism to the presumption of 
Western superiority, and propelled the development of post-colonial theory, a field which 
has been used fruitfully to explore the complicated class, race, and gender issues raised 
by Frankenstein. In this field, Frankenstein’s creature has been interpreted within the 
“tradition in which the mixed-race person [is] often represented as an ambivalent creature 
torn between different cultures and loyalties, an outcast, a misfit, and a biological 
unnatural”.157 I also find that there is a strong parallel between the creature's entrance in 
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the human world and Franz Fanon's first experience as a black man in a white society: in 
his book Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon explains that he first acknowledged – and was 
made conscious of – the fact of his blackness when he was first subjected to the “white 
man's eyes”. In this sense, Fanon does not refer to an harmless gaze of curiosity, but a 
judgmental and criticizing one, whose specific goal was to make him feel self-conscious 
and subject him into a state of social inferiority, remarking his alleged difference on the 
basis of the colour of his skin: 
“Look, a Negro!” It was an external stimulus that flickered over me as I passed 
by. I made a tight smile. 
“Look, a Negro!” It was true, it amused me. 
“Look, a Negro!” The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my 
amusement. 
“Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!” Frightened! Frightened! Now they 
were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, 
but laughter had become impossible.158 
Since Fanon was a psychiatrist, the purpose of his work was to demonstrate the damaging 
effects of colonial racism; in particular, he claimed that colonialism prevented the 
colonized subjects from developing an independent sense of identity and this had negative 
effects on their psyche. According to Fanon, black people were stuck in the effort to 
assimilate with the white culture and, at the same time, negate their own black identity 
but, since this was practically impossible, they were eventually forced to internalize their 
alleged inferiority and see themselves as less-than-human. Of course, the sense of 
alienation that stemmed from this process had profound psychopathological 
repercussions on those subjects, bringing about mentally disturbed behaviours. In the 
same way, Frankenstein's creature is exiled from the social environment by means of the 
horrified gaze and scared remarks with which he is addressed by the humans he meets 
since the moment of his birth. It is his physical aspect that triggers fear and hatred towards 
him and confines him to a state of inferiority; Frankenstein himself declares that “His 
words had a strange effect upon me. I compassionated him and sometimes felt a wish to 
console him; but when I saw the filthy mass that moved and talked, my heart sickened 
and my feeling were altered to those of horror and hatred” (p. 147). 
 Interestingly, within the field of gender studies, the transgendered writer Susan 
Stryker has advanced a transgender reading of Frankenstein: in an autobiographical 
narrative, she compared the creature’s narrative within the novel with her own life 
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experiences. Stryker recounts the anger she has experienced because of her pain and 
rejection, and compared it to “the ostracism that Frankenstein’s monster felt in its enmity 
to the human race”.159 She also compared the reconstruction of her new female body to 
Frankenstein’s assembly of the creature's body, “noting that both operations bespeak the 
conservative attempt to stabilize gender in the service of heterosexism”.160 Hoeveler 
noticed that it is interesting to observe reference to physical “disfigurement” in a 
transgendered woman’s account of her bodily experience, and that this is a clear link to 
the disability-studies approaches that have been employed to analyse Shelley's novel. The 
purpose of disability studies, according to Simi Linton, “is to criticize the constricted, 
inaccurate, and inhumane concepts of disability that have dominated academic 
inquiry”,161 and in particular the notion that disability is primarily a medical category. As 
she explains: 
[T]he medicalization of disability casts human variation as deviance from the 
norm, as pathological condition, as deficit, and significantly, as an individual 
burden and personal tragedy. Society, in agreeing to assign medical meaning 
to disability, colludes to keep the issue within the purview of the medical 
establishment, to keep it a personal matter and “treat” the condition and the 
person with the condition rather than “treating” the social processes and 
policies that constrict disabled people’s lives. [Our goal] is the reinterpretation 
of disability as a political category and to the social changes that could follow 
such a shift. 162 
From this definition, it is possible to see how Frankenstein's creature “can easily be 
interpreted as “disabled” in a society that values external beauty […], conformity, and 
stable gender and class determinacy”.163 Although Frankenstein’s creature instinctively 
seeks society, he soon understands that he needs to hide from humans in order not to 
frighten them, and this is a hint that at the beginning of his life he does not have an evil 
nature at all. In fact, Mary Shelley describes his being cast in a state of “otherness” just 
like a black man in a predominantly-white society, a homosexual within a hetero-
normative one, or a “differently abled in a world of able, hostile, or indifferent 
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people”.164 The “otherness” of the creature, which is founded in its physical appearance 
and size, is “yet another manifestation of disability, a permanent physical condition that 
the subject can never alter”165 and the hostile responses that the monster experiences both 
from his creator and from society – those of rejection, fear and hatred – can all be 
compared to those described by other disabled writers or characters. 
 In this respect, I have found particularly interesting the reading of Frankenstein 
provided by Mark Mossman. Currently Associate Professor of English at Western Illinois 
University, USA, Mossman is a disabled man who used his own life experience to read 
Shelley's novel, showing how the challenges the creature goes through in the novel and 
his striving for acceptance do not differ from those a disabled person experiences in 
contemporary society: 
[W]hen I read Frankenstein for the first time [...] I read myself as the creature, 
as a body that has no place in the world, a body that, in its long twisting scars 
and attachable prosthetic limb, has the imprint of technology and modernist 
science written upon it, and seems, therefore, "unnatural." When I read of the 
creature being built, made from selected parts of dead bodies, I easily read it 
as an enactment that mirrored my own development as a person: artificial, 
"fashioned" limbs and transplanted organs create the creature, the daemon; 
such things also construct myself.166 
Mossman claims that when he first approached the text he felt “all of the resentment of 
the creature, the anger, the isolation, the loneliness. The creature was the ultimate victim 
of stereotyped oppression, of a disabling construction of 'ugliness'”.167 And just like Franz 
Fanon had been subjected to the “white man's eyes”, Mossman recalls the numerous times 
in which inquisitive eyes examined his body and made him feel self-conscious and 
vulnerable, triggering feeling of hatred not only towards those staring at him, but also 
towards himself: “I knew that making eye contact meant imprisonment, displacement, 
perhaps even failure. I knew how the process worked: eye contact would equate deep 
inscription, the aggressive internalization of abnormality and disability”.168 According to 
him, the reading of Frankenstein is particularly effective for those who are familiar with 
experiences of imposed powerlessness, because they can easily identify with Shelley's 
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hated and marginalized creature: “the novel demonstrates the power of cultural inscription, 
the way an individual comes to subjectivity through a series of aggressive cultural 
acts”.169 
 In fact, all the characters in the novel – with only two exceptions – believe that 
the creature's outer appearance is a valid index to his inner nature, assuming that the 
creature’s gigantic, yellow-skinned body reflects his monstrous and evil personality; 
indeed “the term 'monster' derives from the Latin term for a 'divine portent or warning' 
that is, a warning that only works when the brutish, ugly body is understood to signify 
evil”.170 As a consequence of this, the old man in the hut, the villagers, Felix, Safie, 
Agatha, even the innocent William Frankenstein, they all immediately interpret his 
physical appearance – and therefore is behaviour – as that of a “monster”. In this light, it 
is significative that the only character in the novel with whom the creature manages to 
have an unbiased conversation is the old, blind De Lacey. Apparently, Shelley seems to 
claim that blindness is a necessary element in order to put aside the prejudices connected 
to the physical appearance of the creature, and the fact that the only disabled human being 
in the novel is the one who accepts to listen to the creature's story and even proposes to 
help him is a crucial element: within the novel, the creature is repeatedly frustrated in his 
efforts to find an unprejudiced listener, but only the blind De Lacey actually accepts to 
listen to him and recognizes his “humanness”, because “I am blind and cannot judge of 
your countenance, but there is something in your words which persuades me that you are 
sincere. I am poor and an exile, but it will afford me true pleasure to be in any way 
serviceable to a human creature” (p. 134). Genuinely mistaking the creature for a human 
being, he is moved by his words, feels sympathy for him and for the first time he is the 
one who makes the creature feel that there is hope for him to be accepted and loved; 
nonetheless, this experience turns out to be a failure, because the creature's monstrous 
appearance eventually scares the able-sighted members of the De Lacey family at the time 
of their return. Later on, captain Walton meets the creature too; at first, because of the fact 
that he has already listened to Frankenstein's own recollection of the events, he feels anger 
and revulsion at the sight of the monstrous body, but at the same time – by closing his 
eyes – he manages to understand the creature’s suffering, and finally acknowledges his 
remorse for the death of his creator. Moreover, according to Mellor, “Shelley’s reader, 
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who listens to the creature’s voice as recorded in Walton’s letters, has a rare opportunity 
to judge the creature through the ear, not the eye”;171 in fact, the readers of the novel are 
as blind as the old De Lacey is, and they can actually give the creature a chance of 
understanding, accepting to listen to his story without any kind of visual prejudice. Indeed, 
Mossman suggests that “self-narrative is a tool used by the creature to gain self-
determinacy. […] Through self-narrative the creature can, to a point, re-make itself, re-
fashion and re-invent a new understanding of its self. With it story the creature tries to 
resist the disabling definition of “monster” and to write itself into rhetorical normalcy”.172 
Therefore, the narration of his life would be an effective way for the creature to escape 
from the confinement of monstrosity and this is precisely what prevents the readers from 
burdening him with such an oppressive label; however, throughout the novel he is almost 
never given this chance to tell his story, because no matter how often he attempts to create 
a bond with them, all the people he meets instantly run from his disfigured body in fear: 
“I had hardly placed my foot within the door before the children shrieked, and one of the 
women fainted. The whole village was roused; some fled, some attacked me, until, 
grievously bruised by stones and many other kinds of missile weapons, I escaped to the 
open country and fearfully took refuge in a low hovel” (p. 106). It is only the readers who 
can penetrate in the creature's mind and finally grant him the sympathy he longs for, 
because through the monster’s narrative they are taken “through his first sensory 
perceptions, through his strivings for language, through his ardent attentions to the De 
Laceys, through his inchoate desires, through his first self-conscious reflections (literal 
and figurative), through his interpretations of signs and later books, all the way to the 
coalescence of his attitudes and opinions”.173 This is the reason why it is normal, for a 
reader of the novel, to feel pity and understanding towards the creature, who is constantly 
rejected and despised by those who surround him; and although it is impossible to 
condone his acts of violence towards innocent people, any reader can easily acknowledge 
that he is forced into the role of the monster by the circumstances. Percy Bysshe Shelley 
himself, in a review of Frankenstein intended for the Examiner, wrote: “Treat a person 
ill, and he will become wicked [...] divide him, a social being, from society, and you 
impose upon him the irresistible obligations – malevolence and selfishness”.174 Shelley 
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seems to embrace the view that the creature's monstrosity is not a product of its creation, 
but a consequence of its lack of acceptance by other humans, who fail to embrace him. 
 However, apart from the constant rejection on the part of the society, the first 
traumatic event that triggers the creature's conversion into a monster takes place the very 
first night of his life, when he is despised and rejected by his own father and creator. 
Indeed, it is possible to acknowledge that all the monstrous acts that he performs 
throughout his life are not meant to hurt humanity in general, but they have the sole and 
specific purpose of taking revenge on Frankenstein alone, to try and make him understand 
the kind of evil solitude Victor has condemned him to because of his negligence. The 
readers can perceive a first hint of this in the scene of his first homicide, that of little 
William Frankenstein; although the scared child verbally abuses him: “Monster! Ugly 
wretch! You wish to eat me and tear me to pieces. You are an ogre” (p. 142), this does not 
trigger the creature's anger or prompts him to attack the kid; in fact, it is only when he 
finds out that the child is a relative of his careless creator that he resolves to start his 
diabolic plan of revenge: 
As I fixed my eyes on the child, I saw something glittering on his breast. I 
took it; it was a portrait of a most lovely woman. In spite of my malignity, it 
softened and attracted me. For a few moments I gazed with delight on her dark 
eyes, fringed by deep lashes, and her lovely lips; but presently my rage 
returned; I remembered that I was forever deprived of the delights that such 
beautiful creatures could bestow and that she whose resemblance I 
contemplated would, in regarding me, have changed that air of divine 
benignity to one expressive of disgust and affright. (p. 143) 
Mary Shelley tells her readers that the creature's murders are not the consequences of his 
evil nature but of Frankenstein’s rejection and despise: “At birth, the 'creature', like any 
other living creature, is 'benevolent'. It is ready to love and to be loved, to look at and to 
be looked at”.175  Instead, shocked by the uncanny appearance of his “child”, Victor 
deprives him of fatherly affection from the beginning of his life; and even though the 
creature then goes on looking for familiar affection, and he tries to be accepted into the 
De Lacey family, he is bound to remain alone: it is while he observes and learns from the 
family that he becomes aware of his own solitude, and eventually he has to resign himself 
to participate in their lives as an external observer when he realizes that they will never 
be able to welcome him as they did with Safie. And even when he asks for a female 
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companion, someone as deformed as he is and with whom he could identify and manage 
to begin his own family, he is once again deprived of affection by his creator and 
condemned to live as a solitary outcast whose life has no bonds and no purpose: “But 
where were my friends and relations? No father had watched my infant days, no mother 
had blessed me with smiles and caresses [...] I had never yet seen a being resembling me, 
or who claimed any intercourse with me. What was I?” (p. 121).  Even when, at the end 
of the novel, he manages to carry out the outmost form of revenge against Frankenstein, 
the death of his “father” leaves him with no recognition of purpose in his life: 
For while I destroyed his hopes, I did not satisfy my own desires. They were 
forever ardent and graving; still I desired love and fellowship, and I was still 
spurned. Was there no injustice in this? Am I to be thought the only criminal, 
when all human kind sinned against me? [...] I, the miserable and abandoned, 
am an abortion, to be spurned at, and kicked, and trampled on. Even now my 
blood boils at the recollection of this injustice. (p. 220) 
From the beginning of his life until the end of the story, the creature strives for social 
acceptance and sympathy, but no matter how hard he tries to integrate into human society, 
eventually he is forced to acknowledge that he will never manage to be accepted as an 
ordinary man. Even though he repeatedly proves to be good and altruistic – more than 
any other character in the novel – he is forced to recognize his own monstrosity as a 
consequence of his physical difference from ordinary people: 
I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers — their grace, beauty, and 
delicate complexions; but how was I terrified when I viewed myself in a 
transparent pool! At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I 
who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was 
in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of 
despondence and mortification. (p. 114) 
As I have claimed in the first chapter of this thesis, the construction of one's personality 
is necessarily bound to two elements: the body one is furnished with – both the “original” 
one we are given at the moment of birth and its subsequent transformations, additions and 
subtractions – and, as a consequence of it, the unique embodied experiences that each one 
develops throughout their lifetime. These are a direct consequence of the physical body, 
which is necessary to make experience of the world surrounding one, but also of the social 
interactions that one manages to carry out with other beings. The two elements are 
necessarily connected, and mutually influence each other. Unfortunately, the monstrous 
appearance of the creature's body prevents him from creating any kind of significant bond 
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with others: since his body is made from the combination of miscellaneous parts of 
lifeless animal and human bodies – and for this reason the final product cannot be defined 
either as fully human or non-human – he is a unique kind of hybrid being, a new species 
that is impossible to clearly identify using traditional labels, and that is automatically 
described as a monster by those who see him and try to categorize him: “Frankenstein is 
the story of a being who is at once both inside and outside society. It is outside, because 
no one recognizes it as a human being; it is inside because it confusedly feels that it is 
similar to human beings. From this liminal position, the creature looks at the human 
society with a strong and violent feeling of envy”.176 In fact, he feels he is different and 
ugly compared to the human beings that inhabit the world, and with reference to Victor's 
body he declares that “my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the very 
resemblance” (p. 130). Clearly, when he carried out the creation of this hybrid being, 
Victor violated the biological sexual selection intrinsic in the evolutionary process, and 
thus subverted the natural order of human reproduction, creating a being that is “human” 
in regard to his feelings and intelligence, but “non-human” in terms of his physical 
appearance: the very existence of this creature brings into question the (re-)definition of 
what a human being is. 
 It might be argued that, given the superior physical features he is provided with, 
Frankenstein has actually managed to create a being that pushes the “normal” boundaries 
of humanity: “I was not even of the same nature as man. I was more agile than they and 
could subsist upon coarser diet; I bore the extremes of heat and cold with less injury to 
my frame; my stature far exceeded theirs. When I looked around I saw and heard of none 
like me” (p. 120). And the superior features he is furnished with are not limited to his 
body: since he manages to learn how to speak and read properly in a few months, it can 
be argued that his mental capacities exceed those of a normal human being too. 
Apparently, it seems finally possible to answer once and for all the question that hunts 
Frankenstein's creature since the moment he develops his first thoughts; when he 
repeatedly asks “Who was I? What was I?” (p.128), there is a chance to finally provide 
him with an answer, because not only did Mary Shelley write what is commonly identified 
as the very first Science Fiction novel in the history of literature, but she also created one 
of the first characters that can be rightfully labelled as “posthuman”. Although 
Frankenstein's creature will always remain unnamed and it is not possible to define what 
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kind of “species” he belongs to, thus denying him a chance of subjectivity, in the light of 
the contemporary re-evaluations of what constitutes a human being we can finally provide 
him with some kind of reassuring label; a creature that was conceived in a laboratory, a 
product of science and technology applied to human flash, a hybrid individual whose 
nature does not permit to completely include him in the human species, whose physical 
and mental capacities surpass those of an ordinary human being: indeed, when he created 
his “monster”, Victor Frankenstein gave life to a being which, as Katherine Hayles stated, 
“does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals instead the end of a certain 
conception of the human”,177 and forces to broaden the range of species that are allowed 
to coexist on Earth. Although his hybrid, artificial, scary body does not conform to the 
beauty standards that conventionally identify human beings – and as a consequence of 
this he is identified as a “monster” – his belonging to a new species can finally cease to 
be considered a valid reason to cast him away from social relations: the post-
anthropocentric approach that posthumanism is founded upon, with its strong belief that 
the fact of belonging to the “human” realm does not grant people the right to be placed 
on top of the other species and cast them in a state of inferiority, seems to give 
Frankenstein's creature hope for acceptance. Of course, as I have argued before, we do 
not live in a fully posthuman world yet, but we are simply in a transient phase, and this 
implies that the re-creation of a similar subject (already an example of the posthuman 
from the biological perspective, but still a typical human subject from the psychological 
perspective) in our contemporary time would not automatically mean that it could be 
included and accepted within the human society: nowadays, a creature like Frankenstein's 
would probably still be treated just like a disabled person, having to face discrimination 
and fight against exclusion because of his body features. However, it would finally have 
the chance of making his voice heard, which is something that, in Mary Shelley's novel, 
seems to represent a possibility – though never accomplished – to access sympathy, 
acceptance, and a way out from the label of “monster”. 
 In conclusion, the reasons why Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, the Modern 
Prometheus continues to be read, appreciated and re-appraised two centuries after its first 
publication reside in the fact that the same themes Shelley considered of great interest at 
her time are still very much debated in our contemporary age: Frankenstein “stands as 
one of the classic representations of the fears and hopes engendered by humanity’s 
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harnessing of technological power, and the ambivalence occasioned by the prospect of 
artificial intelligence, genetic modification, stem-cell research, prosthetic surgery and 
other interventions”.178 Moreover, Mary Shelley’s depiction of Frankenstein's creature as 
an outcast subject, abandoned by his father and creator, “excite the reader’s sympathies 
and challenge the conventions which demarcate the ‘human’ from the nonhuman or 
inhuman, or the ‘natural’ from the ‘unnatural’”,179 providing a fruitful text to be analysed 
within the light of the developing posthuman movement. To conclude this chapter, I 
would like to quote a passage from Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman, which in my view shows how much of Wollstonecraft's legacy, her “faith in 
futurity and her hope that the light of reason might disentangle the worthwhile from the 
monstrous in new ideas”180 was imbued in her daughter's thinking: 
If the power of reflecting on the past, and darting the keen eye of 
contemplation into futurity, be the grand privilege of man, it must be granted 
that some people enjoy this prerogative in a very limited degree. Every thing 
new appears to them wrong; and not able to distinguish the possible from the 
monstrous, they fear where no fear should find a place, running from the light 
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CHAPTER 3 – A POSTHUMANIST READING OF THE BODY 
BY HANIF KUREISHI 
 
 
3.1 - HANIF KUREISHI: THE COLONIAL LEGACIES OF A WESTERN MAN 
 
Hanif Kureishi was born in Bromley, a South London suburb, in 1954. His mother was a 
middle-class English woman, while his father, who “harboured frustrated desires to 
become a writer”,182 came from a wealthy Indian upper-class family which had been 
displaced by the partition of India and Pakistan. Kureishi grew up experiencing on his 
skin the racial discrimination and cultural clashes that he later addressed in most of his 
early fiction: despite being born, raised and educated in England and claiming poor 
connections with his father's native land and language, he spent his teenage years in an 
environment still imbued with racism, where it was the colour of his skin – not as black 
as his father's, but still not ‘white enough’ as his mother's – that would define who he was, 
precluding him the 'privilege' of calling himself British. In the previous chapter, when 
analysing the social issues that Frankenstein’s creature has to face throughout Mary 
Shelley’s novel, I have introduced the theories developed by the French West Indian 
psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, and I think it is useful to refer to him once again to compare 
his experience with Kureishi’s: the fact of feeling rejected by one’s community is an 
experience common to both men, who, in different ways, managed to elaborate on their 
personal experiences and made these a central feature in the development of their works. 
Despite being born in the Caribbeans, within the French colony of Martinique Fanon 
received a French education and grew up feeling he was a child of the French Empire; so 
much so that during World War II he willingly left his native land and went to Europe in 
order to support the fight of France against Nazi Germany. However, when after the end 
of the war he decided to settle in France, he was forced to acknowledge that what he 
considered to be his home-country was not willing to accept him as a legitimate citizen: 
in fact, his clinical studies stemmed from his own experience of being made to feel as an 
outcast by the white French people who, because of the colour of his skin, would not see 
(and accept) him as one of them. Despite not being a psychiatrist, the psychological aspect 
of being cast in a state of otherness by the community he grew up in is widely explored 
by Kureishi by means of his literary works, in which elements of the author’s biography 
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are often recognizable within the lives of the protagonists of his fiction. 
In the mid-1960s, Pakistanis were a risible subject in England, derided on 
television and exploited by politicians. They had the worst jobs, they were 
uncomfortable in England, some of them had difficulties with the language. 
They were despised and out of place. 
From the start I tried to deny my Pakistani self. I was ashamed. It was a curse 
and I wanted to be rid of it. I wanted to be like everyone else. I read with 
understanding a story in a newspaper about a black boy who, when he noticed 
that burnt skin turned white, jumped into a bath of boiling water.183 
The inspiration for his early work was drawn from his own life’s trials and tribulations as 
a hybrid subject, a condition that forced him into the role of 'cultural translator'; 
reluctantly, Kureishi became a mediator, at the crossroads of two different and apparently 
incompatible cultures – one of which, as he himself claims, was unknown to him at the 
time, since he visited Pakistan for the first time in his twenties and was never taught to 
speak Punjabi or Urdu. The fact that British people showed both repulsion and curiosity 
towards Oriental cultures led to the strong ambivalence that Kureishi explored in his first 
novel; moreover, the fact that both cultures rejected Kureishi, not fully recognizing him 
as a legitimate member of their communities, led to an ambiguous relationship between 
the writer and the two countries: 
Why would anyone with a brown face, Muslim name and large well-known 
family in Pakistan want to lay claim to that cold little decrepit island off 
Europe where you always had to spell your name? Strangely, anti-British 
remarks made me feel patriotic, though I only felt patriotic when I was away 
from England. 
But I couldn't allow myself to feel too Pakistani: I didn't want to give in to that 
falsity, that sentimentality. As someone said to me at a party, provoked by the 
fact I was wearing jeans: we are Pakistanis, but you, you will always be a Paki 
– emphasising the slang derogatory name the English used against Pakistanis; 
and therefore the fact that I couldn't rightfully lay claim to either place.184 
I would like to point out that, even-though his family's background has been directly 
affected by Britain's colonial endeavours, Kureishi himself resists his automatic inclusion 
in the category of postcolonial writing: as Judith Misrahi-Barak observed, “Kureishi is 
not quite part of the post-colonial crowd: he was not born in a former British colony, he 
did not exile himself like many first-generation writers, he does not speak the mother-
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tongue of his parents”.185 Kureishi is a fully Westernized child of an immigrant father, he 
is not a “displaced post-colonial writing back to the centre”; rather “he writes from the 
centre”.186 For this reason, some scholars – Moore-Gilbert in particular among them – 
have attempted to place him within the British literary tradition, a place where Kureishi 
himself – a native of England and lifelong monoglot – plainly believes he belongs.187 
 Kureishi read philosophy at King’s College, University of London, and then 
supported himself by writing pornographic stories using the pen-name Antonia French; 
during his youth he also started working as an usher at the Royal Theatre and later he 
managed to become the theatre’s writer in residence. In 1976, the London’s Theatre 
Upstairs produced his first play, Soaking Up the Heat, which was followed by The Mother 
Country, that won the Thames Television Playwright Award in 1980. He started gaining 
popularity when the Royal Court Theatre produced Borderline, a play about Asian 
immigrants living in London. This led him to have another play, Outskirts, performed by 
London’s Royal Shakespeare Company. 
 In the same years Kureishi started writing screenplays for the film industry, 
leading him to be especially successful in the United States: his 1985 screenplay for My 
Beautiful Laundrette, directed by Stephen Frears, tells the story of a young second-
generation Pakistani immigrant who opens a laundromat in London with the help of his 
gay, white lover. Critics from both sides of the Atlantic praised Kureishi; however, several 
conservative Pakistani organizations felt that their communities were being portrayed in 
a negative manner, as homosexuals and drug dealers. To them, 
a character of Pakistani origin represented the entire Pakistani community, and 
should display a positive stereotype to American and British audiences. 
[However,] Kureishi rejects the politics of representation; he does not assume 
this role as an ambassador representing a minority, preferring to depict the 
harsher realities of racism and class divisions.188 
After My Beautiful Laundrette won several awards, among which the Best Screenplay 
award from the New York Film Critics Circle, Kureishi wrote another screenplay, with 
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the controversial title Sammy and Rosie Get Laid (1987). In this film Kureishi explored 
the world of racially-mixed couples living in London during the race riots; however, this 
was not received as well as his previous film. His screenplays include, among others, The 
Mother (2003), Venus (2006), Le Week-End (2013). 
 Kureishi made his debut on the literary scene in 1990, when he published his first 
semi-autobiographical novel, The Buddha of Suburbia, which opens with the 
protagonist's self-introduction: 
My name is Karim Amir, and I am an Englishman born and bred, almost. I am 
often considered to be a funny kind of Englishman, a new breed as it were, 
having emerged from two old histories. But I don’t care – Englishman I am 
(though not proud of it), from the South London suburbs and going 
somewhere.189 
Drawing from Kureishi’s own experiences, The Buddha of Suburbia is about the life of a 
young bisexual man, who is half-Asian and half-English, who grows up in the London 
suburbs longing for the time when he can finally move to the big city. In the meantime, 
he educates himself with classic novels and the best pop music of the time. It is not a case 
that Kureishi himself, in an autobiographical essay, thus described his own youth: 
I was only waiting now to go away, to leave the London suburbs, to make 
another kind of life, somewhere else, with better people. 
In this isolation, in my bedroom where I listened to the Pink Floyd, the Beatles 
and the John Peel show, I started to write down the speeches of politicians, the 
words which helped create the neo-Nazi attitudes I saw around me.190 
Full of expectations for his future, the protagonist of The Buddha of Suburbia is 
compelled to find his own place in Britain, which he describes as “a nice place if you're 
rich, but otherwise it's a fucking swamp of prejudice, class confusion, the whole thing”.191 
Pop music and the demolition of class boundaries are tightly connected in Kureishi's view, 
who, in an interview, declared that: 
One of the things that happened in the sixties was that you were slightly 
liberated from your sense of class, because the pop stars that we knew, who 
were mostly lower middle class, like John Lennon or The Who, had liberated 
themselves from the straightjacket of class. We identified with them and felt 
that we could then make our way to London, in culture, in pop, in fashion.192 
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Ambition and class issues, as well as sexual curiosity and generational conflicts, are 
central themes in Kureishi's first novel, but racism and the dream of a multi-cultural 
London are the real issues at stake: when in 1967 Enoch Powell said that, because of the 
Pakistani immigrants, “[Britain would] not be worth living in for our children” and, in the 
same year, the Conservative politician Duncan Sandys declared that “the breeding of 
millions of half-caste children would […] produce a generation of misfits and create 
national tension”, young Hanif was ready to state that “I wasn't a misfit. I could join the 
elements of myself together. It was the others, they wanted misfits; they wanted you to 
embody within yourself their ambivalence”.193 
 The Buddha of Suburbia won the Whitbread Book of the Year Award for the first-
novel category of the Booksellers Association of Great Britain and Ireland and in 1993 a 
TV series drawn from the novel was released, featuring a soundtrack written and arranged 
by David Bowie. In 1991, Kureishi made his directorial debut with London Kills Me, 
which he also wrote; in this film he expanded on his interest in street life, by focusing on 
the world of drugs and gangs. In 1994 he published his first collection of short stories, 
Love in a Blue Time. 
 In his 1995 novel, The Black Album, Kureishi delves into “the painful, lonely, and 
confused world of [Shahid], a young man of Pakistani origin, who finds himself having 
to choose between his white British lover and his Muslim friends”.194 The novel makes 
many references to pop culture, especially music and drugs, which feature in a great deal 
of Kureishi’s work. This novel, as well as his renowned short story My Son the Fanatic 
(published in the 1994 collection Love in a Blue Time), deals with the issue of fully-
Westernized second-generation immigrants who turn to Islamic fundamentalism as an act 
of rebellion against the racist society in which they were raised: in the violent wing of the 
same religion their fathers had rejected as a way to detach themselves from the cultural 
traditions of the countries they moved away from, the children find a locus of resistance 
and communal help. The theatre adaptation of The Black Album was performed at the 
National Theatre, in London, in July and August 2009. With regard to Kureishi's first two 
novels, Bradley Buchanan observed that: 
[they] are distinct from the rest of his fiction in that they show two young men 
attempting to mediate between their individualistic, knowledge-and-pleasure-
seeking urges, and the traditional morality and emotional support offered by 
                                               
193 H. Kureishi (2005), The Rainbow Sign, cit., p. 17. 
194 S. Sharma (1997), “Kureishi, Hanif”. In Postcolonial Studies @ Emory, cit.. 
 66 
the nuclear family and religion. While Karim seems more successful than 
Shahid at balancing these forces, both novels assume that such a balance is 
desirable and, in a better world, possible. Kureishi's later fiction will suggest 
otherwise, but these two early novels hold out a tantalizing promise: that we 
can have the cake of our desires and eat it in good conscience too. If others 
see a conflict between Karim's family and his career, or between Shahid's love 
of sex and drugs and his religious inclinations, there is no special reason to 
worry. Contradictions are in the eye of the beholder, in Kureishi's early fiction, 
and his ingenuous heroes happily pursue apparently incompatible courses with 
equal ardour. They escape serious consequences, primarily because of their 
youth. Kureishi's later, older characters, who have become fathers and 
husbands, will not be so fortunate.195 
By then, Kureishi was married with film-and-television producer Tracey Scoffield and 
the couple had had two twin sons. The novelty of family life was soon reflected in the 
writer's work, and Buchanan acknowledges that “an important shift in Kureishi's work 
occurs when his protagonists cease to be young men and become paternal figures 
themselves”.196 However, the trope of “dysfunctional families” that also characterized 
Kureishi's early novels and stories remains, in that, “unwilling to admit their desire to 
retain the authority they once resented in others, [Kureishi's male characters] absent 
themselves from the familiar circle by infidelity or some other form of mid-life crisis”.197 
The issue of race becomes less visible in his later fiction, which instead centres on the 
“trials and tribulations of private life”,198  especially marriage and parenthood, often 
conveying the discouraging message that “family and sexual problems erode life's 
pleasures”.199 In fact, Kureishi's characters are now grown-up men whose “youthful air 
of innocence [has] gone”;200 and even though they are not willing to forsake the hedonism 
that characterised their youth, they are now forced to realize that “the power of the father 
is not a purely artificial construction that has been forced on them, but rather an important 
aspect of their own identities”.201 
 His 1998 novel Intimacy revolves around the story of a man who is about to leave 
his wife and two young sons after feeling physically and emotionally rejected by his wife; 
the story opens immersing the reader in the psychological turmoil of the irresolute 
protagonist, an oppressive feeling that is consistent throughout the whole novel: 
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It is the saddest night, for I am leaving and not coming back. Tomorrow 
morning, when the woman I have lived with for six years has gone to work on 
her bicycle, and our children have been taken to the park with their ball, I will 
pack some things into a suitcase, slip out of my house hoping that no one will 
see me, and take the tube to Victor's place. […] Soon we will be like strangers. 
No, we can never be that. Hurting someone is an act of reluctant intimacy. We 
will be dangerous acquaintances with a history.202 
After its release, the novel created some controversy, as Kureishi had recently left his own 
partner and their two young sons; therefore, once again the novel was assumed to be at 
least semi-autobiographical. In 2001 the novel was adapted into a film, Intimacy by 
Patrice Chéreau, which won two Bears at the Berlin Film Festival: a Golden Bear for Best 
Film and a Silver Bear for Best Actress (Kerry Fox). As Intimacy demonstrates, “once 
race has been relegated to the background, the disintegration of the family becomes the 
major theme of Kureishi's fiction. The cause of this familial breakdown are simple enough: 
middle-aged men who desert their joyless relationships in pursuit of keener sensations, 
whether sexual, chemical or emotional”.203 
 In 2003 he published the short-story collection The Body and Seven Stories, whose 
opening novella will be analysed in the next few pages. Kureishi's 2004 book, My Ear at 
His Heart, is a partial biography of his father, Rafiushan Kureishi, and an account of his 
father's obsessive literary strivings and setbacks. According to Buchanan, “there is a 
strong sense that the book is an attempt to displace the burden of guilt Kureishi has carried 
for many years, by virtue of having succeeded where his father had failed”.204 He also 
published Dreaming and Scheming: Reflections on Writing and Politics (2002) and The 
Word and the Bomb (2008), two collection of essays in which he explores many of the 
topics that influenced his thinking and writing. In 2008 he was appointed Commander of 
the Order of the British Empire (CBE), in recognition for his services to literature and 
drama. In 2011 he was victim of a fraud, in which he nearly lost all his life savings; he 
then narrated those events in A Theft: My Con Man (2014), which was later included in 
the 2015 collection of stories and essays Love+Hate. 
 As Kureishi ages, so do his characters: the protagonists of his two most recent 
novels, The Last Word (2014) and The Nothing (2017) are both old, ill men; two former 
artists – a novelist and film-maker – who enjoy their late years with their attractive and 
much-younger wives. And even though their aged bodies don't let them pursue the 
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hedonistic urges that distinguished their youth, they don't allow their minds to rest: they 
keep an eye on what is going on around them, because “[as] an artist you have to force 
yourself to turn and look at the world, and the world is always worse, and more interesting, 
than you can imagine or render”.205 Given the many obvious connections that appear 
between Kureishi's work and the broad movements of his life, it is difficult to avoid the 
hypothesis that Kureishi's work is “primarily autobiographical rather than social, or 
confessional rather than political”:206 
His own upbringing, family life and early education seem to have produced 
the Freud-inflected pessimism about love and sex that his characters express 
so frequently, and his later struggles with substance abuse, marital problems 
and paternal responsibility colour his vision of the world considerably. 
Furthermore, this personal aspect of Kureishi's work is weighted towards 
childhood and adolescence; although Kureishi is now middle-aged and enjoys 
the lifestyle of a successful author and celebrity, his work continues to be 
marked by the tragic sexual and racial conflicts that marked his early life. His 
oft-professed interest in popular culture's portrayal of young people, therefore, 
is perhaps as much a symptom of his preoccupation with his own youth as it 
is a systematic engagement with the overall political and social trends of his 
era.207 
In the latter part of Kureishi's literary production, his outlook on life seems much more 
tragic and conflicted: his once-carefree characters have been “dragged into the mud of 
maturity, where they become husbands, fathers, divorcé(e)s, men and women with 
stagnant careers, and self-hating failures. The battle between pleasure and morality has 
become a bloody one, and most of his heroes have chosen the former”.208 His characters' 
rejection of traditional bonds and stable relationships is often an attempt to escape from 
the torments of their adulthood, which only become more painful when the innocence of 
childhood is recalled. These books are “sad, angry, despairing testaments to the 
difficulties that attend one's adult obligations, whether one accepts them fully or not”.209 
 
3.2 - «ALL I WANT IS TO BE RID OF THIS, TO GET OUT OF THIS MEAT»: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE BODY 
 
In the previous pages I have pointed out that the second part of Kureishi's production is 
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considerably different from his earlier works, in that it is characterised by the increasingly 
strong theme of “mid-life crisis” that affects his male heroes – or rather antiheroes, since 
even though they are often distinguished by a general dissatisfaction towards their 
everyday lives, they usually react to that by running away from their responsibilities, and 
in particular from their disappointing relationships and family bounds. In fact, it has been 
noted that “the cinematic and novelistic multiculturalism which [Kureishi] largely 
pioneered in Britain with My Beautiful Laundrette and The Buddha of Suburbia has given 
way to compressed tales of family and the self”.210 Moreover, in the works he published 
at the beginning of the 2000s, Kureishi momentarily put aside his traditional realist and 
semi-autobiographical style and decided to experiment with some relatively 
uncharacteristic fictional strategies, employing a “somewhat inconsistent version of 
magical realism”211 in Gabriel's Gift, published in 2001, and using a science-fiction 
premise in The Body, published in 2002 as a single novel and then republished in the same 
year as the eponymous novella that opens the collection of short stories The Body and 
Seven Stories. 
 Bradley Buchanan claims that artistic creativity is the new, dominant theme in 
both Gabriel's Gift and The Body, and this will be a relevant topic also in the 2014 novel 
The Last Word and in The Nothing, published in 2017. In all these novels, Kureishi 
“minimizes concerns such as race and class”, which strongly identified his earlier 
production, “instead concentrating on family, personal identity (especially in terms of 
gender and masculinity), sexual experimentation and artistic achievement”. 212  As 
Kureishi's work progresses, he seems increasingly eager to use family troubles “not 
merely to examine the plight of his tormented fathers, boyfriends and husbands, but also 
to explore the escape and fulfilment offered to them by the process of artistic and creative 
achievement”.213 Indeed, the premise that propels Adam, the protagonist of The Body, to 
embark on his adventure is a longing for a breath of fresh air in his creative works: for 
too long he has been feeling increasingly marginalized by the world surrounding him, 
from which he feels to be disconnecting as times goes by. According to him, this has been 
affecting his latest works, which are not as compelling as those he used to produce when 
his young body allowed him to be part of the social world: he perceives his old, withering 
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body as an enemy that prevents him from living his life to its fullest, increasingly 
confining him in a state of social exclusion. Waldo, the protagonist of Kureishi's 2017 
novel The Nothing, expresses the same feelings: “I wish, even in this state, that I had a 
final project, something to fill me with creative hope. Whoever heard of an artist retiring? 
We become more frantic to fulfil ourselves as we age”.214 According to Buchanan, The 
Body is “another eloquent testament to [Kureishi's] abiding obsession with the power of 
youth, and another recognition of how central this power is to his conception of 
contemporary culture”.215 So much so that, in his reading of Kureishi's works, he claims 
that, for the writer, “our political lives – which concern our racial, religious, class and 
gender identities – matter much less than does the fact of being (or having once been) 
teenagers. Kureishi comes close to making youth into its own cultural ideology, albeit a 
provisional and self-consciously superficial one”.216 
 The protagonist and first-person narrator of the novella, Adam, is a middle-aged, 
almost-forgotten, London-based playwright, screenwriter and novelist, whose “heyday of 
theatre production is long over. He is greatly troubled by his 'ailing existence' and feels 
out of touch with real life”,217 having realized that his life seems “to have happened too 
quickly” (p. 17).218 Like most people of his age, Adam sees and feels the impact of the 
years on his body; moreover, he is all too aware of his own approaching mortal destiny 
(so much so, that his memoirs is titled 'Too Late'). Adam is tired and wishes to restore his 
curiosity about the world surrounding him, in which he now feels like an outcast: “I no 
longer believe or hope that book knowledge will satisfy or even entertain me, and if I 
watch TV for too long I begin to feel hollow” (p. 5); he laments: 
I am no longer familiar with the pop stars, actors, or serials on TV [...] It is 
like trying to take part in a conversation of which I can only grasp a fraction. 
As for the politicians, I can barely make out which side they are on. My age, 
education, and experience seem to be no advantage. I imagine that to 
participate in the world with curiosity and pleasure, to see the point of what is 
going on, you have to be young and uninformed. Do I want to participate? (p. 
5) 
Adam is aware that the natural ageing process his body is undergoing is the main source 
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of his tribulations, and helplessly witnesses the decay of his body and of all the bodies 
around him: “I got up and briefly talked to my friends – the old fucks with watery eyes” 
(p. 16). He no longer feels entertained when talking with his peers: “we would talk of 
grand-children, hospitals, funerals and memorial services, saying how much we missed 
so-and-so, wondering, all the while, who would be next, when it would be our turn” (pp. 
10-11). Among others commentators, Alexander Linklater argued that, just like the 
protagonist of Intimacy, Adam is another version of the “Kureishi persona”, with the 
exception that in this case the fictional character is “flabbier and more decrepit than the 
real thing”: 219  having “sharpened a style on his own midlife crisis”, Kureishi now 
analyses the difficulties of living as an aged man and “his struggle to maintain his self-
esteem and joie de vivre prompts him to give a very cynical account of the old people's 
situation in a society ruled by beauty, youth and desire”.220 Therefore, he does not indulge 
in stereotypes that depict the elderly as wise and respected people: in “The Body”, “old 
people are submitted to the reign of flesh over society, just as much as anyone else”,221 
and indeed, since old people are often tired and unhealthy, they cannot actively take part 
in social events and are therefore cast aside. 
 At the beginning of the novella, during a theatre party where established directors 
and writers mingle with young, aspiring actors, Adam is approached by Ralph, one of 
those he labels as “young and uninformed” (p. 5). Adam feels uncomfortable among these 
people, because “[t]he young appear as sheer enemies, whose needs terrify the old: their 
vocabulary is incomprehensible, their presence is threatening”;222 however, to Adam's 
surprise, Ralph turns out to be an affable person, as well as a great admirer of his works, 
and he claims to have seen some of Adam's theatrical performances that must have taken 
place long before his biological birth. According to Menard, Ralph appears as a Deus Ex 
Machina, who has come “to save him and help him overcome his despair”:223 Ralph tells 
Adam of a clinic that is pioneering a new, expensive technique, and where “[c]ertain old, 
rich men and women were having their living brains removed and transplanted into the 
bodies of the young dead” (p. 12). If he dared undergoing the exclusive surgery, Adam 
would have the chance to become someone else, while retaining his memory and thoughts; 
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he would then be able to do all the things that young people enjoy doing, but with the 
benefit of all the knowledge and experience he has stored during the sixty years he has 
spent in his old body. At first Adam does not believe the story, but Ralph's own account 
of the second chance the operation has provided him are so convincing that he eventually 
agrees to temporarily transplant his brain into a “new facility” (p. 27). 
 Among others, Menard and Colway agree that the Science Fiction premises of the 
novella are quite inconsistent: little do we know about the actual surgery and the 
technology behind it, and this is something that, quite surprisingly, Adam himself is little 
interested in as well; however, even though “this is very bad science, [it works as] a good 
fictional set-up”:224 Kureishi provides himself a device for “extending his peculiar form 
of meditative narration. Adam's journey verges on the theoretical, a reflection on the 
extent to which the body is a bearer of human identity, and how much the needs of the 
young terrify the old”.225 In fact, Susie Thomas argues that, given Kureishi's lack of 
“interest in the medical or mechanical aspects of brains being implanted into recently 
deceased bodies, [The Body] does not read like science fiction but rather allegory or 
fable”,226 and Menard shares the same view when she states that: 
placing most of Adam's adventures in Greece, Hanif Kureishi implicitly 
compares his character to Greek mythological figures such as Apollo and 
Dionysius: Adam has Apollo's wonderfully built body superbly crafted 
features, and Dionysus's taste for orgies and sexual pleasure. And of course 
Adam resembles them in the sense he has become immortal... Or one might 
also be reminded of Ulysses, especially when Adam has to fight some sexual 
temptations while on a cruise boat.227 
Finally persuaded to venture in this experience, Adam accepts the risks of this extreme 
form of surgery and he has the chance to “undergo a peculiar metamorphosis”,228 as he 
tries to remake himself and escape the dullness of  his old age: given the opportunity to 
escape his own decay, he finally lives the dream of combining the virility and stamina of 
a 25-year-old's sensual body with the wisdom and life-experience of his original brain. It 
is therefore an opportunity that Adam cannot resist, but he cautiously agrees to a short 
“six-month sabbatical” (p. 19): in fact, he admits that he is not “particularly unhappy” (p. 
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21) with his life, and what he wants is just a short holiday from his decaying body, to “be 
cured of [….] indifference, slight depression or weariness” (p. 30), so that “he can later 
reflect on the meaning of deterioration”.229 
 Adamʼs new shell (the peculiar choice of which will be further analysed in the 
next few pages) is the gorgeous corpse of a young man in his mid-20s, with a muscular 
body, tanned skin, soft brown eyes and a “fine, thick penis and heavy balls” (p. 25). In 
his new persona, Adam then embraces his new life with renewed vigour and passion, 
embarking in an odyssey of physical hedonism. It is interesting to notice that even though 
– as it was mentioned earlier – what had propelled Adam to undergo the surgery had been 
the longing to “participate” again in the world in order to fuel his artistic production, once 
he has assumed his new body he decides that “writing [...] was a habit I needed to break” 
(p. 85). Adam's physical transformation seems to become a replacement for his earlier 
forms of artistic self-expression, turning his own new body into a sort of canvas, a piece 
of art that he is ready to exhibit to the world, because as he soon notices, “[n]ot that beauty, 
or life itself, means much if you're in a room on your own. Heaven is other people” (p. 
35), and so “[in] our new gear we went to bars suitable for looking at others as we enjoyed 
them looking at us” (pp. 52-53). He then trades his curiosity in the world for the pleasure 
of being looked, and in fact Kureishi makes it clear that “having reattained youthful 
vigour, Adam/Leo no longer has any need to be creative or even intellectually active”230 
when the protagonist notes, with some satisfaction, that “I was almost free of the desire 
to understand” (p. 69). 
 “Smoothly and painlessly transferred to this new excellent vehicle”,231 Adam 
renames himself Leo Raphael Adams, after some among the greatest artists of the 
Renaissance, and starts wandering around Europe, enjoying a variety of casual 
conversations with people of any sorts and taking odd jobs. As many critics have 
highlighted, being this a Kureishi story it is not surprising that the previously mentioned 
fine, thick penis is “quickly put into action whenever a suitable opportunity [presents] 
itself”;232 Adam describes his renewed sexual appeal as follows: “I was all sex, a walking 
prick, a penis with an appended body” (p. 78).233 And if his Oldbody - this is the technical 
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term that identifies 'normal' people throughout the novella, those who have not undergone 
the surgery (yet) - could not cope any longer with the stunts of physical intimacy, as a 
Newbody “I began to like the pornographic circus of rough sex [...] I begged to be turned 
into meat, held down, tied, blindfolded, slapped, pulled, and strangled, entirely merged in 
the physical, all my swirling selves sucked into orgasm” (p. 58), fully enjoying the 
stamina offered by his new, energetic body. 
 However, if at first he is excited by the opportunities his new life offers him, little 
by little his second youth turns out to be a succession of loneliness, mechanical sex and 
bad, unsatisfying jobs. “Real youth requires innocence, or at least ignorance, and what 
Adam finds he values most is his knowledge of the world and the world's knowledge of 
him”, Linklater claims, commenting on the novella: in his temporary new persona the 
protagonist cannot allow himself the pleasure of creating lasting relationships, and he is 
bound to wander around the world, making do of fleeting meetings with random strangers 
to whom he cannot reveal his real self: “What I miss,” he says in his loneliness, “is giving 
people the pleasure of knowing about me” (p. 96). Increasingly, he feels like a prisoner 
inside the new body he has purchased, and just like he used to feel like a disoriented 
outcast as a “famous oldster in London cultural circles”, so he does once again “as a 
beautiful youngster in the party circles of Europe”.234 Although “The Body” is mainly set 
in “the cosmopolitan and highly superficial world of European art, fashion, and society 
events”,235 a long stretch of the narrative is set in a 'spiritual centre' on a remote Greek 
island, where elderly, rich women can relax and meditate. After weeks of relentless 
enjoyment and wandering, Adam ends up taking an oddjob at this women's retreat centre 
where the middle-aged clients and even the centreʼs founder, facing what they perceive 
as the end of their desirability, enjoy flirting and looking at him; and Adam, in his renewed 
narcissism, is more than happy to let them do it. 
 It is at an exclusive party on a yacht that Adam meets Matte, and soon the yachtʼs 
wealthy owner reveals him that he is a Newbody too, just like most of the guests attending 
the party. Adam is excited of finally meeting someone like him, and he hopes to engage 
Matte and the other Newbodies in a discussion of their peculiar state: “[t]he thing I missed 
most in my new life was the opportunity to discuss – and, therefore, think about properly 
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– the implications of becoming a Newbody” (p. 51), but Matte is not a chatter: 
‘They do talk about it, “the newies”. But I want to live, not chatter. I love being 
a funky dirty young man. I love pouting my sexy lips and being outstanding 
at tennis. My serve could knock your face off! You should have seen me before. 
I’ve got the photographs somewhere. What’s the point of being rich if you’re 
lopsided and have a harelip? It was a joke, a mistake that I came out alive like 
that! This is the real me!’ (p. 96) 
Matte is probably the most ambiguous character in the whole story: if he was to be 
classified in traditional terms, he would be identified as the villain and, in fact, his 
aggressive behaviour and thirst for power perfectly suit the 'bad guy' portrait. However, 
to a more in-depth analysis he is not as negative a character as he seems at first: it is true 
that he is willing to do anything to get hold of Adam's new body, even killing him if 
necessary, but his motives for wanting it are selfless: his old and sick brother is terminally 
ill, and Matte wants to buy a new “facility” for him too. Matte also informs Adam and the 
readers that this is not the first time he has donated a body to someone in need: in some 
kind of philanthropist generosity, he has given an old child psychologist a new, female 
body: “When he was ill, not long ago, I paid for him to become a Newbody. He had 
arthritis and was bent double. He needed to finish his book and to continue help others, 
as a woman. Don't you think that's a pretty charitable thing? […] She's not sweeping the 
floor somewhere and chasing sex” (p. 101). According to Buchanan, “Matte comes to 
seem an unwitting agent of morality who punishes Adam/Leo for his hubristic 
transgression of natural, familiar and human laws”.236 Indeed, this is the point when 
Adam's 'promethean fate', as it is mentioned in the title of this thesis, starts to become 
clear: although the readers of Kureishi's novella can easily sympathize with the 
protagonist, since they share both his reasoning and, most likely, his curiosity about the 
opportunities offered by the surgery – after all, “Who hasn't asked: Why can't I be 
someone else? Who, really, wouldn't want to live again, given the chance?” (p. 13) –, 
towards the end of the novella it becomes clear that Adam has made the wrong choice 
and is being punished for having been so careless about the possible consequences of the 
surgery and for having abandoned his wife and family, telling them he was going on a 
six-month sabbatical when, in fact, he was just traveling around Europe having sex with 
whomever caught his attention. Continuing on the trope of the aforementioned allegorical 
fable, Menard maintains that “the reader does not pity him too much when he ends as a 
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new Sisyphus, bound to live forever and ever, to make meaningless encounters and 
discoveries, and to remain unable to share true thoughts and feelings with his loved 
ones”.237 Indeed, it is at this point that Adam starts worrying again for his dear ones and 
decides to go back to London, where his family lives; however, he is still in disguise and 
can only follow his wife Margot and spy on her. This is when Adam fully realizes that in 
his new body he misses the emotions he was used to when he inhabited his old 'facility' 
and, most of all, he misses the chance of sharing his feelings with the people he loves, 
especially his wife. When he manages to talk to her, he gets to know a woman that for too 
long he had neglected and whose love and company he had taken for granted: 
Her story made more sense to me now, or I was able to let more of it in. We 
drank tea and wine. She was stimulated by my interest, and amazed by how 
much there was to tell. She wanted to speak; I wanted to listen […] I wanted 
to offer her all that I'd neglected to give in the past few years. How withdrawn 
and insulated I'd been! It would be different when I returned as myself. (p. 117) 
Adam feels like a stranger in his own house, and sadly realizes that his wife and children 
have carried on with their lives; they have accepted his desire to run away and have set 
him free: “I was also shocked by how forgettable, or how disposable, I seemed to be. For 
years, as children, our parents have us believe they could not live without us. This 
necessity, however, never applies in the same way again, though perhaps we cannot stop 
looking for it” (p. 118). To reverse his condition of estrangement, he realizes that he wants 
his old, mortal body – and therefore his old life – back as soon as possible: “all I want is 
to get rid of this, to get out of this meat” (p. 122) he says, announcing his final resolution. 
Kureishiʼs novella closes with a chase, ending back at the clinic where the surgery had 
been performed. However, the place is now empty and derelict, electricity has been cut 
off and Adamʼs old body has disappeared. And when Matte's henchmen predictably 
appear, the only chance he has to escape is to threaten to damage his own body, the only 
valuable thing he is left with: “[e]ventually Leoʼs borrowed body becomes a mere 
commodity, for which there exists a competing bidder”,238 and the novella closes with 
Adam's foreboding words: “I was a stranger on the earth, a nobody with nothing, 
belonging nowhere, a body alone, condemned to begin again, in the nightmare of eternal 
life” (p. 126). It might be argued that the fact of using a past tense at the beginning of this 
final sentence might imply that Adam actually managed to find a way out of his 
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nightmarish condition and that, back to his original body, he is now recalling his 
adventures in order to warn the readers not to make the same mistakes. However, the 
general atmosphere that surrounds the ending of the novella is dominated by a sense of 
hopelessness and defeat that is hard to ignore, and this does not surprise: Kureishi’s 
protagonists are never granted a truly happy ending and are often left to ponder whether 
the drastic decisions they have taken have actually led them to live a better life. Buchanan 
claims that “Kureishi's protagonists often feel as if they have begun life all over again 
when they leave their wives and children, and The Body takes this idea of a new beginning 
to a nightmarish extreme”.239 In fact, I find that, even though the two texts are extremely 
different in style and themes, a strong parallel in the plot development can be identified 
between his debut novel The Buddha of Suburbia and The Body: both Haroon (the Buddha 
mentioned in the title of the novel, who is the protagonist's father) and Adam are aged 
men who, tired of the dullness of their domestic everyday lives, flee in search of new 
emotions without any initial regret of what they leave behind: the first leaves his wife for 
a younger and more active woman, the second leaves his body for a younger and more 
active self. At first, they both embrace the new, exciting opportunities offered by their 
new life, but they soon come to realise that “the greatest horror is losing everything you've 
used up a lifetime getting used to”,240 and by the time they come to realise this, they are 
also forced to acknowledge that the world has moved forward without waiting for them; 
and since there is no way to turn back time, they now find themselves stuck in their new, 
once-apparently-idyllic life. Eventually, in both novels Kureishi seems to recognize that 
“the familiar isn't necessarily mundane”241 and apparently he wants to emphasize that it 
is only when you have lost it, that you understand the real value of what you have left 
behind and cannot get back: 
In my straighter moments, despite everything, I wanted to be close to my wife. 
I loved to watch her walk about the house, to hear her undress, to touch her 
things. She would lie in bed reading and I would smell her, moving up and 
down her body like an old dog, nose twitching. I still hadn't been all the way 
round her. Her flesh creased, folded, and sagged, its colour altering, but I had 
never desired her because she was perfect, but because she was she. (p. 61) 
In addition to this, when in The Buddha of Suburbia young Karim glimpses into socialite 
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Charlie's exuberant lifestyle, he declares that “I wanted to live always this intensely: 
mysticism, alcohol, sexual promise, clever people and drugs”;242 and, as for Charlie 
himself, he declares that “I coveted his talents, face, style. I wanted to wake up with them 
all transferred to me”,243 which is, in fact, what the protagonist of The Body experiences: 
he can be young and irresponsible again, but better-looking this time. In the end, “[l]ike 
all tales of eternal youth, this one asks us to consider the problem of answered prayers”:244 
Adam, like most of Kureishi's characters, does not resist the urge to satisfy his hedonistic 
desires, and his carefree attitude is eventually punished in what Kureishi himself seems 
to consider a deserved way: 
[W]hen characters lose themselves in their desire for satisfaction, and since 
we can all be overwhelmed and disturbed by pleasure, it is also where 
characters reveal themselves the most. We identify with their alternative 
morality as they cross lines we’d never dare approach. These characters aren’t 
undecided about things; they don’t care; they are freer than us. They are 
usually punished too, which contributes to our satisfaction: the world is re-
balanced. We are not in a hellish, never-ending spiral of wild enjoyment.245 
 
3.3 - AGEING ISSUES AND THE YOUTH MYTH: THE COMMODIFICATION OF 
THE BODY 
What had disturbed him was that at least three people had failed to recognize 
him, not out of cruelty or even short-sightedness. It was worse than that: they 
had no idea who he was. He had made a simple mistake, one he swore he 
would never make again – he had aged.246 
This quote is not drawn from the text of “The Body”; in fact, the sentence refers to the 
protagonist of “The Woman Who Fainted”, another short story written by Hanif Kureishi 
and published in his 2015 collection Love+Hate. This is to suggest that ageing is indeed 
an increasingly present theme in his literary production and that, even more than the fact 
of growing old, Kureishi's characters (and probably the author too) fear the consequences 
connected to the passing of time: those of an ever-changing body that makes them 
increasingly unrecognisable in the eyes of the others and that, in turn, makes the outer 
world increasingly foreign to them. In this chapter I am going to analyse how Kureishi 
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approached the social struggle his ageing protagonist undergoes to in “The Body”, as well 
as the strategy that he employs to make his protagonist attempt to run away from the 
threats posed by his own Oldbody. This is how Adam describes his “old carcass” at the 
beginning of the novella: 
Want to hear about my health? I don't feel particularly ill, but I am in my mid-
sixties; my bed is my boat across these final years. My knees and back give 
me a lot of pain. I have haemorrhoids, an ulcer and cataracts. When I eat, it's 
not unusual for me to spit out bits of tooth as I go. My ears seem to lose focus 
as the day goes on and people have to yell into me. I don't go to parties because 
I don't like to stand up. If I sit down, it makes it difficult for others to speak to 
me. Not that I am always interested in what they have to say; and if I'm bored, 
I don't want to hang around, which might make me seem abrupt or arrogant. 
(p. 3) 
Ageing seems to be commonly considered “a matter of biology, best defined by an 
increasing risk of irremediable physical disability and death”247 and as far as the body is 
concerned, it is usually understood as “an inexorable decline, involving shrinking, 
atrophy and a loss of mental capacity”.248 Of course, it seems impossible to deny that each 
biological lifespan is limited in its duration, and that ageing appears to be a matter-of-fact, 
physical discourse, connected to the possibility of prolonging one’s life. However, just 
like the discourse on disability that was developed in the previous chapters, ageing is a 
socially-constructed phenomenon too: as time goes by, not only do people care and worry 
about the physical changes their bodies undergo to, which inevitably bring about an 
increasingly chance of aches and pains, but they are all too aware of the social stigma 
traditionally connected to old people, who are commonly perceived as support-
demanding and in constant need of attention. In short, “faced with the physicality of old 
age – the changes in appearance and function that are seen socially as defining adult 
ageing – it seems impossible to argue that ageing can be understood as rooted not in the 
domain of biology but in social relation”.249 Indeed, it has often been pointed out that 
ageing can actually be considered a state of disability that all humans eventually acquire 
at some point in their lives; of course, people try not to think about that, and this might 
be the reason why ageing and death seem to have become taboos in our contemporary 
Western society. 
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 However, this social silence cannot be considered an effective solution to the 
alleged unacceptability of a natural stage of human life that the majority of people will 
experience; in fact, in their book Cultures of Ageing: Self, Citizen and the Body, Chris 
Gilleard and Paul Higgs have explained how ageism, which is the development of 
stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination against people on the basis of their age, has 
“economic, psychological and social effects that potentially impact the physical well-
being of retired people”250 and this indeed seems to be the case of Kureishi's character, 
who, as time goes by, gradually sees his body deteriorating and starts losing his self-
esteem too: 
It was a while ago, during my early fifties, that I began to lose my physical 
vanity, such as it was. I've been told that as a young man I was attractive to 
some people; I spent more time combing my hair than I did doing equations. 
Certainly I took it for granted that, at least, people wouldn't be repelled by my 
appearance. As a child, I lived among open fields and streams, and ran and 
explored all day. For the past few years, however, I have been plump and bald; 
my heart condition has given me a continuously damp upper lip. By forty I 
was faced with the dilemma of whether my belt should go over or under my 
stomach. Before my children advised me against it, I became, for a while, one 
of those men whose trousers went up to their chest. (p. 29) 
The narrator's self derision, mingled with a certain feeling of bitterness, immediately 
warns the readers that they are about to dive into Adam's personal account of the horrors 
of ageing. With the distinctive irony and sense of humour that characterizes his literary 
production, Hanif Kureishi tackles the issue of loss of physical agility and sexual appeal 
that characterizes the approaching of the 'third age', as well as the alleged loss of value 
that, as I have mentioned, is the perceived social consequence people of all ages fear for 
their future. In fact, youth too is affected “by the cultural one-sidedness which reprises 
old age”251 and many young people feel compelled to resort to a series of procedures to 
try and delay the threat of ageing, for the reasons that I am going to analyse in the next 
few pages. 
 Among the scholars who have investigated these questions, I have found 
particularly interesting the analysis developed by Italian psychoanalyst Luigi Zoja 
regarding the ubiquitous gerontophobia that, according to him, characterizes our 
contemporary society: in his view, because of the fact that in primitive, underdeveloped 
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societies reaching old age was a matter of luck (the exception rather than the rule), the 
old used to be relatively few in number and were granted social value, since they were 
normally entrusted the transmission of culture; in an age characterized by the total 
absence of mass media or even books, the importance of becoming old was particularly 
stressed, as they were the “guardians and transmitters of wisdom, traditions and 
collectively accepted values”.252 Thanks to the dramatic advancements in the fields of 
medicine, nutrition and hygiene that took place in the last few centuries, modernization 
has obviously brought about a growth in the number of people who reach old age, making 
this a reasonable expectation, but to the detriment of their social value: for the first time 
in history, our century has expropriated the traditional roles of the old, because “by 
inventing retirement it has taken away most of their socio-economic role, and by 
inventing the mass media and mass culture it has dispossessed them of their psychological, 
truly archetypal role”.253 A clear consequence of this is a psychological self-devaluation 
on the part of the old too, because if in earlier times they knew that they concentrated 
many collectively recognized values in themselves – and this was obviously a source of 
pride and social value – now the mass media convince them that they are, in fact, “the 
prototype of the loss of accepted value”.254 Mass media and advertising campaigns, 
typical features of consumeristic societies, have given rise to modern prejudices 
connected with old age, which is generally viewed as a state of malady characterized by 
“deficiency of youth”.255 As a consequence of this, youth is traditionally seen as the 
embodiment of value, while old age is burdened with non-value; Zoja claims that: 
In our society old age is statistically present as never before, while 
psychologically it is tending to disappear. Current values, which are reflected 
in the mass media and advertising, have rendered our society both hypomanic 
and ‘juvenilistic’. One has only to turn on the radio or television to notice that 
‘Mr Average’ advertised and appealed to has to be terribly extrovert, active 
and healthy - in a word, he is basically young. According to the advertisement 
he needs a lot of goods, but goods can be substitutes for individuation and 
belong to the world of youth; a car or liquor, for instance, are sold to you 
because you are young and they make you feel young. If the advertisements 
or the media do address themselves to the older person, it is precisely in order 
to ask him to disown his age, and if he wants to remain a client - and he usually 
does or he will be lost to society - he must betray and repress his archetypal 
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reality.256 
Before further exploring the role of mass-media in the development of gerontophobia and 
its consequences on the youth, I think it is worth to point to the fact that, along with the 
perception of ageing as a taboo in the contemporary society, death has become an 
intolerable topic too: it is now considered bad taste to speak about these themes, and the 
fact that people should feel ashamed of talking about death seems to point to the fact that 
they should feel ashamed of having to die too. According to Zoja, in earlier times not only 
was death considered an everyday topic but, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, death used to be a major public event that children of every age were brought 
to witness, because it was felt that “through death they could learn about life”:257 not only 
was the old person believed to possess wisdom, but with the approach of death this was 
perceived to reach its climax; therefore, the words uttered by an old person about to die 
were considered to contain teachings for everybody, thus emphasizing not only the 
prestigious role of old people in that kind of society, but also the importance of death as 
a natural stage in everyone’s life cycle, and especially the importance to speak about it in 
order to gradually prepare for one’s final moment: “[s]udden, unexpected death was 
traditionally a most dreaded occurrence, a dread still reflected in popular beliefs about 
restless ghosts haunting their place of death. These people are usually supposed to have 
died young or suddenly - more especially to have been murdered - and, their preparation 
for death not having been completed, they are unable to die completely”.258 And if in 
earlier times the old person was to eventually become the representative of a wisdom 
“freed from the burden of petty daily needs”,259 now they are forced to give up their 
autonomy and take the role of the patient, a passive object of medicine and technology. 
Nowadays, geriatricians seem to have taken on and to have been entrusted with the task 
of fighting death by constantly delaying it (even though there seems to be no such thing 
as dying of old age, because no matter how much and for how long one’s body is fixed, 
mended and taken care of, biological bodies are eventually bound to perish) and hospices 
and hospitals tend to transform death into “the most collective and anonymous episode of 
life”260: both doctors and relatives usually prefer to hide a patient’s imminent death from 
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them, and they do this on “the ‘psychological’ ground that the lie has a placebo effect and 
can help the patient to some sort of recovery”,261 but, in doing so, they prevent them the 
chance to prepare for the most natural of all events. Indeed, if there is anything that defines 
humans, it is the knowledge of one's own mortality, because “[a]lthough (other) animals, 
too, are mortal, at least they don’t know that they are. They don’t have to worry about it. 
We, on the other hand, worry about death constantly”.262 
 These seem to be the reasons why taboos connected with ageing and death pervade 
our society, instilling in young people a premature anxiety for an event that is perceived 
as shameful and, consequently, propelling them to look for ways to delay (but also stop 
and, in their wildest hopes, rewind) the ageing process, or at least its superficial effects 
on the body. Arthur Kleinman claims that “[a]fter muscular and lithe youth and the 
robustness of early middle age pass, we move down the long slope of decline at the bottom 
of which death awaits us. Aging has become a disease in the contemporary West”.263 This 
seems to be the truth, and many people seem to be willing to do anything within their 
means to conserve and prolong their (appearance of) youth as long as possible, in the 
hope to preserve also the social “values” traditionally associated to (and promoted as 
distinguishing) youth. This is seen as the age of endless pleasures and possibilities in 
terms of ambition, relationships and even sex - which is something traditionally linked 
with youth, even though many studies have shown that sexuality knows no age limit, and 
that it is cultural prejudice that makes old people give up their sex life because it is 
something that is commonly perceived as offensive for our aesthetic taste. 264  As a 
consequence of this, the process of ageing is made to be perceived as an unfair deprivation 
of life possibilities and, seen in this light, it seems reasonable that many are unwilling to 
accept their defeat. Among them there is Adam, the protagonist of Kureishi’s novella, 
who admits that: 
When I first became aware of my deterioration, having had it pointed out by 
a disappointed lover, I dyed my hair and even signed on at a gym. Soon I was 
so hungry I ate even fruit. It didn’t take me long to realise there are few things 
more risible than middle-aged narcissism. I knew the game was up when I had 
to wear my reading glasses in order to see the magazine I was masturbating 
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over. (p. 29) 
It seems possible to assert that, if “aging has become a disease” in our society, youth (or, 
at least, a youthful look) has become a fetish of our times, something which is idealized 
and, consequently, aptly commodified. However, Slater points out that “although the ideal 
body may always be young, the young body is not always ideal”:265 although they do exist 
in real life, not only old bodies, but also disabled and disfigured young bodies that fall 
out of traditional standards of beauty are often neglected by the mass media, an industry 
that instead grounds most advertising campaigns on the fashion model's body, that not 
only is young, but traditionally embodies health and beauty; these are the actual “values” 
inscribed in the young body, with the direct consequence that “the pervasiveness of media 
idealized body images have allowed the unattainable to become a normal standard of 
acceptable beauty”.266 Media seem to be the main cause of bodily unhappiness in our 
society, conveying a series of beauty stereotypes that burden even ‘able’, standard-size 
people with self-doubt: most ordinary people are, in fact, much larger that most fashion 
models, yet “models, as the noun implies, represent a collective value in the sense that 
they set a dominant standard for how women 'ought to be'”.267 As a consequence of this, 
“[s]uch images of 'perfection' lead us to falsely believe that hairless legs and flat stomachs 
are both 'natural' and 'normal', and place an expectation on women to comply with these 
perceived norms”.268 In fact, it seems undeniable that women have been for a long time 
the main target of beauty campaigns, although in the last few year men have started to be 
increasingly targeted and, as the protagonist of Kureishi's novella shows, made self-
conscious about their ageing bodies too. 
[A]lthough having a 'youthful' body is ideal, when used in this way, the terms 
'young' and 'youthful' represent something very different to the lived-
experiences of chronologically 'young' people, and contradictory to other 
discourses of youth. When considering those chronologically young the 
emphasis is on temporality: youth is the period after childhood and prior to 
adulthood; a time of disruption, risk and rebellion; a time of laziness and 
apathy; a time it is desirable to 'grow out of' by meeting pedestalled adulthood 
signifiers. Youth and time are intrinsically, yet incongruously linked: whereas, 
on the one hand, we want to assist young people in their risky transition to 
adulthood (the sooner they can reach it the better), there is also a desire to 
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remain, as adults, forever young. Although when discussed explicitly youth is 
about transience, when discursively, perhaps implicitly used, youth is about 
the desire to pause time.269 
Of course, since it is impossible to halt or reverse the flow of time, people try at least to 
find ways to overcome its effects on their bodies; in fact, new cosmetic surgery techniques 
are constantly being introduced on the market (Gilleard and Higgs mention chemical skin 
peels to rejuvenate the appearance of the skin, scleropathy, hair transplantation, facelifts 
and tucks, forehead lifts and blepharoplasty, tummy tucks, botox injections and facial fat 
grafting, just to name some of the most popular270) and the fact that their costs are 
increasingly affordable are making them appealing to people of any age. This is to point 
out once again that it is not only people who already bear on their skins the marks of the 
ageing process that undergo this kind of practices, but an increasing number of people in 
their twenties and thirties seek anti-ageing procedures too, in an effort to retain what they 
already own and are not willing to let go. It is important to point out that cosmetic surgery 
and related procedures “do not ‘restore’ a youthful appearance so much as improve the 
‘aesthetic’ appearance of the ageing face”271 and this points to the fact that people feel an 
increasing urge to improve their natural appearance to conform to beauty standards – and 
once again, in contrast to what I have stated in the first chapter of this thesis in relation to 
disabled bodies, when referring to cosmetic surgery the adjective 'normal' appears to be 
used in a derogative way, in opposition to the artificially improved body. In the society 
Kureishi describes in his novella – which is, in fact, a typical Western society of the 
beginning of the 21st century – people are obsessed with their physical appearance: 
It was rare for my wife and her friends not to talk about botox and detox, about 
food and their body shape, size and relative fitness, and the sort of exercise 
they were or were not taking. I knew women, and not only actresses, who had 
squads of personal trainers, dieticians, nutritionists, yoga teachers, masseurs 
and beauticians labouring over their bodies daily, as if the mind's longing and 
anxiety could be cured via the body. (p. 29) 
Here, the construction of a beautiful, well-kept body becomes a disciplining force bound 
by strong moral burdens, because “[a] fit body is defined as an energetic body, where 
energy is not only an instrument that the subject can exploit in daily life, but also an 
indicator of their (self-)worth”.272 Once again, the outer appearance becomes an indicator 
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of that person's moral value: just as a 'monstrous' body automatically defines a deviated, 
cursed mind (as it was the case in Mary Shelley's novel) a pleasant-looking body is an 
indicator of high commitment, self-determination and a whole other series of positive 
values connected to it: 
[The body's] omnipresence […] in advertising, fashion and mass culture; the 
hygienic, dietetic, therapeutic cult which surrounds it, the obsession with 
youth, elegance, virility/femininity, treatment and regimes, and the sacrificial 
practices attaching to it all bear witness to the fact that the body has today 
become an object of salvation. It has literally taken over the moral and 
ideological function from the soul.273 
This is what Mike Featherstone identifies as the purpose of 'body maintenance', which 
can be understood as an instrumental strategy in a context where “self preservation 
depends upon the preservation of the body [and where] the body is the passport to all that 
is good in life. Health, youth, beauty, sex, fitness are the positive attribute which body 
care can achieve and preserve”.274 Of course, it is undeniable that opting for a healthy 
lifestyle that includes a balanced diet and fitness is something that everyone should aim 
to, as a 'natural' way to prevent disease and (ideally) extend one's lifespan; However, since 
the idea of body perfection is something which is imposed by the media, this can become 
an obsession towards the accomplishment of imposed beauty standards that, for some 
bodies, are simply unattainable, because they would require the exceeding of natural 
bodily “plasticity limits”275: 
Beauty has become an absolute, religious imperative. Being beautiful is no 
longer an effect of nature or a supplement to moral qualities. It is the basic, 
imperative quality of those who take the same care of their faces and their 
figures as they do of their souls. It is a sign, at the level of the body, that one 
is a member of the elect, just as success is a such a sign in business.276 
And once this “absolute, religious imperative” has become an imposed necessity in order 
to (socially) survive in a society that values beauty and fitness as if they were moral values, 
people feel the need to resort to any kind of resource to tackle the problems inscribed in 
their bodies, to the point of accepting “invasive techniques like plastic surgery [instead 
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of] exploiting its intrinsic capacity”.277 In “The Body”, Kureishi takes this idea to the 
extreme; so much so that, in order to live again in a young and beautiful body, rich people 
are willing to undergo a 'cosmetic transplant', so to speak, and actually 'wear' a corpse. 
What Kureishi portrays is perhaps “the most striking image of amoral consumerism one 
could wish for”;278 In fact, the entrepreneurial spirit that Matte, the antagonistic Newbody, 
shows throughout the novella, prompts him to say that “[s]oon everyone’ll be 
talking ’bout this. [...] Then there’ll be shops where you go to buy the body you want. I’ll 
open one myself with real bodies rather than mannequins in the window. Bingo! Who 
d’you want to be today!” (p. 96). In the dystopic (but possibly not too futuristic) society 
Kureishi describes, bodies come to have the same functions that clothes and accessories 
have now: they can be easily bought, sold, worn and discarded, and just like people today 
pick clothes from shops or their wardrobes and choose what to wear according to the kind 
of person they want to look like, in the novella bodies are something one can go shopping 
for: 
Suspended in harness, there were rows and rows of bodies: the pale, the dark 
and the in-between; the mottled, the clear-skinned, the hairy and the hairless, 
the bearded and the large-breasted; the tall, the broad and the squat. Each had 
a number in a plastic wallet above the head. Some looked awkward, as though 
they were asleep, with their heads lolling slightly to one side, their legs at 
different angles. Others looked as though they were about to go for a run. All 
the bodies, as far as I could see, were relatively young; some of them looked 
less like young adults than older children. The oldest were in their early forties. 
(pp. 23-24) 
The show is obviously intimidating, and Adam is “reminded of the rows of suits in the 
tailors I'd visit as a boy with my father. Except these were not cloth covering but human 
bodies, born alive from between a woman's legs” (p. 24). However, the idea of a new start 
in really appalling, and he delves into this “warehouse of the lost” to choose the body he 
will spend his next six months into. Of course, he knows that this is not a choice to be 
taken lightly: not only is this a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, but he also knows that he 
is going to choose the appearance that others will be seeing in the following months when 
looking at him, so he needs to choose carefully. It is interesting to notice that, being a 
worn-out artist in search of new inspiration for his work, Adam might decide to 
experience something completely different from what he is used to in terms of sex – “You 
might, for a change, want to come back as a young woman. […] Some men want to give 
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birth. Or they want to have sex as a woman” (p. 24) – or ethnicity – “you could choose a 
black body. [...] Think how much you'd learn about society and... all that” (p. 25) – but 
apparently this is not the kind of “new start” Adam is looking for. He eventually chooses 
the body that, according to him, is going to grant him the best possible range of enjoyable 
experiences in relation to the society he lives in and, although the choice might seem 
banal, he eventually opts for a facility that is “stocky and as classically handsome as any 
sculpture in the British Museum, he was neither white nor dark, but lightly toasted, with 
a fine, thick, penis and heavy balls. I would, at last, have the body of an Italian footballer: 
an aggressive, attacking midfielder, say. My face resembled that of the young Alain Delon 
with, naturally, my own brain leading this combination out to play for six months” (p. 25). 
And indeed, once he manages to try out his new purchase, he is overjoyed by the 
responses he receives by the Oldbodies that surround him: 
I was delighted with the compliments about my manner and appearance, loved 
being told I was handsome, beautiful, good-looking. I could see what Ralph 
meant by a new start with old equipment. I had intelligence, money, some 
maturity and physical energy. Wasn't this human perfection? Why hadn't 
anyone thought of putting them together before? (p. 56) 
Adam seems to embody the ultimate transhumanist dream: that of an extended life 
reached thanks to technological applications on the biological body. Transhumanism is 
the branch of posthumanism that “pursue[s] a utopian vision of improving or perfecting 
the human species via life extension processes (millions of nanobots scouring disease 
from our bodies and improving our cognitive abilities), genetic enhancement, and 
biotechnological prostheses”.279 The purpose of transhumanism is human enhancement 
and, among the many ways in which this term can be interpreted, life and health extension 
have the highest priority in the transhumanist discourse. Of course, “if death is the worst 
that can happen to a person then it follows that no price can be too high to pay to avoid 
one’s own death as long as possible and to achieve virtual immortality”,280 and in fact 
Adam willingly accepts to spend a considerable sum of money in order to undergo the 
procedure that will grant him more life: 
[The surgeon's] assistant ensured the paperwork was rapidly taken care of, and 
I wrote a cheque. It was for a considerable amount, money that would 
otherwise have gone to my children. I hoped scarcity would make them 
inventive and vital. My wife was already provided for. What was bothering 
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me? I couldn't stop suspecting that this was a confidence trick, that I'd been 
made a fool of in my most vulnerable areas: my vanity and fear of decline and 
death. But if it was a hoax, it was a laboured one, and I would have parted 
with money to hear about it. (p. 21) 
Money is indeed a crucial topic in the posthuman discourse, because the economic 
accessibility (or lack of it) to biotechnological advances may lead to the creation of a 
social hierarchy in which access to enhancement of human abilities could be a privilege 
held by the wealthy and powerful, while the less affluent would be relegated to a state of 
'disadvantaged humanity': “If enhancement of human abilities becomes more available, 
the worry is that only the moneyed elite will have access, thus creating a hierarchy not 
just of possibilities and opportunities, but of actual humanness. Democracy becomes a 
sham if certain humans can become - or be born as - superior in intellect and physical 
ability”. 281  This implies that human enhancement requires responsibility, because 
“possibilities of abusing biotechnology and thus creating a radical inequality that 
endangers liberal democracy and even the nature of the human species”282 are at stake. 
This fear of an amoral exploitation of technology at the expense of those who cannot 
afford to access it is explored also in Kureishi's novella, when Ralph says that ill and 
disadvantaged people “can’t get the help they need. Even in the long run they don’t come 
around. Anti-depressants, therapy, all that, it never works. They’re never going to be doers 
and getters like us, man. Better to be rid of them altogether and let the healthy ones live” 
(p. 47). In fact, this is the kind of dystopic turn that Kureishi envisions in his story: a 
future where the prolongation of the life of privileged and powerful people takes place at 
the cost of the lives of those who are marginalised and poor, those who cannot afford a 
posthuman future, because “Who wants a lot of Oldbodies hanging about the world? 
They’re ugly and expensive to maintain. Soon, they’ll be irrelevant” (p. 103). And since 
their lives are evaluated as worthless to be lived, the implication is that those bodies would 
better be used to host the brains of those who, instead, can afford to keep living: “Live in 
the bodies of the discarded, you mean? The neglected, the failures? […] I see what you're 
getting at” (p. 47). Although Kureishi envisions this kind of threat in his science-fiction 
text, the democratic use of technologies and other ways to reach human enhancement is 
an issue which is already being discussed within the posthuman discourse, although 
different views are currently advanced: Ferrando reports that in transhumanism 
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distinctive currents coexist, among which there are Libertarian Transhumanism, that 
“advocates free market as the best guarantor of the right to human enhancement” and 
Democratic Transhumanism, that “calls for an equal access to technological 
enhancements, which could otherwise be limited to certain socio-political classes and 
related to economic power, consequently encoding racial and sexual politics”.283 In fact, 
it could be argued that the kind of attitude towards life-prolongation described by Kureishi 
is not very different from the attitude people currently show towards cosmetic practices: 
Cosmetic surgery is available only to a limited number of people. It is not 
funded within either taxation-based or insurance-based healthcare systems. 
There are still relatively few people whose lives create sufficient dissonance 
between their public and private selves that they would go so much out of their 
way to realize a wish to look younger. [However], that a significant minority 
of people - usually those with considerable material resources - do choose to 
have aesthetic surgery to rejuvenate their appearance shows what the many 
without those resources might also do had they similar opportunities.284 
However, if cosmetic surgery aims to correct alleged flaws people feel like they can no 
longer live with, in order to improve what one already has, Adam's operation aims to give 
him what originally belonged to someone else; accepting to take part in the experiment, 
Adam defies mortality and, as a consequence, his own humanity too, and he is eventually 
bound to regret it: “Matte and I were both mutants, freaks, human unhumans – a fact that 
I could at least forget when I was with real people, those with death in them” (p. 102). In 
a society that has “replaced ethics with aesthetics” (p. 97), he buys his way into “an elite, 
a superclass of superbodies” (p. 96), but he eventually finds out that the renovated vigour 
of a youth body is not enough to make him happy, and would be willing to give anything 
in order to get his derelict, old body back. To conclude this chapter, I think that Katherine 
Hayles' words are appropriate. In her How We Became Posthuman, Hayles generally 
expresses a positive, optimistic view of what will be our posthuman future (or rather, 
according to the title of her work, of what our posthuman present already is); she is aware 
of the fear of technology that is traditionally connected to science-fiction and dystopic 
literature, but she is confident that humans will eventually learn to accept death and, rather 
than keep trying to delete it, they will embrace it as an intrinsic component of their being 
humans: 
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If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies 
as fashion accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is a version 
of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies 
without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied 
immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human 
being, and that understands human life is embedded in a material world of 
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CHAPTER 4 – METAMORPHIC BODIES AND UNCANNY SELVES 
 
4.1 – VENTURING INTO SCIENCE FICTION: HANIF KUREISHI'S HOMAGE 
TO MARY SHELLEY 
The door opened and the surgeon came in. 
'You look splendid.' He walked around me. 'Michelangelo has made David!' 
'I was going to say Frankenstein has just -' (Kureishi, pp. 35-36) 
In the next few pages I would like to further investigate the two texts that I have analysed 
in the previous chapters, as to identify a number of features that characterize both of them 
and that, in my view, connect two literary works written almost two centuries apart from 
one another. On a general level, it can be argued that they both describe the “birth” of two 
un-human creatures (indeed, Kureishi's Adam is fully identified as a human being by 
those surrounding him but, at least for the sake of this analysis, I think it is right to grant 
Frankenstein's unnamed “monster” a fellow specimen to be compared with), and they are 
both created in a laboratory by a male scientist who takes advantage of the latest 
technological advancements of his times. However, although the two male subjects that 
are given life share the same kind of unnatural origin, their adventures differ considerably 
in terms of social experiences that their new bodies provide them with, but which 
eventually lead both of them to the same kind of lonely epilogue; in short, these are two 
novels that, in different ways, show us that “our bodies [...] are both our enablers and our 
prisons”.286 
 As I have claimed in the previous chapter, Hanif Kureishi's The Body represents a 
unique example in his literary production, in that it was the first time that the writer put 
aside his traditional realist style to embrace science fiction as a new narrative strategy. 
However, the literary purpose of this choice remains the writer's typical desire to explore 
his characters' wishes and aspirations and, in fact, the introspective approach that he 
manages to carry out in the text does not differ from what he employs in his other novels 
and short stories. In an interview with Bradley Buchanan, Kureishi claimed that: 
I think all my characters try to enlarge their sense of self, struggling against 
constraint. [...] They're trying to find out who else they may be, or who else 
might be inside them, or what identifications with other groups are possible to 
enlarge the sense of self. Most of my characters […] are pretty restless. […] 
So what I'm interested in is 'Who can I become?', What are the possibilities of 
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life for me?287 
This desire of transformation, that meets the groundbreaking possibilities offered by 
science and technology, is in fact at the centre of Kureishi's 2002 novella. The writer has 
claimed more than once that one of the main sources of inspiration for his literary style 
come from the reading of “the real thing”,288 the novels that have shaped the Western 
literary canon, among which he places the “British fantastic tradition”289 of Stevenson's 
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Wilde's Picture of Dorian Gray and, of course, 
Shelley's Frankenstein. These authors are some of his models and in their works he 
especially appreciates “the wild implausibility, boldness and brilliance of the artist's idea 
or metaphor rather than the arrangement of paragraphs”.290 Therefore, it seems reasonable 
to propose that, in writing his very first story that makes use of science fiction as a literary 
strategy, Kureishi might have drawn inspiration from – and possibly also wanted to pay 
homage to – the author of the novel which is commonly assumed to be science fiction's 
foundational text, namely Mary Shelley's Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus. 
 It might be argued that the two stories do not, in fact, involve the same kind of 
surgical procedure at the centre of their plots: although both creatures are born out of an 
assemblage of different body parts, the crucial point in Kureishi’s narrative is the transfer 
of a living and perfectly-functioning brain into a deceased body, while the main theme in 
Shelley’s novel is the “bestowing [of] animation upon lifeless matter” (Shelley, p. 50). In 
fact, the origin of Frankenstein’s creature’s brain is never really mentioned and, although 
it can be assumed that what the scientist employs is a human brain – since the mode of 
thinking and the feelings the creature develops throughout his life are typically human –, 
Shelley never refers to it in her text. Frankenstein admits that he “dabbled among the 
unhallowed damps of the grave”, that he “collected bones from charnel houses”, and that 
the “dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of [his] materials” (Shelley, 
p. 53), but Shelley’s original narrative “includes no nightly forays into cemeteries or 
morgues, no organ removal from corpses, no stitching together of bodily parts, no scars 
on the creature’s skin, not even a hint of the brain’s significance for the creature’s 
identity”.291 However, as I have argued in chapter two, the popular narrative that is 
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connected with the ‘Frankenstein’s myth’ in the 21st century differs considerably from the 
original novel: nowadays, a typical trait that is popularly connected with the “monster’s” 
appearance is a jugged, big scar that runs across his forehead, furnished with rough, 
prominent stitches or metal clamps, and sometimes these appear to be the only evident 
signs that a surgery has been performed on the creature’s body. According to Fernando 
Vidal, this is due to the fact that the many film adaptations that have stemmed from 
Shelley's novel since the onset of cinematography have contributed to shape a 
representation of the creature’s body (as well as his personality) that is far from what the 
author originally described. In his article Frankenstein’s Brain: “The Final Touch”, Vidal 
contends that, since the renowned 1931 movie by James Whale, Frankenstein movies 
gradually “abandon the original theme of the creation of life and place a brain 
transplantation subplot at the core of their narrative”:292 in Whale’s movie, a pivotal scene 
is the mistaken implant in the monster's body of a brain which is labelled as 
“dysfunctional” in place of a normal one and, from that moment on, in the many other 
Frankenstein films that included a “brain subplot”, this was the feature that more than any 
other provided the cause for the creature’s monstrous instincts: although, as I have 
previously stated, Shelley blames the parental negligence on the part of Frankenstein, as 
well as the repeated social rejection the creature is subjected to as the causes of his turn 
to monstrosity, in many movie adaptations of the novel these tend to be overshadowed by 
the mistaken implant of an inherently-evil criminal brain whose “biological criminality 
and lack of speech sentence [the monster] to a life of guilt, condemnation, and social 
impotence”.293 Unfortunately, Vidal also noticed how the theme of brain transplantation, 
instead of being used to explore the themes of personhood, identity and the ethical stances 
connected to transplants, has “mostly served entertainment purposes by way of violence 
and occasionally comedy”,294 often displaying increasing amounts of violence, blood and 
gore as a way to exploit the commercial appeal that the horror genre has gained, especially 
from the 1960s onward. In his view, the 'brain-transplant subplot' has become a persistent 
theme in the entertainment industry, which has been especially propelled by the 
groundbreaking scientific advancements of the last few decades. In fact, to the present 
day no full-body human transplant has been performed yet, but Vidal reports that in 1999 
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the American surgeon Robert J. White (who in the 1970s had transplanted the head of a 
monkey onto the body of another) predicted that the “Frankenstein legend”, ultimately 
including brain transplantation, “will become a clinical reality early in the 21st 
century”.295 Indeed, this seems to be something Hanif Kureishi agrees with, because in 
his novella he has his protagonist say that “[i]t seems logical that technology and medical 
capability only need to catch up with the human imagination or will. I know nothing about 
science, but isn't this usually the way?” (Kureishi, p. 12). In fact, as it has often been 
pointed out, it is true that literary works, as well as movies, 
are always cultural documents and bear traces of contents, structures and 
events that exist off-screen; one way or another, they articulate values, beliefs 
and concerns that subsist without them. They can therefore be approached as 
the expression and elaboration of issues circulating in the world […]. More 
importantly, since they are themselves part of the contexts they supposedly 
‘reflect’, they must be considered as active agents in structuring them.296 
This proposition suggests a mutual influence between fictional works and scientific 
advancement, and even though neither Shelley or Kureishi have devoted their life to 
science, it is known that Mary Shelley was exposed to debates and exhibitions of the latest 
scientific discoveries of her time prior to the writing of her Frankenstein, and it is possible 
to suppose that, being Kureishi a man of the 21st century, when information circulates 
non-stop throughout the media and the web, he too is exposed to the contemporary 
scientific and technological advancements, and might be drawn to question himself about 
their implications. 
 It has also been noticed that the popularity of Frankenstein has well survived to 
this day because “there is the tendency to read today's concerns back into the novel, to 
take its 'message' about 'obsessive scientific pursuit' for granted as a prefiguring of 
science's often dangerous advances in the twentieth century”.297 However, just like it has 
been argued that the lack of scientific details Kureishi provides weakens the identification 
of his novel as science fiction, some reviewers have criticized Shelley's novel for the same 
reason, claiming that she “skips the science in her account of the creature's animation”.298 
Of course, this seems to be a tenuous criticism, because in writing their texts neither 
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Shelley or Kureishi aimed to provide their readers with a detailed scientific lecture on the 
surgeries they included in their works: although the scenes in which they give life to their 
creatures are to be considered among the most pivotal ones in their narrations, those are 
not the climax events that conclude their novels, but rather the very beginning of the 
action. Science was simply the pretext that helped to spark the visionary gaze of the two 
authors, who used their fiction in order to speculate on the possible consequences of what 
they saw was happening around them, especially in terms of the scientific and 
technological innovations that were being developed around the time they wrote their 
fiction. It is true that, in both cases, the consequences they envision are generally negative, 
but the two texts are not meant to be taken as a certain prediction, but rather as a warning, 
a cautionary tale, because science fiction offers its readers the tools for reimagining the 
world they live in – and themselves too – providing glimpses of how things might be 
otherwise in “alternative scenarios that create an effect of estrangement, defamiliarizing 
existing reality, and making the reader aware of his provisional quality, its potential to be 
radically changed”.299 In fact, in her Cyborg Manifesto, Donna Haraway claimed that “the 
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion”,300 highlighting 
the multiple connections between the literary genre and the posthuman reality that 
contemporary developed countries are moving towards. Critics of the posthuman claim 
that people will necessarily need to reconfigure the way they conceive relationships and 
subjectivities, and the speculative frames that science fiction offers may help readers to 
come to terms with these changes, because “[b]eyond obvious connections to 
technological posthumanism, SF has long imaged subjectivities beyond the human, value 
systems premised on systems other than humanism, and the expansion of agency and 
ethics to non-human actors [...] whose sentience is either raised by technology or newly 
recognised by non-anthropocentric culture”.301 Science fiction can therefore make its 
readers reflect upon the possibility that the human is only one among countless species, 
the reality they live in only one possible among many, and their history only a fragment 
of the history of the whole universe, offering them “a possible escape velocity that can 
sweep readers out of their spacetime continuum, warping their minds into a cognitive 
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zone from which they might look back at their own social moment, perhaps with anxiety 
or better with anger, and then discover that such a place might be known for what it is 
and changed for the better”.302 Indeed, just like Donna Haraway proposed in her Cyborg 
Manifesto, “SF is occupied in overcoming notions of binary oppositions, between norm 
and deviation […], concentrating its imaginary in the perception and evaluation of the 
technosciences and of the manipulation of living form whether they carry the negative 
meaning of doom or the positive meaning of promise”.303 As I have highlighted in the 
first chapter, the human–technology assemblage that Haraway referred to when she took 
the cyborg as the central figure of her thinking was meant to be provocative, but not 
exclusive: even though the idea of mingling organic bodies with computer circuits is the 
first image that comes to most people's minds when they hear somebody talking about 
cyborgs, this is only one of the many possible figurations of the posthuman, and that does 
not exclude human-animal – or even human-human – assemblages. In Shelley’s and 
Kureishi's novels readers are presented with two examples of creatures that comprise both: 
they are human, animal, and technological at the same time, because although no 
prosthetic piece of technology is included in their bodies, it is thanks to science that they 
are born. 
 I would like now to momentarily put aside the posthuman implications of the two 
texts, in order to concentrate on a few peculiar similarities and divergences between them. 
Of course, the two novels were written in different historical periods by two authors who 
experienced dissimilar social experiences, but in my view it could be easily argued that 
what Kureishi aimed to do when he published The Body was to stage a 21st century re-
writing of Shelley's classic. The first connection that I think is plausible to make is that 
they both seem to be 'visual' novels: not only because both authors provide their readers 
with extensive descriptions of the places where their characters’ adventures take place, as 
a way to fully immerse them in the narration, but also for the fact that in both texts the 
creatures' eyes and the sense of vision in general are given preeminence. In both narratives, 
eyes are conceived as the first and most direct way by which one experiences the world; 
apparently, the authors want to assert that sight is the most immediate of our senses, the 
one that before any other is used as a mode of appraisal, evaluation and judgement of the 
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world surrounding the subject, but also that, as a consequence of this, vision is the sense 
that can be most easily tricked, and that the evaluations that come out of it can be biased. 
In my view, this seems to be plausible in that the characters’ eyes are a central feature that 
both authors pay attention to during the process of body selection, life-creation and birth 
of their creatures; Jay Clayton noticed that “[i]n Shelley’s novel, disembodied eyes terrify 
Frankenstein repeatedly. Indeed, eyes seem to hold a special place among the bodily 
organs the novel assembles”:304 from the very first moment that Frankenstein sees “the 
dull yellow eye of the creature open” on his operating table, he is repelled by this feature, 
because the “watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets 
in which they were set” (Shelley, p. 55) terrify and upset him. That same night, when the 
creature starts exploring the world where he has been delivered and visits Frankenstein’s 
bedroom, what upsets the creator is the fact that the creature’s “eyes, if eyes they may be 
called, were fixed on me” (Shelley, p. 56). Moreover, Frankenstein is repeatedly hunted 
by a vision of eyes constantly watching him wherever he goes: “I saw around me nothing 
but a dense and frightful darkness, penetrated by no light but the glimmer of two eyes that 
glared upon me” (Shelley, p. 181). In the same way, they represent a central feature in the 
body-selection process that Kureishi's Adam carries out before his operation: not only 
does the nurse insist that he takes a look at his new facility's eyes before he agrees to 
purchase it but, but when he is examining his new body in the mirror (a process that will 
be further analysed in the next few pages), he acknowledges that “[t]he nurse had asked 
me to examine my eyes. I saw what she meant. There was a softness in me, a wistfulness; 
I detected a yearning, or even something tragic, in the eyes” (Kureishi, p. 35). Throughout 
the novella, they are also the bodily feature that Adam uses to detect other people's 
appreciation of his seductive body when he notices that, looking at him, “[their] eyes were 
glazed with desire” (Kureishi, p. 80). However, in my view both authors seem to believe 
that eyes are also easy to deceive: as I have claimed before, in both novels all the 
characters are easily misled by the creatures’ physical appearance, which is assumed to 
be a valid system to judge their personality too. For this reason, while Frankenstein’s 
creature is considered a wretch, a fiend, and a horrid monster because of his disfigured 
appearance, Adam’s body is the symbol of perfection, “a pure fashion item which didn’t 
require elaboration” (Kureishi, p. 86), that not only is pleasing to see, but has direct effects 
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on others: people fall in love with him, they are willing to pay in order to spend more time 
near his body, they want Adam as an accessory to show off (and this also points to the 
fact that they see him as a handsome, brainless toy-boy, bringing about further prejudices 
connected with physical appearance) but people are also jealous of him, because 
apparently he is “someone who had everything, and a future too. There was nothing I 
couldn’t do or be […]. They hated it and wanted it” (Kureishi, p. 79). In both stories, the 
creatures eventually end up suffering because of these visual assumptions: whether people 
want to look at them, or on the contrary refuse to do so, they both realize and acknowledge 
that their outer appearance does not match with their true, internal self, which is 
something that people cannot see with their eyes – and in fact it is not a case that old De 
Lacey’s blindness is a blessing for Frankenstein’s creature, who, for once in his lifetime, 
has the chance to feel listened to and to reclaim his non-monstrosity. 
 Moreover, I would suggest that in both novels visual images are constantly 
following the characters, even when their eyes are closed; in fact, a special kind of ‘vision’ 
that can be taken into account is the recurrent presence of dreams and nightmares that 
hunt them at night, when they are most vulnerable. In the case of Frankenstein this is not 
surprising: Mary Shelley herself, in her introduction to the 1931 edition of the novel, 
informed the readers that the idea for her book occurred to her during a sleepless night, 
when “[m]y imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the successive 
images that arose in my mind with a vividness far beyond the usual bounds of reverie”.305 
In a sort of waking dream, the gist of Frankenstein’s plot took life in front of her eyes: 
I saw the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he had put 
together. I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the 
working of some powerful engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, 
half-vital motion. Frightful must it be; for supremely frightful would be the 
effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism of the 
Creator of the world. His success would terrify the artist; he would rush away 
from his odious handiwork, horrorstricken.306 
Therefore, it is not surprising that dreams, and not necessarily pleasant ones, play an 
important role in the development of her novel307; dreams belong to those psychic states 
“where the ego relinquishes its leading role and makes way for unconscious content”,308 
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and in Shelley's novel there are at least three of these episodes that it is possible to identify. 
The first dream that appears in her story is the one Victor has right after his experiments 
succeeds; after fleeing at the sight of his monstrous creature, he runs to his room and falls 
asleep, but he is “disturbed by the wildest dreams”: 
I thought I saw Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets of 
Ingolstadt. Delighted and surprised, I embraced her, but as I imprinted the first 
kiss on her lips, they became livid with the hue of death; her features appeared 
to change, and I thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother in my arms; 
a shroud enveloped her form, and I saw the grave-worms crawling in the folds 
of the flannel. (Shelley, p. 56) 
This dream can be considered as a sort of premonition of Elizabeth’s death, which, in fact, 
will be caused by the creature who has just been given life, and whose sight provoked in 
Frankenstein the deep state of anxiety that led to this nightmare. The second dream 
Shelley describes is the one that follows the creature’s approach to and attempted meeting 
with the De Lacey’s family: “The horrible scene of the preceding day was forever acting 
before my eyes; the females were flying and the enraged Felix tearing me from his father's 
feet” (Shelley p. 137). After the creature is rejected once again by the human society, and 
particularly after this attempt – on which he had placed all his hopes – fails, the creature’s 
dream gives voice to the inner struggle that seizes him: in the dream (which is actually a 
recollection of past events), the creature witnesses once again the deprivation of female 
affection and fatherly love, which are both things he strives for throughout the novel and 
that are violently torn away from him by Felix, who in the dream takes the place of Victor. 
The third dream described in the novel is both a partial premonition of later events, 
namely Victor Frankenstein’s death at the end of the novel, and an account of his inner 
state at the moment of the dream: “I felt the fiend's grasp in my neck and could not free 
myself from it; groans and cries rang in my ears” (Shelley, p. 183). In fact, Victor is not 
suffocated by his creation in the epilogue but, although indirectly, it is the creature that 
causes his death. Instead, what Victor witnesses in his dream is an account of the last 
moments of life of both his little brother William and his friend Clerval, and since he is 
aware that it was the creature he had given life to that strangled both of them, it seems 
plausible that Frankenstein feels responsible for their death. In a similar way, dreams, 
visions and nightmares have the same kind of function also in Kureishi's novella: the first 
dream that Adam has, while he is still recovering from the operation, is set in a railway 
station: “In the dream, when I arrived at the station, everyone wanted to meet me; they 
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crowded around me, shaking my hand, touching, kissing and stroking me in 
congratulation” (Kureishi, p. 31). Since in his Oldbody Adam lamented that “[t]he older 
and sicker you get, the less your body is a fashion item, the less people want to touch you” 
(Kureishi, p. 34), this dream might be a hopeful anticipation of what he expects his new 
purchase will bring him: he has just embarked on his journey (hence the train station) and 
he predicts that in his new ‘facility’ many more people will want to surround him in order 
to be close to his body, and he anticipates the pleasure of being noticed, cherished and 
desired. Later on, he meets Patricia, the owner of the spiritual centre where he spends 
most of his adventures as a Newbody. Patricia regularly holds “dream workshops” that 
are particularly popular among the guests, during which they free-associate and provide 
interpretations of their night visions. Adam accepts to participate, but he is soon forced to 
run away, because the emotional load this experience raises in him is too much to stand – 
and in fact the the protagonist ironically remarks that Patricia's classes “were known more 
for the quantity of tears shed than for the quality of wisdom transmitted” (Kureishi, p. 70). 
Adam's dreams are obviously connected to the experiences he is living in his new body 
and, just like in Shelley's novel, they anticipate part of the future actions:   
I was to see my dead parents again, for a final conversation. When I met them 
– and they had their heads joined together at one ear, making one interrogative 
head – they failed to recognise me. I tried to explain how I had come to look 
different, but they were outraged by my claims to be myself. They turned away 
and walked into eternity before I could convince them – as if I ever could – of 
who I really was. (Kureishi, p. 72) 
Indeed, this seem to be an anticipation of the epilogue, in which Adam is stuck in a body 
that belongs to him just because he has paid for it, but that does not reflect who he really 
is and that forces him into a state of lonely isolation, in which he feels that he cannot 
either go back to his old life or move on as to start a new life all over again; indeed, he 
comes to feel condemned to eternal “unrecognisability”, since he cannot retrieve the 
affection of the people who met him and loved him in his old body. The third dream he 
has is connected to the surgery too, and it is the most anxiety-provoking, as well as the 
one in which Adam admits for the first time to be regretting his choice, because he dreams 
of 
a man in a white coat with a human brain in his hands, crossing a room 
between two bodies, each with its skull split open, on little hinges. As he 
carried the already rotting brain, it dripped. Bits of memory, desire, hope and 
love, encased in skin-like piping, fell onto the sawdust floor where hungry 
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dogs and cats lapped them up. (Kureishi, p. 72) 
Adam feels that, when he willingly agreed to undergo the surgery, he implicitly accepted 
to lose part of himself, his original essence. Accepting to let go of his decaying body, he 
assumed that he could bring with him the most important part of his self, and that what 
was contained in his brain was enough to recover his essence in his new facility. However, 
he overlooked the risk that he was letting go of his “embodied knowledge” as well, and 
he is eventually forced to acknowledge that “my old body and its suffering stood for the 
life I had made, the sum total of my achievement made flesh” (Kureishi, p. 62); when the 
animals in the dream devour the most intimate parts of his old self, he starts to 
acknowledge the risk that he might have forfeited his old life forever, and that going back 
might not be an option anymore. It is worth noting that the three characters who recall 
their dreams are all in such a peculiar state that they cannot confide their own secrets to 
anyone else but the readers: whether their loneliness is self-inflicted or imposed by others, 
they have no chance to unload the burden they feel within themselves, and the readers 
become their only confidents and listeners. 
 Indeed, loneliness and isolation are the feelings that linger on both texts, and I 
would like to point out how both authors give relevance to the name 'Adam', the name of 
the man who, according to the Bible, inhabited alone the Garden of Eden until God 
provided him with a companion to relieve his solitude. In Frankenstein, commentators 
argued that Mary Shelley provides a re-writing of the story narrated in the Genesis, “albeit 
mediated through John Milton’s Paradise Lost, and Victor’s scientific ambition to undo 
death and disease, the effects of the Fall, through his man made Adam and Eve”.309 In 
fact, the creature admits that: 
Like Adam, I was apparently united by no link to any other being in existence; 
but his state was far different from mine in every other respect. He had come 
forth from the hands of God a perfect creature, happy and prosperous, guarded 
by the especial care of his Creator; he was allowed to converse with and 
acquire knowledge from beings of a superior nature, but I was wretched, 
helpless, and alone. Many times I considered Satan as the fitter emblem of my 
condition, for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of my protectors, the 
bitter gall of envy rose within me. (Shelley, p. 129) 
The creature is portrayed as “a forsaken Adam whose tragedy we are to pity”310 and Victor, 
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in contrast, as an omnipotent but cruel and irresponsible creator, who sees himself as the 
father of a new species, but whose ambition overshadows the thought of what life will be 
like for that species. Moreover, the Creature’s fall from grace is “poignantly played to 
express the isolation, liminality, and melancholy associated with his patchwork 
monstrosity and engineered creation”311 and this seems to be the same destiny to which 
Kureishi's Adam is bound, when in the last sentence of the novella he claims that “I was 
a stranger on the earth, a nobody with nothing, belonging nowhere, a body alone, 
condemned to begin again, in the nightmare of eternal life” (Kureishi, p. 126); it has been 
noticed that the use of the words 'earth', 'condemned to begin' and 'eternal life' seem to be 
a direct reference to the story in the Genesis book: “Adam in the Bible was the first man 
on Earth, made of bones and flesh, destined to die; whereas [Kureishi's Adam] refuses to 
grow old and ends up immortal because he cannot recover his old body”.312 In the novella, 
the protagonist is posited as one of the first men in a new kind of society, he is “a walking 
laboratory, an experiment. [He is] beyond good and evil” (Kureishi, p. 40) but, in contrast 
to the first man described in the Bible, he has forsaken his innocence, his virtuousness 
and his nature to pursue his hedonistic yearning, and in doing so he has condemned 
himself to a lonely un-human existence for the eternity. In fact, none of the three men in 
the novels is relieved from his solitude by an Eve: Frankenstein denies his creature the 
pleasure of companionship when he refuses to comply with his request to make a female 
being, and the creature takes revenge on his creator by denying him the same love he feels 
he has been deprived of when he kills Elizabeth; Adam has a woman who loves him, but 
he realizes only too late that because of his actions he might have lost her forever. 
 Finally, I would like to point out two elements that stand out at the end of both 
novels, and that mark the last scenes in which the two creatures appear; these are the 
powerful element of fire and the action of escaping. Fire appears extensively throughout 
Shelley's novel and, in my view, it comes to symbolize both life and death: at the 
beginning of his narration, Victor Frankenstein explains that he was first made curious by 
nature when he beheld the power of a thunder that shredded a tree, turning it into ashes: 
I beheld a stream of fire issue from an old and beautiful oak which stood about 
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twenty yards from our house; and so soon as the dazzling light vanished, the 
oak had disappeared, and nothing remained but a blasted stump. When we 
visited it the next morning, we found the tree shattered in a singular manner. 
It was not splintered by the shock, but entirely reduced to thin ribbons of wood. 
I never beheld anything so utterly destroyed. (Shelley, p. 38) 
The experience is both shocking and mind-blowing for young Victor, that from that 
moment on directs his whole attention to his studies of natural philosophy, that will 
eventually lead him to “infuse a spark of being” into lifeless matter and create life. Fire 
also means cosiness and better nourishment for the creature when he first discovers it, but, 
when he sticks his hand into the naked flame, he understands that fire can also bring about 
pain and destruction; and this is exactly what he wants to take advantage of when, in a 
thrust of destructive revenge, he wants to pay the De Lacey family back for having given 
him false hope for sympathy. Even though they have already run off, the creature decides 
to burn their house down, as to remove anything that is connected to them: 
I lighted the dry branch of a tree and danced with fury around the devoted 
cottage […] and I waved my brand; it sank, and with a loud scream I fired the 
straw, and heath, and bushes, which I had collected. The wind fanned the fire, 
and the cottage was quickly enveloped by the flames, which clung to it and 
licked it with their forked and destroying tongues. (Shelley, p. 139) 
Finally, fire reappears in the promise of self-immolation that closes the novel: once he 
learns that his creator has died, the creature feels like there is no more purpose in his life, 
and announces Captain Walton and the readers that he is ready to commit suicide in a 
remote land among the ice of the Polar Circle. Although the reader does not witness this 
self-immolation, the creature's words are powerful and resolute: “I shall collect my 
funeral pile and consume to ashes this miserable frame, that its remains may afford no 
light to any curious and unhallowed wretch who would create such another as I have been. 
I shall die” (Shelley, p. 221). And he remarks his intentions once again right before 
jumping off Captain Walton's ship: “I shall ascend my funeral pile triumphantly and exult 
in the agony of the torturing flames. The light of that conflagration will fade away; my 
ashes will be swept into the sea by the winds. My spirit will sleep in peace, or if it thinks, 
it will not surely think thus. Farewell” (Shelley, p. 222). In the same way, fire is a powerful 
and ambivalent element also in Hanif Kureishi's novella: right after his operation, when 
he is still inebriated by the constant attention his new body grants him, fire is used as a 
metaphor of the ardour and passion that he feels are revived within himself: “[f]or the 
first time in years, my body felt sensual and full of intense yearning; I was inhabited by a 
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warm, inner fire, which nonetheless reached out to others – to anyone, almost. I had 
forgotten how inexorable and indiscriminate desire can be” (Kureishi, p. 48). But it is 
once again towards the end of the story that fire comes to represent death and destruction: 
expecting that Matte's henchmen will eventually hunt and catch him, Adam has to rely on 
the last valuable thing he owns, namely his new body, to grant himself a hope for salvation: 
“I didn’t believe they’d shoot me. The last thing they’d want to do was blow up my body” 
(Kureishi, p. 119). Taking advantage of the last option he is left with, he buys a can of 
petrol and soaks his whole body in it, and once his persecutors encircle him, he threatens 
them to fatally damage the thing they want more than anything else: “I held the lighter 
close to my chest. I didn’t know how much closer I could get it without turning into a 
bonfire. Still, rather self-immolation than the degradation which would otherwise be my 
fate. I’d go out with a bang, burning like a torch, screaming down the road” (Kureishi, p. 
126). Although neither of these self-destructive burnings actually take place in the two 
narratives, both creatures are willing to set fire to their body and delete any trace of their 
existence, but for different reasons: Frankenstein's creature feels like he has reached the 
end of his purposeless existence, he has strived for love and sympathy all his life but has 
never been given the chance to experience them, and he feels that this is all his wretched 
body's fault. On the other hand, Adam wants to live more but is willing to destroy his 
body rather than give it to his chasers: “I’m not handing my body over to anyone. I’m just 
settling in. We’re getting attached” (Kureishi, p. 99). Both narratives end with the two 
creatures running away from certain death towards an unclear future; the open ending of 
the two stories leaves the readers wondering if there is hope for the two of them to get an 
happy ending, but they can only witness as they are “borne away by the waves and lost 
in darkness and distance (Shelley, p. 222)”. 
 Although I have concluded the first part of this chapter dealing with the end of the 
two novels and, ideally, the “literary death” of the two creatures, in the next few pages I 
will to move back to the moment of their birth, in order to retrace the ways in which their 
un-human bodies contributed to the formation (or reconceptualisation) of their identity. 
 
4.2 - TWO NEWBORNS IN FRONT OF THE MIRROR: LACAN AND THE “WHAT 
WAS I?” QUESTION 
A theory-loving friend of mine has an idea that the notion of the self, of the 
separate, self-conscious individual, and of any auto-biography which that self 
might tell or write, developed around the same time as the invention of the 
 107 
mirror, first made en masse in Venice in the early sixteenth century. When 
people could consider their own faces, expressions of emotions and bodies for 
a sustained period, they could wonder who they were and how they were 
different from and similar to others. […] According to my friend, if a creature 
can't see himself, he can't mature. He can't see where he ends and others begin. 
This process can be aided by hanging a mirror in an animal's cage. (Kureishi, 
p. 28) 
Moving along the literary features that I have decided to analyse and compare with regard 
to Shelley's and Kureishi's novels, I would like now to take into account the early life 
experiences their creatures live soon after the peculiar surgeries that give them life are 
carried out with success. As I have claimed in the previous chapters of this thesis, not 
only do the two subjects share the same kind of unnatural conception, but shortly after 
their ‘birth’, they are either abandoned (as in the case of Shelley) or let free to explore 
and live (as in the case of Kureishi) by the men who gave them life. Of course, right after 
their birth they don’t live the same kind of childhood experiences: Adam intentionally 
underwent the “body-swapping” procedure, and he is immediately ready to enjoy his 
long-yearned renewed agility and flexibility provided by his new body: “I sat lay down, 
jumped up and down, touched myself, wiggled my fingers and toes, shook my arms and 
legs and, finally, placed my head carefully on the floor before kicking myself up and 
standing on it – something I hadn't done for twenty- five years. There was a lot to take in” 
(Kureishi, pp. 28-29). In fact, Adam is not a newborn in the strict sense of the term, 
because he has already been a child once, he had parents who helped him to grow up and 
develop into an adult man and therefore he already knows how to ‘use’ a body and behave 
among other people; in short, he can skip the process of early development that children 
normally go through during the early stages of their life and he just needs to learn how to 
cope with the unfamiliar bulkiness of his new body, because, as he soon notices, “[m]y 
feet were an unnecessary distance from my waist. […] I'd never been unfamiliar with the 
dimensions of my own body before” (Kureishi, p. 40). However, it doesn't take him long 
before he gets familiar with and confident in it, and shortly after he is free to venture into 
the world, in order to make the most out of his new facility. 
 Instead, when listening to Frankenstein’s creature's recollection of his first days 
of life, readers are faced with a genuine account of an adult body experiencing the world 
for the first time. Just like a child, the creature gradually gets to know the world that 
surrounds him, the bodily needs he has to learn how to quench, the ways in which his 
body and the world are in mutual connection and how he can use one to cope with the 
other. However, if a child usually has parental figures who accompany him/her through 
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this journey of gradual discovery, from the beginning of his life the creature is left to his 
own, abandoned by his father and forced to quickly learn how to survive in a foreign 
environment, relying on his own senses alone: 
It is with considerable difficulty that I remember the original era of my being; 
all the events of that period appear confused and indistinct. A strange 
multiplicity of sensations seized me, and I saw, felt, heard, and smelt at the 
same time; and it was, indeed, a long time before I learned to distinguish 
between the operations of my various senses. By degrees, I remember, a 
stronger light pressed upon my nerves, so that I was obliged to shut my eyes. 
Darkness then came over me and troubled me, but hardly had I felt this when, 
by opening my eyes, as I now suppose, the light poured in upon me again. I 
walked and, I believe, descended, but I presently found a great alteration in 
my sensations. […] I lay by the side of a brook resting from my fatigue, until 
I felt tormented by hunger and thirst. This roused me from my nearly dormant 
state, and I ate some berries which I found hanging on the trees or lying on the 
ground. I slaked my thirst at the brook, and then lying down, was overcome 
by sleep. (Shelley, p. 102) 
However, among the many peculiar experiences that both Shelley’s and Kureishi’s 
creatures undergo early on in their new, fragmented bodies, the one that I would like to 
concentrate on in the next few pages is the inner mutation and development they go 
through when, for the first time, they find themselves face-to-face with their own reflected 
image. According to the French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, this first 
encounter signals the inception of the process of formation of one's self: between six and 
eighteen months of age, when children see their reflection and recognize themselves in it, 
Lacan claims that they enter in the so-called “mirror stage” and they begin to understand 
themselves as unified beings, separate from the rest of the world. This identification is 
“the donning of an identity, an 'armor' against the chaotic or fragmentary body”313 and it 
is therefore “contingent on the repression of the earliest experience of the body, which is 
of the body as fragmented. Moreover, this process of repression generates the 
‘hallucination’ of the self as corresponding to a whole and coherent body”.314 Although 
neither of the two characters in the novels is a child in the strict sense of the word, and 
even though the readers do not witness, using Lacan's words, “the striking spectacle of a 
nursling in front of a mirror who has not yet mastered walking, or even standing but who 
[…] overcomes, in a flutter of jubilant activity, the constraints of his prop in order to adopt 
                                               
313 L. J. Davis (2005), “Visualizing the Disabled Body: The Classical Nude and the Fragmented Torso”. In 
M. Fraser, M. Greco (eds.) (2005), The Body: a Reader, cit., pp.167-181, p. 173. 
314 M. Fraser, M. Greco (2005), “Normal Bodies (or not)”. In M. Fraser, M. Greco (eds.) (2005), The Body: 
a Reader, cit., pp. 145-150, p. 147. 
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a slightly leaning-forward position and take in an instantaneous view of the image in order 
to fix it in his mind”,315 in the next few pages I would like to make use of Lacan’s 
development of his mirror-stage theory as to explore the different ways in which the 
creatures described in the two novels learn to identify themselves with (but, as in the case 
of Frankenstein's creature, not necessarily come to accept) their reflected image. 
 At the beginning of his essay The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as 
Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience, Lacan claims that, when children recognize 
themselves in a mirror, they are drawn to carry out a “series of gestures in which [they] 
playfully experiences the relationship between the movements made in the image and the 
reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates - 
namely, the child’s own body, and the persons and even things around him”.316 This is 
exactly what Kureishi’s Adam does: bewildered by the fact that the operation actually 
worked, “I continued to examine myself in the mirror, stepping forwards and backwards, 
examining my hairy arms and legs, turning my head here and there, opening and closing 
my mouth, looking at my good teeth and wide, clean tongue, smiling and frowning, trying 
different expressions” (Kureishi, p. 35). What Kureishi describes is the satisfying 
experience of a man who, for the first time after many years, manages to look in a mirror 
and finally sees an image that suits his own vision of selfhood: that of a muscular, sexy 
young man ready to enjoy the best life has to offer and challenge himself with new, 
exciting experiences. Of course this is paradoxical, because for the first time in over 60 
years Adam looks in a mirror and sees a face and a body that really have nothing to do 
with who he is, with the person he has been all his life; instead, just as if he was in a 
boutique’s changing room, he enjoys his new purchase and is pleased by the expectation 
of all the good things that he anticipates will come out of it. 
 On the other hand, Frankenstein’s creature’s first glimpse in the water pool that 
reflects his image is anything but a positive experience, because “[i]n a grim variation on 
the Narcissus myth, the creature beholds his reflection […] and is terrified, the inimical 
image contradicting, if not nullifying, his nascent sense of a benevolent self”.317 In the 
few episodes when he came across human beings, the creature experienced vexations and 
                                               
315 J. Lacan, B. Fink (trans.) (2006), “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience”. In J. Lacan, B. Fink (trans.) (2006) Écrits: The First Complete Edition in 
English. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 75-81, pp. 75-76. 
316 Idem, p. 75. 
317 B. Wyse (2018), “'The Human Senses Are Insurmountable Barriers': Deformity, Sympathy and Monster 
Love in Three Variations on Frankenstein”. In C. M. Davidson, M. Mulvey-Roberts (eds.) (2018), 
Global Frankenstein. Studies in Global Science Fiction, cit., pp. 75-90, p. 77. 
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rejection, but until the moment he meets his reflection he cannot understand the reasons 
of the negative reactions he aroused. Therefore, instead of falling in love with himself, 
which is something that happens both to Narcissus and Kureishi's Adam, the creature is 
terrified by what he sees in that water pool, he is unable to accept that what he is staring 
at really is what others see when they look at him, and immediately develops a feeling of 
hatred towards his image and himself: 
I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers – their grace, beauty, and 
delicate complexions; but how was I terrified when I viewed myself in a 
transparent pool! At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I 
who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was 
in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of 
despondence and mortification. Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal 
effects of this miserable deformity. (Shelley, pp. 113-114) 
 Indeed, the traumatic event that the creature experiences the first time he sees 
himself in that water pool will unforgettably affect him for the rest of his life. In fact, 
Felice Cimatti claims that “Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus is a Lacanian novel; 
it is the novel about what happens when the ‘mirror stage’ does not succeed”,318 and once 
again he claims that it is Victor Frankenstein who must be blamed for this, in that it was 
his rejection of his own, infant child that precluded his creature the formation of his own 
identity and, as a consequence of this, it was the pitiless father who condemned him to a 
life burdened by a never-ending struggle to be accepted. Not only does Cimatti observe 
that, in the traditional development of the 'mirror-stage', “there is always a third party 
between the infant and the mirror: an adult […] who ensures the infant what she is seeing 
is her own image”, but he also remarks that “in the ‘mirror stage’ the child recognizes 
herself in the mirror only if the adult who holds her smiles at her”.319 Therefore, parental 
approval is a decisive aspect in the process of self-recognition, but since Victor 
Frankenstein categorically refuses to support, help and love his child, this is condemned 
to solitude and perpetual lack of identity. Of course, the creature tries to overcome his 
fate, reaching out for sympathy and looking out for substitute parental models in the De 
Lacey family: “When I slept, or was absent, the forms of the venerable blind father, the 
gentle Agatha, and the excellent Felix, flitted before me. I looked upon them as superior 
beings, who would be the arbiters of my future destiny” (Shelley, pp. 114-115), however 
                                               
318 F. Cimatti (2016), “Frankenstein on Language and Becoming (Post)Human”. Ecozon@: European 
Journal of Literature, Culture and Environment, vol. 7, n. 1 (2016), pp. 10-27, p. 13. 
319 Ibidem. 
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they refuse to take responsibility for his 'upbringing', because they cannot overcome the 
fear induced by his monstrous body and, just like any other character in the novel, they 
“assume that his outer appearance is a valid index to his inner nature”.320 And if at first 
the creature is “unable to believe” that the monstrous figure he sees in the pond is indeed 
himself, over time he is forced to convince himself that he actually is that monster, 
gradually internalizing the hatred and abuse he is continually subjected to. In my view, 
this is in line with what Owen Hewitson said commenting Lacan’s Mirror Stage as 
Formative of the I Function: according to him, Lacan’s theory is often misinterpreted, in 
that many assume that “once we have passed through the mirror stage we emerge at the 
other end with an ego”. 321  Instead, he claims that Lacan is very careful with his 
pronouncements on the subject, and warns the readers that this is not an immediate 
passage; in fact, “[Lacan] says that the mirror stage reveals the relation of the child to his 
image, and that the image is the Urbild or prototype of the ego”.322 But the crucial passage, 
the creation of the actual ego, takes place at “the time at which the specular I turns into 
the social I”,323 meaning that it is neither the mirror as such, our own reflected image or 
the mirror-stage people get their ego from; instead, the process is completed when they 
finally manage to experience the social world, because “the mirror stage terminates when 
you stop looking at the reflection in the mirror and start looking at other people, your 
fellow beings”.324 Therefore, the creature's mirror-stage is bound to remain permanently 
incomplete, in that he has no reference “fellow beings” to identify himself with and 
separate himself from, and this is why he is eventually forced to admit that “I was 
dependent on none, and related to none. […] My person was hideous, and my stature 
gigantic: what did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was 
my destination? These questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them” 
(Shelley, p. 128). His healthy, intelligent mind is unable to accept to be trapped within a 
deformed, monstrous body, that is what the creature eventually understands to be the 
constraint that prevents him to live a full, satisfying social life: the creature's tragedy is 
that “he is forced […] to accept the opinion of the only beings he has ever known and 
                                               
320 A. K. Mellor (2003), “Making a 'Monster': an Introduction to Frankenstein”, cit., p. 20. 
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322 Idem. 
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they all think that he is hideously ugly; in short, he is doomed to see himself as others see 
him”,325 and since everyone in the novel is prone to associate his ugliness with a wretched 
moral state, “[b]y consistently seeing the Creature as evil, the characters in the novel force 
him to become evil”.326 
 The social implications offered (or denied) by one's body and the ways in which 
these influence one's assessment of their own identity are obviously at the centre of Hanif 
Kureishi's novella too; the writer has often manifested his interest in philosophy and 
psychoanalysis, and early on in The Body the protagonist casually mentions that “I am a 
cheap drunk. A few glasses and I can understand Lacan” (Kureishi, p. 4). In my view, this 
could be a warning for his readers: Kureishi might want to state that Lacan's theories – 
and among them those regarding body-image and identity in particular – have influenced 
his own belief that “identity and the self are totally fluid concepts – that they are 
determined by our relationships with others” and, as a consequence of this, “[i]f acquiring 
a new body might change the way others perceive and interact with you [...], it will change 
your self in some ‘essentialʼ way”.327 Many critics have observed that the idea of identity 
as a “constructed, multiply-determined, mixed, provisional and relational” entity that 
“emerges from a process of negotiation with the characters who surround one”328 has long 
been at the centre of Kureishi's writing, and that in The Body he just claims once again 
that the concept of identity is deeply rooted in our physical being and connected with the 
social experiences that arise out of it. Kureishi sees identity as “performative and as 
subject to active negotiation”,329 and his works often describe a complex interplay of 
many cultural factors that keep re-shaping it. According to him: 
There aren't any formed identities, any finally formed identities. There isn't a 
day when you're there, when you're made. It keeps on going, you keep on 
engaging with your past in new ways all the time, over and over. […] So I 
don't believe that there is a final resting place in terms of identity; it's a 
continuous process. I mean here I am, a man nearly fifty, and I'm thinking 
about how in the next twenty years I'm going to die, and who I'm going to 
identify with as an older man. I'm going to read and think and look at other 
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old guys, and find an identity out of all these bits and pieces.330 
By way of conclusion, I would like to summarize the two main points that I have tried to 
carry out in this thesis. Firstly, that in both novels the action is born out of feelings of fear 
and anxiety connected with human corporeality: ageing, physical decay and death are 
features congenital to all human beings, but both Victor Frankenstein and the old Adam 
are unwilling to accept this fact. Indeed, they both resort to the means offered by science 
and technology to try and dominate the natural life process and, at first, they apparently 
succeed in their objectives. However, they are soon bound to learn that meddling with 
nature without considering in advance the possible negative outcomes of one’s actions is 
a high risk, and even though in the beginning they both seem to have reached their long-
yearned goals, cheating nature and gaining control over death and ageing, they later have 
to acknowledge that such selfish actions have a tremendous cost and do not, ultimately, 
provide them with the originally desired result. 
 Secondly, the surgeries performed in the two novels both give birth to un-human 
creatures; these are both the product of laboratory experiments that involve the 
assemblage of different body parts, that are reanimated and brought back to life. However, 
their life experiences and the perception readers have when approaching the stories of the 
two creatures are quite diverse: on the one hand, Adam seems to be blessed by the 
rejuvenating process, but both the fact that his new life necessarily requires inhabiting the 
body of a dead ‘donor’, and the fact that he is prone to discard his own body expecting 
that there will be no consequences, make him a negative character who is bound to get 
punished: the experiment he willingly accepts to take part in advances the idea of a future 
society in which bodies will be considered as mere vehicles that can be discarded and 
replaced when no longer useful, but this implies that new bodies will need to be made 
constantly available, eliminating the subject who inhabits that body in order to make room 
for a new one. Kureishi brings about a dystopic vision of a future in which the wealthy 
and powerful can keep on living to the detriment of the ‘dregs of society’, who are 
exploited in new, inhumane ways. Moreover, the writer describes how Adam and the other 
body-buyers assume that their brain, “though material, behaves like the traditional 
immaterial and immortal soul—maturing but not aging, and insuring the personality’s 
survival after death”331 and that, on the contrary, their decaying physical body is not 
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involved in the definition of personal identity. However, as the protagonist eventually 
comes to understand, the body’s role is not simply that of a brain’s repository, but it is a 
person’s interface with the outer world, which necessarily shapes that person’s view on 
the world surrounding him/her and, and the same time, determines how the world sees 
and evaluates that subject. In fact, this is the central proposition that I have taken into 
consideration in the analysis of both novels: the two creatures’ life experiences are 
fundamentally determined by the peculiar bodies they 'wear' and that (both in Kureishi's 
contemporary 21st century society, as well as in the 19th century one in which Shelley’s 
creature lives) are the first thing that people who meet them use to interpret how they are 
in terms of personality: if on the one hand Adam manages to escape from the apathetic 
life that he feels his old body had condemned him to, and after the surgery his new body 
becomes the enabling tool that rekindles the zest for life he had long set aside (before he 
realizes that he has willingly condemned himself to live in a foreign body and witness his 
old life as an external spectator), Frankenstein's creature's life is doomed to be spent in a 
state of imposed loneliness that cannot give him any hope for the future, because although 
the reader perceives that he is a good-natured and sympathetic being, those who judge 
him using their eyes cannot overcome the terrifying and repulsive feelings his monstrous 
body generates in them. But as distinct from Adam, Frankenstein's creature never asked 
to be brought to life, he never had the chance to choose his body, and he is repeatedly 
denied the only thing he ever asked for: love and affection. 
 To conclude, putting at the centre of their narrations two non-human characters 
that are also the narrators of their own stories, both authors question the stability of the 
concept of “human”, pushing their readers to consider whether the technologically-
mediated lives of their not-fully-human characters should be afforded the same kind of 
dignity and respect as any other human subject. This is the same kind of philosophical 
question that lies at the heart of posthumanism, that tries to de-privilege the traditional 
hierarchical status of the humanist subject: even though posthumanism does not mean to 
reject the humanist traditions of the past, it proposes a “reconceptualization of selfhood 
and social relations”332 that seems to be more appropriate to describe the lives and modes 
of relations of the (post-)humans who live in the 21st century: “Humanist 
conceptualisations of selfhood as coherent, stable and individualistic are ill-suited to life 
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in the new millennium”,333 in which computers are increasingly part of people’s lives, 
advances in medicine and biotechnology allow diseased or malfunctioning body parts to 
be replaced with genetically engineered or mechanical substitutes and the increasing 
popularity of online social media is shifting the way most people who live in first-world 
countries conceive their own self and social relations too. With this in mind, what both 
Shelley’s prescient novel and Kureishi’s (not too) futuristic novella seem to advocate for 
is an ethical development of science and technology that will not create further hierarchies 
and new subaltern classes among individuals but, in a hopeful and positive view of the 
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Lo scopo di questa tesi è proporre un’analisi e un confronto fra due opere di genere 
fantascientifico che, sebbene siano state scritte in epoche diverse e da due autori che poco 
sembrano avere a che fare l’uno con l’altra, sono accumunate da un numero notevole di 
caratteristiche letterarie; tanto da far supporre che, nello scrivere la più recente delle due, 
l'autore possa essersi ispirato alla prima e, con la volontà di rendere omaggio ad un opera 
così rilevante per la storia della letteratura, ne abbia voluto proporre una riscrittura in 
chiave contemporanea. 
 La prima delle due opere che ho preso in considerazione per lo sviluppo di questa 
tesi è il romanzo che viene comunemente considerato come l’iniziatore del genere 
letterario della fantascienza: pubblicato da Mary Shelley nel 1818, “Frankenstein” è stata 
l’opera che per prima ha affrontato il tema dell’ingerenza della scienza e della tecnologia 
sul corpo umano; in un'epoca in cui questi nuovi campi del sapere stavano fiorendo, 
Shelley scrisse un romanzo che ancora oggi spinge i suoi lettori a riflettere sulle 
conseguenze del progresso scientifico incontrollato. Ispirandosi al mito di Prometeo e 
intersecando fantascienza e atmosfere gotiche, Mary Shelley diede vita ad un nuovo 
genere letterario grazie al suo avveniristico romanzo, in cui Victor Frankenstein, il 
moderno Prometeo divenuto oggi l'emblema dello “scienziato pazzo”, deciso a superare 
i limiti imposti dalla natura si sostituisce a Dio, imponendosi come creatore di una nuova 
specie. Il risultato del suo avventato esperimento è una creatura dall'aspetto mostruoso 
che, a causa dei sentimenti di terrore e spavento che la sua vista provoca in Frankenstein 
stesso e negli altri esseri umani che egli incontra, diventa un reietto della società. Pur non 
volendo criticare il progresso tecnoscientifico in sé, da cui Mary Shelley stessa, nei suoi 
scritti dell'epoca, ammetteva di essere incuriosita e affascinata, in “Frankenstein” essa 
riuscì a condensare i timori intrinseci nell’uso sconsiderato delle nuove possibilità che il 
progresso scientifico stava favorendo, portando ad esiti non sempre prevedibili. La 
smania di conoscenza e l'ambizione dell'uomo ricevono nel romanzo un severo monito, 
poiché non sempre l'uomo è in grado di prevedere e controllare le conseguenze delle 
proprie scoperte. Questo tema è talmente attuale che il romanzo potrebbe essere stato 
scritto oggi come risposta agli interrogativi sul rapporto tra scienza ed etica, e non è 
dunque un caso se, due secoli dopo la pubblicazione del romanzo, i personaggi creati 
dalla penna di Shelley godono ancora di buona salute. 
 Il timore che deriva dall’uso improprio dei mezzi tecnologici è ancora vivo ai 
giorni nostri e nella mia tesi voglio proporre il confronto di questo classico della 
letteratura con il romanzo breve pubblicato dallo scrittore inglese Hanif Kureishi nel 2002, 
il cui titolo, “Il Corpo”, già identifica l’oggetto centrale della narrazione: se Mary Shelley 
per prima aveva permesso al suo protagonista di infondere nuovamente la vita ad un 
cadavere con l’unico scopo di diventare egli stesso padrone delle leggi della natura, 
all’alba del ventunesimo secolo lo stesso esperimento viene ripetuto con successo, ma 
con uno scopo ben diverso. Kureishi riprende il tema delle biotecnologie iniziato da 
Shelley due secoli prima, ma aggiunge a questo un altro grande tema sociale che 
caratterizza il mondo occidentale contemporaneo: il consumismo imperante diffuso dai 
mass media, che alimentano le insicurezze legate all'aspetto fisico dei compratori per 
trarne il massimo profitto. Kureishi ambienta la sua narrazione in una società in cui la 
compravendita di beni è portata agli estremi, tanto che dei facoltosi acquirenti possono 
permettersi di acquistare dei corpi nuovi, giovani e in buona salute, in cui hanno la 
possibilità di “trasferirsi” grazie ad un pionieristico (e molto costoso) trapianto di cervello 
da un corpo ad un altro. Nella società distopica creata da Kureishi, i corpi umani, una 
volta “svuotati” dal precedente proprietario, diventano accessori di lusso che possono 
essere indossati ed acquistati, e la loro compravendita alimenta un giro d'affari in cui 
uomini senza scrupoli sono pronti a gettarsi a capofitto. 
 Il quadro di riferimento teorico che ho scelto di utilizzare per analizzare le due 
opere è quello sviluppato attorno alle teorie del “postumano”, un concetto che, pur 
presentando molte articolazione, pone l’attenzione sul rapporto tra uomo e  tecnoscienza 
che caratterizza l’epoca attuale, e in particolare sulle straordinarie potenzialità della 
scienza e della tecnica che oggigiorno sono in grado di modificare l’organismo umano, 
integrandolo con apparati tecnologici che vengono ormai considerati normali 
complementi del corpo umano (dalle lenti a contatto alle protesi, dal pacemaker agli 
apparecchi acustici), creando di fatto un essere ibrido, non più necessariamente e 
interamente organico, un cyborg che trascende i tradizionali limiti umani e che mette in 
discussione una serie di dicotomie che hanno caratterizzato l’identità unitaria dell’uomo 
a partire dall’Umanesimo. Infatti, se nella loro componente futurologica le teorie del 
postumano speculano sulla possibilità di utilizzare le tecnologie per perfezionare l'essere 
umano e superarne i naturali limiti biologici, quali la malattia, l'invecchiamento e, 
ovviamente, la morte, nella sua componente filosofica il postumanesimo propone un 
ripensamento radicale del soggetto liberale e della tradizione umanistica occidentale. Al 
centro di questo ripensamento vi è innanzitutto il superamento della centralità che 
l’Umanesimo ha attribuito all'essere umano, riconoscendo invece che esso è in constante 
relazione sia con gli organismi non-umani che popolano il pianeta, sia con gli utensili e i 
macchinari di cui si serve per fare esperienza del mondo e, dunque, per adattarsi ad esso. 
L'antropocentrismo umanista viene dunque contestato dal postumanesimo e, insieme ad 
esso, vengono rigettati tutta una serie di dualismi statici, proponendo invece una visione 
dell'identità umana caratterizzata da plasticità, molteplicità e relazioni dinamiche. 
 Il motivo per cui ritengo adeguato utilizzare queste teorie contemporanee per 
proporre un'analisi dei due testi letterari che ho preso in considerazione è che, 
riconoscendo il contributo della scienza e della tecnologia nello sviluppo della vita umana 
sulla terra, le teorie del postumano mettono al centro delle proprie discussioni le ricadute 
etiche, sociali e socio-economiche che queste comportano, criticando invece lo scarso 
interesse che il mondo della scienza sembra talvolta dimostrare per questi temi. Allo 
stesso modo, con la volontà di creare un dibattito proficuo e un dialogo tra il mondo delle 
discipline scientifiche e quello delle discipline umanistiche, all'inizio del diciannovesimo 
secolo Mary Shelley consegnò ai propri lettori un romanzo che, ancora oggi, li obbliga a 
riflettere sulle ripercussioni degli esperimenti scientifici e sulle conseguenze di un 
progresso avventato che non tiene in considerazione gli aspetti sociali che questi possono 
avere. Due secoli più tardi, Hanif Kureishi si rivolge ai propri lettori, ponendoli di fronte 
agli stessi interrogativi, con la consapevolezza che oggi più che mai il progresso 
scientifico è ad un passo dalla creazione di nuovi “mostri”. 
